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Abstract 
Cyber crime is a significant threat to modern society that will continue to grow as 
technology is integrated further into our lives. Cyber attackers can exploit 
vulnerabilities to access computing systems and propagate malware. Of growing 
concern is the use of multiple exploits across layers of the software stack, plus faster 
criminal response times to newly disclosed vulnerabilities creating surges in attacks 
before signature-based malware protection can take effect. The wide scale adoption 
of few software systems fuels the problem, allowing identical vulnerabilities to be 
exploited across networks to maximise infection in a single attack. This requires new 
perspectives to tackle the threat. Biodiversity is critical in the functioning of healthy 
ecosystems. Whilst the idea of diversity benefiting computer security is not new, 
there are still gaps in understanding its advantages. 
A mathematical and an agent-based model have been developed using the 
ecosystem as a framework. Biodiversity is generated by individualised software 
stacks defined as genotypes with multiple loci. The models allow the protection 
offered by diversity to be quantified for ad hoc networks which are expected to 
become prevalent in the future by specifying how much diversity is needed to 
tolerate or mitigate two abstract representations of malware encompassing different 
ways multiple exploits target software stack layers. Outputs include the key 
components of ecosystem stability: resistance and resilience. Results show that 
diversity by itself can reduce susceptibility, increase resistance, and increase the 
time taken for malware to spread, thereby allowing networks to tolerate malware 
and maintain Quality of Service. When dynamic diversity is used as part of a multi-
layered defence strategy with additional mechanisms such as blacklisting, 
virtualisation, and recovery through patching and signature based protection, 
diversity becomes more effective since the power of dynamic software updating can 
be utilised to mitigate attacks whilst maintaining network operations. 
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1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the motivation, hypothesis, research contributions, and 
structure for the work presented within this thesis. The motivation and rationale 
behind the consideration of biodiversity in the context of cyber security stems from 
both a) the impact that wide-scale cyber attacks such as those caused by malware 
can have when systems use the same non-diverse software or underlying 
technology, and b) the benefit biodiversity can have within a natural ecosystem in 
providing resistance against attack from disease and pests.  
Included is an introduction to the concept of biodiversity for cyber security through 
several motivating factors. These include an ever-changing cyber threat landscape 
fuelled by advancements in technology, risks associated with computing 
monocultures, and the range of benefits provided by biodiversity within natural 
systems. Gaps in current research knowledge are highlighted together with an 
emphasis on wireless mobile computing such as ad hoc networks which are 
predicted to become more prevalent in the future. Understanding the benefits and 
mechanisms of biodiversity underlying natural systems and applying them to this 
digital wireless domain may enhance cyber security against such malware attacks. 
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1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 The Changing Cyber Threat Landscape 
One of the biggest security problems modern society currently faces is the 
growing threat from cyber attacks. Cybercrime is estimated to cost the global 
economy US$575 billion annually [4], and maintaining an adequate level of security 
is a co-evolving process between improved defensive techniques and ever more 
sophisticated attack methods. Advancements in technology fuel this process but 
also simultaneously change the threat landscape. The world purchased more than 
1.4 billion smartphones in 2015 [5] and it is predicted there will be 50 to 200 billion 
total connected devices by 2020 [6] [7] [8]. This has the potential for them to be 
integrated into every aspect of our lives creating an attractive target for online 
criminals. Cyber attackers exploit vulnerabilities within the software, firmware or 
underlying fabric of the devices, as well as the user to gain access to important data, 
deny the use of services, spy, control systems, spread viruses, and sometimes cause 
irreversible damage.  Worryingly it has been estimated that up to 70% of attacks go 
undetected [4]. Most software programs have vulnerabilities and since it is difficult 
to remove all vulnerabilities, the problem is likely to become worse as the use of 
wireless supported mobile computing and the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to 
grow and change the threat landscape. 
1.1.2 The Risks of Computing Monocultures 
The increased use of computing devices and wide scale adoption of few 
operating systems (OS) and common protocols continues to pose a significant 
threat. Computing monocultures refers to the widespread use of the same 
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hardware, firmware, or software. Although different patching habits of individuals 
can create some level of diversity between devices using the same firmware or 
software, the diversity is restricted to the locality and functionality of the patch. 
Similarly different versions of the same software, for example different versions of 
operating systems, may utilise much of the same underlying libraries. Therefore 
large commonality of code described in this way adds to the monoculture 
argument. For example of the 1.4 billion smartphones purchased in 2015 98 percent 
were dominated by two operating systems: five out of six ran the Android OS, and 
one in seven ran “ppleȂs iOS [5]. This made Android devices the most targeted by 
attackers [9] [10] [5], a trend that has been on-going for several years [11]. A similar 
scenario is seen with desktop personal computers (PCs) where Microsoft Windows 
dominates the OS market, and it is predicted that over the next five years leading-
edge IoT devices will experience the same scenario [7]. Having a small number of 
different operating systems or application software is more economically efficient 
because of the ease of maintenance and compatibility. It also has greater user appeal 
because of the need to learn only a few different types of applications and systems. 
However, much effort is spent protecting the resultant computer networks from 
attacks and malware, which in some cases can spread to a large number of devices 
in a matter of minutes [12] [13]. In ŘŖŗś Symantec reported that ȃ“ttackers “re 
Moving Faster, Defenses “re NotȄ [14] in response to attackers exploiting zero-day 
(publically unknown) vulnerabilities much faster than vendors could create and roll 
out patches. Patch times can range from a day [5] to several months [14], however 
even generating patches within a few hours may not be fast enough to stop the short 
term spread. Additionally, it has been reported that zero-day attacks can last up to 
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30 months before the vulnerability is even disclosed [15]. The number of new mobile 
vulnerabilities being discovered is increasing every year, with the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database reported that vulnerabilities with 
Android in 2016 were estimated to be twice that of 2015 (131) [16]. Current security 
solutions for mobile devices remain limited in their ability to protect, particularly 
against zero-day attacks, with manufacturers being slow to address fundamental 
security issues for IoT devices. Additionally it is predicted that over the next five 
years attackers will not just be targeting applications and operating systems but will 
look for additional vulnerabilities at layers lower down the software stack 
independent of operating systems [7] such as low level drivers and protocols. The 
use of multiple exploits (code or data directed at a specific vulnerability) across 
layers of the software stack will pose a significant threat, especially if they are 
targeting zero-day vulnerabilities. The 2010 Stuxnet worm for example is known to 
have used four separate zero-day exploits [17]. 
The risk associated with software monocultures has long been recognised within 
the computing industry [18] [19], however the physical technology and 
infrastructure to produce, and maintain alternative versions of software is only now 
becoming possible [20]. As the number of devices and vulnerabilities grow, 
traditional security methods will become less effective. To keep up with the 
sophistication of attack methods there will need to be greater automation of 
defences and new paradigms of defence mechanisms including those to alleviate the 
monoculture risks. 
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1.1.3 Agricultural Monocultures and Biodiversity within 
Natural Systems 
The risks of monocultures are well known within the agricultural industry which 
has experienced the resultant problems first hand. A single species is often selected 
for its productivity or disease resistance properties and is grown over a large area 
for economic efficiency [21]. But this efficiency creates risks: Land cultivated in this 
way removes the naturally diverse communities, reduces the soil quality, and 
results in the need for fertilizers to protect crops from pests and diseases. 
The range of plants, animals, insects and other organisms living within an 
ecosystem is termed biodiversity. Biodiversity is linked to the stability and 
productivity of ecosystems buffering them from pest invasions, disease epidemics 
and extreme environmental events [22]. Biodiversity is also critical to the 
functioning of such ecosystems and the services they provide. The  agricultural 
industry is now becoming more appreciative of the essential benefits biodiversity 
brings and is slowly changing its habits through modernisation of traditional 
methods such as crop diversification and crop rotation [23] to help reduce 
infestations of pests in the soil. The benefit of biodiversity has also been evinced in 
other areas of natural systems. It has been shown to reduce the spread of diseases 
between animals such as Lyme disease [24], and the hantavirus affecting deer mice 
[25]. High levels of biodiversity have also been found to increase resistance against 
extreme climate events, which are now becoming more frequent world-wide [26] 
[27]. 
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1.2 Hypothesis 
The intuition that diversity might be desirable has existed within the security 
profession for many years. In the 1970s N-version programming [28] was proposed 
within the field of fault tolerance to increase the reliability of systems that used 
software. It was known that identical software running on independent systems 
would fail in exactly the same way with the same inputs. Interest in this approach as 
a security mechanism grew as computers became ubiquitous, attacks became more 
common, and the risks of a software monoculture was acknowledged [19] [18]. A 
biological perspective on diversity as a security mechanism however has largely 
been overlooked and requires an understanding of ecological processes and 
interactions, and their effects on the system [29]. Current research is mainly focused 
at point solutions for creating diverse software [30] [31] [32] [33] [34], although there 
has been some work on creating diverse networks [35] [36] [37] and measuring 
diversity within networks [38] [39] [40]. Despite the recently growing research in 
this area there is still a large gap in understanding the actual benefits of diversity as 
a security mechanism, particularly from an ecological perspective, even whilst 
evidence surrounding the benefits of biodiversity in natural systems is continuously 
growing. 
It is expected that peer-to-peer wireless networks such as ad hoc networks will 
become more mainstream than they are currently. This drive will be as a result of 
billions more connected devices such as through the evolving IoT [8], and 
developing protocols such as fifth generation (5G), which supports direct device to 
device communication [41]. Such topologies are decentralised, rely on physical 
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locality to form local communication links, and may change due to the mobility of 
devices.  
Creating diversity of software to the benefit of security within such topologies 
has largely been unexplored, let alone from an ecological perspective. There are 
similarities between peer-to-peer mobile wireless networks and natural 
communities due to their movement and short range communication patterns 
making them a good candidate for studying the effects of biodiversity as a security 
mechanism. Additionally, the modelling of multi-exploit malware propagation 
targeting vulnerabilities across layers of a software stack has so far been neglected 
in the literature. 
The focus of this research combines these two domains where the hypothesis for 
this work is therefore: 
“Incorporating biodiversity within peer-to-peer mobile 
wireless computer networks makes them more resistant 
to multi-exploit malware propagation.” 
1.3 Contributions to Research 
The original and significant contributions of this thesis are: 
 Definition of an Ecosystem model of an ad hoc network (§5). 
Aspects published in the conference proceedings of the IEEE Symposium 
on Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security, 2011 [1]. The model 
proposes that by applying biodiversity strategies at different scales of a 
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network, the destructive effects arising from security attacks can be 
counterbalanced with the constructive effects of biodiversity to maintain 
ecosystem function and services, and hence benefit overall resistance and 
resilience. 
 Modelling of multi-layer multi-exploit malware within diverse computing 
systems which includes (§6, §7): 
o Representations, including analytical, of malware types with 
multiple exploits targeting multiple software layers with two 
different (logical AND and OR) relationships (§6).   
o Genetic matching of malware types to devices forms part of the 
novel approach of simulating malware propagation in diverse 
computing devices (§6, §7). 
The representations allow the susceptibility of a network to be determined, 
and allow simulation of such malware in a network where the diversity 
remains static (§6, §7) (the software on each device remains fixed during the 
simulation scenario) or is dynamic (the software on each device can change 
during the simulation according to the rules of the diversity algorithm) (§7). 
 Definition of metrics to measure the diversity of any computing network (§5, §6, 
§7). 
Single measures of diversity in computing systems have been defined in 
the literature; however several metrics are necessary to define diversity of 
multi-layer software stacks across a network, including those to define the 
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software stack granularity, the number of different software, their 
distribution, and their structural composition. A genetic approach is used 
where several definitions from ecology have been adopted. The Nei genetic 
diversity index [42], which has not been used previously, has been adopted in 
its monoploid form to measure the distribution of different software. It is 
very rarely stressed in the literature that it can be applied to any number of 
chromosome sets since most studies focus on diploid chromosomes of 
animals and plants. It is used here to measure the global performance of the 
dynamic diversity algorithm and calculate theoretical maximum diversity 
values for a given network configuration.  
 Development of a mathematical epidemic model which includes (§6): 
o Enhancements to the compartmental (applicable to both 
deterministic and stochastic) SI/SIR models to incorporate malware 
types with multiple exploits across multiple software layers in a 
wireless peer-to-peer ad hoc network where the diversity remains 
static. 
o A method has been developed to calculate optimum amounts of 
diversity necessary to tolerate or mitigate different types of multi-
exploit, multi-layer malware. 
o Ecosystem outputs including resistance and resilience. 
Note that enhancement of the SIR model to incorporate static diversity for an 
exploit targeting only single software configurations has already been proposed in 
the literature [43]. 
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 Development of an agent-based simulation framework within the Mathworks 
Matlab environment to understand how biodiversity can make wireless 
peer-to-peer computer networks more resistant to malware (§7). The 
source code for the model is available at the permanent link : 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/98458. 
The simulation framework allows the diversity of networks to either 
remain static, or be modified dynamically. It allows for testing, simulating 
and experimenting with different diversity algorithms, networks, attacks, and 
additional security mechanisms to prove and explore the hypothesis. The 
simulation framework incorporates the following aspects: 
o A mobility model controlling how and when individual devices 
communicate with one another. The following standard models 
have been used: 
 Uniformly distributed random encounter. 
 Random Waypoint which has been further developed to 
model the selection of devices to form a communication 
link with and the successful data transmission. 
o A diversity model controlling what software is installed on each 
device and when. Within this a dynamic diversity algorithm has been 
developed based upon local information. The algorithm can incorporate 
optional security mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of 
diversity, and constraints that may limit the diversity achievable. 
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o A malware model to inject malware into the network at a predefined 
time and monitor the health of each device as the simulation 
progresses. The SI/SIR compartments have been used. 
o Metrics including biodiversity levels as the simulation progresses, 
and ecosystem outputs including resistance and resilience. 
Further contributions of note include: 
 A comprehensive review covering how biodiversity works in nature and where 
lessons can be learned and applied to ad hoc networks (§2, §5, and work 
published in [1]). 
 A comprehensive review of current research associated with diversity as a 
security mechanism (§3.4).  
 A comprehensive review of the location of vulnerabilities at different scales of 
an ad hoc network and their link to undesirable security events 
(disturbances) (§3). A self contained study is published online [2]. 
 Simulations of malware propagation with different spreading mechanisms in 
Bluetooth peer-to-peer networks. Published aspects included within the 
thesis are documented within the Declaration. Work published in the 
journal paper [3]. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has given an introduction to the concept of biodiversity for cyber 
security. The next three chapters provide a comprehensive background that directly 
supports the work in the remainder of this thesis. Chapter 2 details the link between 
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biodiversity and ecosystems in natural systems, and how biodiversity is critical to 
the functioning of such ecosystems and the services they provide. Chapter 3 
explores computer security in detail, the extent of current diversity research, and the 
enabling technologies that may allow the diversity of computing and software 
possible. Chapter 4 details methods of modelling mobile networks, malware and 
epidemiology. Chapter 5 draws on the background material and presents an 
ecosystem model of an ad hoc network. Chapters 6 and 7 present the two different 
diverse system models developed and Chapter 8 details their results and analysis. 
Chapter 9 draws together the conclusions by summarising the work presented, and 
providing ideas for future work. 
Figure 1-1 provides a graphical representation of the thesis structure: 
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1.5 Summary 
This introduction has established the concept of biodiversity for cyber security. 
The focus of the biodiversity inspired security research is wireless peer-to-peer 
mobile networks since they are predicted to become prevalent in the future 
computing market. The hypothesis given for this work is that incorporating 
biodiversity within peer-to-peer mobile wireless computer networks makes them 
more resistant to multi-exploit malware propagation. The final sections of this 
chapter outlined the contributions made by this work and the structure of the thesis. 
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2 Ecology and Biodiversity in Natural Systems 
Chapter 2 
Ecology and Biodiversity in Natural 
Systems 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding biodiversity from an ecological perspective, its relationships, and 
how its effectiveness is measured against external inputs is important for 
considering analogous relationships and measures of diversity within mobile 
wireless peer-to-peer networks and its effectiveness against malware. This chapter is 
split into two sections: 
The Biodiversity and Ecosystem Relationship: The first section discusses biodiversity 
and its relationship with other components of an ecosystem. It discusses how 
biodiversity links to ecosystem functionality, how biodiversity is affected by 
external disturbances, and how the effect of biodiversity on limiting the severity of 
disturbances is measured. 
Measuring Biodiversity: The second section details the metrics for measuring 
biodiversity at the genetic level only, which are referenced during later chapters of 
the thesis. 
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2.2 The Biodiversity and Ecosystem Relationship 
2.2.1 Biodiversity within Ecosystems 
An ecosystem is comprised of interacting organisms such as plants, animals, 
insects etc and their physical environment. The global behaviour of an ecosystem is 
the result of local peer-to-peer interactions of such organisms and with their 
environment resulting in distributed (sharing of tasks), self-organising (global 
coordination from local interactions), and emergent (collective behaviour or 
property) properties. Biodiversity encompasses the variety of genes, species, or 
functional traits within an ecosystem and is critical to the functioning of such 
ecosystems and the emergent services they provide. External influences can impact on 
biodiversity and function and affect these services.  Ecosystem health, and in 
particular its relationship with biodiversity, is often assessed by looking at the 
outputs of ecosystem functions and services where productivity, stability, and disease 
transmission are measures often used within field studies and theoretical models. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Biodiversity and ecosystem relationship 
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2.2.1.1 Biodiversity 
There are generally three levels of biodiversity defined in the literature: genetic 
diversity, species diversity, and ecosystem diversity. Most theoretical and experimental 
studies focus on the species level when considering ecological consequences of 
biodiversity because it is easier to work with and measure [22], however 
biodiversity is hierarchical and over the past decade there has been a steadily 
growing interest in the genetic level, with research suggesting that genetic diversity 
can also have significant effects on ecological processes [44]. In addition to these 
three levels another dimension of diversity is often discussed, especially in relation 
to ecosystem function, and that is functional diversity. This encompasses functional 
traits at all three levels of diversity but research is again often focused at the species 
level.  
(1) Genetic diversity is the variety of differences between the genetic makeup of 
individuals. It is often measured within species at an individual scale but does not 
necessarily have to be limited to that. Genotypes determine the actual set of genes 
carried by an individual and phenotypes are the observable characteristics and traits 
coded for by those genes.  
(2) Species diversity is usually measured within a geographical region or 
ecosystem at a community scale by quantifying the number of different species and 
their distribution. It is different to genetic diversity in that groups of individuals 
with the same characteristics are divided into distinct groups which are usually well 
known and documented. The classification of species is usually via a taxonomy 
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approach using a hierarchical branching structure with various kingdoms defining 
the top level, such as the animal kingdom.  
(3) Ecosystem diversity includes the measurement of diversity of communities, 
geographical regions or complete ecosystems. For example species diversity can be 
measured at and between different scales of geographical areas [45]. 
 (4) Functional diversity is about differences in functional traits. Ecosystem 
function depends on functional diversity more than on the number of different 
species alone. For example, species may have the same role creating redundancy but 
low functionality; alternatively, species may have different roles creating low 
redundancy but high functionality.  
2.2.1.2 Ecosystem Functions 
Ecosystem functions are the ecological processes that take place within an 
ecosystem as a result of environmental factors and individual functionality, in 
particular the interaction of the individual with others and the environment. They 
have been categorised in different ways such as in terms of material, energy and 
information flow [46], or broken down into categories such as regulating functions 
(e.g.  water and nutrient regulation, pollination), supporting functions (e.g. soil 
formation such as chemical weathering of rocks), and provisioning functions (e.g. raw 
materials such as biomass and plant production) [47]. Biodiversity has a strong 
influence over ecosystem function and is discussed further in section 2.2.2.1. 
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2.2.1.3 Ecosystem Services 
Ecosystem services are the benefits that ecosystems provide to humanity and are 
derived from the many functions operating within an ecosystem. They are of a 
particular concern to ecologists since their demise or loss can be devastating [48] 
[49] [50]. Services can also be broken down into regulating services (e.g. air and water 
quality, buffering against extreme natural events such as drought, controlling pests 
and diseases), provisioning services (e.g. food products such as fish, crops and 
livestock, water, fuels such as wood and gas) [50], and sometimes additionally 
cultural services (e.g. providing iconic landscapes and recreational opportunities) [47] 
and further supporting services (e.g. crop pollination) [46] [51]. 
2.2.1.4 Disturbances 
Disturbances are influences on an ecosystem which can be both natural and 
artificial such as rain or human interaction, and can also be severe such as a flood or 
a drought. Disturbances can impact biodiversity which in turn affects functions and 
services. There are two aspects of disturbances: disturbance events and the natural 
disturbance regime [52]. 
(1) A disturbance event is an incident that disrupts an ecosystem usually over a 
relatively short period of time. Disruptions can include the spread of a disease, 
changes in the physical environment or resources. 
(2) The natural disturbance regime shapes an ecosystem over long time scales 
and includes many disturbances with varying intensities at different spatial and 
temporal scales such as changing temperatures and seasons [53] [54] [55]. This 
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generates natural levels of biodiversity by varying the conditions in which different 
species can operate.  
2.2.1.5 Measured Outputs 
Productivity and stability (including resistance and resilience), are often measured 
to assess the output of an ecosystem and how well it can cope with the effects of 
disturbances and changes in biodiversity. Often in the literature function and 
productivity are grouped together. For example the function of producing biomass 
often leads to assessing biomass productivity. Stability is about assessing how well 
the ecosystem can cope under different scenarios, such as how the productivity 
changes and how quickly the ecosystem recovers from a disturbance like a disease 
epidemic [56]. Productivity, stability and disease transmission are discussed further 
in section 2.2.2.2. 
2.2.1.6 Relationships 
There are relationships between disturbance, biodiversity, and ecosystem 
function. Within the literature some studies focus on just disturbance and its effect 
on species diversity [57] [53] [58] [59] [60] or genetic diversity [61] [62] [63], some 
consider the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem function (§2.2.2.1) [64] 
[22] [65] [46], whilst others consider the effects of disturbance severity on the 
measured outputs as a result of species [66] [67] [27] or genetic [68] [44] [69] 
diversity (§2.2.2.2). The latter two relationships are discussed further in the next 
section since these both consider biodiversity as a controlling mechanism on the 
output of an ecosystem. 
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2.2.2 Biodiversity Relationships 
2.2.2.1 Biodiversity Mechanisms Underlying Ecosystem Function 
Biodiversity has a large influence on ecosystem function and since the measured 
outputs of an ecosystem are based upon the productivity and stability of functions 
and services, this section details the mechanisms (as pictured in Figure 2-2) that link 
biodiversity to ecosystem function. This includes Niche differentiation (§2.2.2.1.1), 
facilitation (§2.2.2.1.2), multiple trophic levels (§2.2.2.1.3), and genetic variation 
(§2.2.2.1.4).  
 
Figure 2-2 – Biodiversity mechanisms linking ecosystem function 
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a species interacts with another species there may be some overlap in one or more 
dimensions (Figure 2-3 (b)) creating competition of resources. The niche space then 
becomes restricted due to the competition (Figure 2-3 (c)) and this is called the 
realised niche. Niche overlap determines how strongly two species might compete 
with each other. If species are too similar the lesser competitor will either be 
excluded from an area or go extinct ǻGauseȂs exclusion principleǼ [71]. When species 
coexist, competition can drive them into different niches. This process is called niche 
differentiation of which there are several types (Figure 2-2). One of the most 
discussed is resource partitioning where species divide up a resource such as food at 
different places (spatial resource partitioning), at different times (temporal resource 
partitioning), or in different ways (niche complementarity, or morphological 
differentiation). Often temporal resource partitioning is discussed as a separate form 
of niche differentiation and is referred to as temporal niche differentiation, conditional 
differentiation or the storage effect [72] where species have different competitive 
abilities under different environmental conditions. The mechanisms of niche 
differentiation is not just limited to species, niche complementarity has also been 
found during various genotypic diversity experiments [73] [69] [74].  
 
 
Figure 2-3 – Fundamental and realised niches of coexisting species 
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Additionally, functional complementarity has been discussed in the literature as a 
specific type of niche complementarity where different species occupy different 
functionally distinct niches, benefiting ecosystem function [65] [22] and providing an 
important link between biodiversity and productivity [65] [75]. With negligible 
niche overlap, termed perfect complementarity, more of the total niche space is used, 
increasing ecosystem functioning but causing fragility due to the dependence on 
specific species. With large niche overlap there is large ecosystem function, but this 
quickly saturates as species diversity increases making them functionally redundant 
(Figure 2-4) [22]. Redundancy can improve the stability of the ecosystem if species 
are lost, but can competition between species when the resource is limited [65]. This 
suggests that both functional redundancy and functional complementarity are 
needed to benefit ecosystem services rather than just the number of different 
species.  
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Figure 2-4 – Relationship between species diversity and ecosystem function [22] 
Functional complementarity also occurs at the genetic level. Whilst genes can 
provide unique functionality, functional redundancy can also occur during the 
evolutionary process producing genes with overlapping functionality. The most 
common method is through direct gene duplication [76] caused by errors during 
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DNA replication such as through reproduction. Another method is through natural 
selection where previously dissimilar genes evolve to provide similar functionality 
through partial functional overlap [77]. 
2.2.2.1.2 Facilitation 
Facilitation describes interactions between species or individuals, but can also 
apply at the genetic level [78] [79] [44], creating positive benefits for at least one 
without causing harm to the other. Facilitation can be either mutual where both 
species benefit, or commensal where only one species benefits. Increasing species 
diversity in the presence of facilitation can lead to increased ecosystem functioning 
[80] [81].  
 
2.2.2.1.3 Multiple Trophic Levels 
Many of the experimental studies have involved plant or microbial populations, 
often within a single trophic level (hierarchical level in an ecosystem such as the 
position in the food chain) [22] [82] [50] however it has been recognised that 
diversity across multiple trophic levels has the potential to impact ecosystem functions 
even more strongly [50]. The levels (Figure 2-5) consist of primary producers, at the 
bottom, followed by primary consumers, secondary consumers, and tertiary consumers, 
which consume species within the levels below them. There are also decomposers that 
break down dead or dying tissue from other species at different levels. The trophic 
pyramid however is often a very simplified picture of reality, where interactions 
between levels are very complex. 
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Figure 2-5 – The trophic pyramid 
2.2.2.1.4 Genetic Variation 
Whilst there is evidence that the previous mechanisms are relevant at both the 
species and genetic levels [44], genetic variation appears only at the genetic level. 
Genetic variation is the variation of genes within a population and is the driving 
force behind functional differences between individuals and species. It is also a 
prominent component of evolutionary change and determines genetic diversity [83] 
[44] (§2.3.2).  
Chromosomes are located within every cell but the number of sets can vary 
between species. There can be one set (monoploid), two sets (diploid), three sets 
(triploid) and more than three sets (polyploid). Animals and plants have two sets of 
chromosomes and are therefore diploid as shown in Figure 2-6. Each chromosome 
pair contains genes, representing short sections of DNA, which are located at a 
specific site called a locus [84].  
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Figure 2-6 – Chromosome pair with multiple loci and alleles 
Simplistically, loci determine traits or functions. Single genes can determine 
discrete traits such as eye colour, whereas the additive effect of multiple genes can 
determine continuous traits such as height. Genes may come in several different 
variants called Alleles. When both of the chromosome copies within the pair contain 
the same allele this is called homozygous and when they are different they are called 
heterozygous. A genotype represents the actual genes found within an individualȂs 
chromosome. Differences between alleles and genotypes, and their frequencies in a 
population, signifies the amount of genetic variation. 
Genetic variation is caused by multiple factors. If two or more alleles coexist in 
the population at a specific locus, this is termed genetic polymorphism. Many species 
have genetic polymorphism at different loci [83]. Reproduction processes such as 
crossover (DNA exchange by parents) and mutation (random change, potentially 
creating a new allele) as well as the migration of individuals and genetic drift 
(occurrence of alleles randomly fluctuate over time) [85],  can change the frequency 
and distribution of alleles, and introduce different combinations of genes leading to 
individualised genotypes.  
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2.2.2.2 The affects of Biodiversity on Limiting Disturbance 
Severity 
There are two outputs of ecosystems that are commonly measured in relation to 
the effects of biodiversity on limiting disturbance severity. These are productivity 
and stability [64] [22] [86] [27] (see Figure 2-7). When disturbances occur, the 
productivity and stability can be affected in different ways depending upon the 
disturbance severity and the level of biodiversity within the ecosystem. When 
disease spread is considered as a disturbance event, such as in the case of an 
epidemic, properties involving the dynamics around disease transmission is also 
analysed. 
 
Figure 2-7 – The effect of biodiversity on limiting disturbance severity 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Productivity 
Productivity is about the efficient use of input resources to generate outputs. It is 
a measure of how much and how quickly something is being produced. 
Productivity has been used to measure how well a particular ecosystem function is 
performing under different conditions in relation to diversity [87], and within 
ecological studies it is generally measured by the rate of increase in the total 
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community biomass (total mass of living matter) in an area [66]. Changes in 
productivity in relation to disturbances or biodiversity change can be measured 
over time to assess ecosystem stability (§2.2.2.2.2) [88] [27]. 
2.2.2.2.2 Stability 
Stability in relation to ecosystems can have two meanings, either the 
measurement of the temporal variability of an ecosystem property (temporal 
stability), or the measurement of an ecosystemȂs ability to defy change such as that 
from disturbances [89] [90] [22] [27]. Often the temporal attribute measured is the 
variance in population densities, or changes in productivity, such as that of biomass, 
over time (see Figure 2-8 (a)) since most biodiversity and ecosystem functioning 
studies focus on plants or microbial communities [88] [90] [22] [27]. There may also 
be a tolerance threshold, below which ecosystem functions and services become so 
degraded that it impacts the ability of the ecosystem to survive or recover. When the 
stability of a system is a measure of its ability to return to equilibrium following 
disturbance, two dimensions of stability are used, termed resistance (sometimes 
persistence) and resilience [22]. 
(1) Resistance describes how much of an ecosystem property changes in 
response to disturbance. The less the property changes the more resistant it is (see 
Figure 2-8 (b)). For example the resistance of productivity to climate events has been 
studied in grasslands in relation to diversity [27], as well as resistance of 
productivity to plant invasions where the invading plant biomass [91], and the 
invading plant cover [92] were measured in relation to biodiversity with the studies 
showing that biodiversity can act as a good barrier. 
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(2) Resilience, more specifically Engineering resilience [93] assumes that stable 
ecological systems operate at a single global equilibrium (one stable state) so that 
the resilience is a measure of the time taken to return to this global equilibrium 
following a disturbance (see Figure 2-8 (b)). The faster the ecosystem can recover, 
the more resilient it is [21] [27]. Ecosystems may react differently to different types 
of disturbances in which case the resilient and resistant characteristics will change. 
 
Figure 2-8 – Methods of measuring ecosystem stability 
2.2.2.2.3 The Case of Disease Spreading 
The spread of a disease is considered as a disturbance event [55] especially if it 
turns into an epidemic. Controlling the spread of diseases is often defined as a 
regulating service offered by ecosystems (§2.2.1.3) [50], and therefore has been used 
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as another output component of assessing ecosystem health. Whilst some studies in 
relation to disease spread and biodiversity examine stability components, such as 
that involving species diversity and productivity changes [94] or resistance of alleles 
(§2.2.2.1.4) against pathogens in genetic studies [95], others instead focus on changes 
in actual disease transmission of a population [56]. Experimental research suggests 
that the effect of biodiversity loss on the spread of diseases can have two outcomes; 
either it can decrease, or increase (majority of cases) transmission [56]. This can be 
linked to two theories regarding biodiversity and disease spread: The Dilution Effect 
and the Amplification Effect:  
(1) The Dilution Effect [24] [96] [97] [56], is any factor that causes a relative 
reduction in: the number of individuals that are susceptible to the disease and can 
pass it on (suitable hosts) relative to the total number of individuals, or their 
encounter rates, which can decrease the transmission of disease. For example a 
decrease in the relative number of those susceptible through an increase in the 
number of different species. 
(2) The Amplification Effect [98] [97] [56] is caused by factors that cause a 
relative increase in: the number of individuals that are susceptible to the disease and 
can pass it on (suitable hosts), or their encounter rates, which can increase the 
transmission of disease, for example an increase in the number of susceptible 
individuals when species that are added to increase diversity are also susceptible. 
For genetic diversity studies, disease transmission is studied in relation to genetic 
variation (§2.2.2.1.4), both in terms of genotypes and alleles. There is a general 
consensus that genetically homogenous populations are more vulnerable to disease 
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transmission than genetically diverse populations [99] [100], which has been seen in 
agriculture where disease epidemics have destroyed monocultured crops [101] 
(§1.1.3).  Studies also suggest that genotypes with high allelic diversity are needed 
in a population to constrain transmission [102] [103] [99] particularly when exposed 
to multiple parasites [103] [99]. 
2.3 Measuring Biodiversity 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As outlined in section 2.2.1.1 genetic, species, and functional diversity measures 
are used to describe biodiversity in ecosystems. The majority of practical studies 
focus on species diversity because it is easier to measure than genetic diversity [104] 
[44]. However, measurement at the genetic level can determine diversity within and 
between the species of whole ecosystems by considering differences in genotypic 
structure at the individual scale. This section reviews biodiversity measures at the 
genetic level only, these being referenced during later chapters. 
2.3.2 Genetic Diversity 
When analysing genetic diversity in relation to genotypes (§2.2.2.1.4) there are 
two types of measures: those based directly upon genotypes as a whole entity, and 
those based upon alleles which make up the genotypes. These two aspects are 
reviewed below. 
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2.3.2.1 Genotypic Measures 
Genotypic measures focus directly on the genotype and ignore its allelic 
construction. A selection of measures described below is used in the literature to 
assess diversity. 
2.3.2.1.1 Genotypic Richness 
Genotypic richness      is the number of different genotypes that has been 
measured within a population. Observational studies can count the number of 
genotypes, whilst experimental studies can create the required number of genotypes 
using clonal species [44].  
2.3.2.1.2 The Proportion of Different Genotypes 
The proportion of different genotypes      within a population of size   is defined in 
Equation (2-1) [105] as the genotypic richness per population. It has a maximum 
value of 1 when all individuals within the population have a unique genotype and 
approaches 0 when there are very few genotypes. 
        (2-1) 
 
2.3.2.1.3 Genotypic Diversity  
Genotypic diversity      [106] [105] takes into account the frequency of all the 
different genotypes     , where   is the frequency of the  th genotype, as shown in 
Equation (2-2) giving an indication as to how the genotypes are distributed across 
the population. It has a minimum value of 1 when there is only one genotype 
present in the population, and a value of    when multiple genotypes are present 
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and are evenly distributed, up to a maximum value of      when all individuals 
have a unique genotype. 
                 (2-2) 
 
2.3.2.1.4 Genotypic Evenness  
Genotypic evenness      [105] as given in (2-3) specifies how evenly or dominantly 
the genotypes are distributed amongst the population.  When a single genotype 
dominates, providing that there is more than one genotype present in the 
population, the evenness approaches 0. When the genotypes are evenly distributed, 
the evenness has a maximum value of 1.   
         (2-3) 
 
2.3.2.2 Allelic Measures 
Allelic measures concentrate on the genetic variation of alleles across a 
population where alleles are positioned at different loci within a genotype 
(§2.2.2.1.4). A selection of measures described below is used in the literature to 
assess diversity. 
2.3.2.2.1 Allelic Richness 
Allelic richness      [44] is the average number of different alleles per locus that 
has been measured across a population. It is on a par with genotypic richness but is 
now focused at the allelic level. Similar to genotypic richness it does not consider 
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how many instances of each allele are present. As shown in Equation (2-4) The 
number of different alleles     at each locus     is summed and then divided by the 
total number of loci    . 
                (2-4) 
 
2.3.2.2.2 The Nei Genetic Diversity 
The Nei Genetic Diversity     [42] is defined as the probability that at a single 
locus any two alleles chosen at random from the population are different to each 
other. This principle applies for monoploid (haploid), diploid and any other 
polyploidy chromosome sets (§2.2.2.1.4) but is very rarely stressed in the 
literature [42] [107] since most studies measuring genetic diversity in this way 
focus on diploid chromosome sets of animals and plants. For diploid 
chromosome sets the genetic diversity measure for a single locus is referred to as 
the expected heterozygosity which is a measure of how different the two allele 
pairs are (§2.2.2.1.4). For monoploids the terminology of heterozygosity cannot 
be applied but the Nei Genetic Diversity is still valid since it assumes that any 
two alleles chosen at random can be from different individuals. The frequency      of each different allele     at each locus can be calculated using Equation 
(2-5) as the number of times the allele is present      divided by the total number 
of alleles     across the population.  The value     is equivalent to the 
population size     for monoploids and twice the population size      for 
diploids since a diploid has two alleles for each gene. 
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        (2-5) 
The probability that two alleles chosen at random will be the same      is given 
by Equation (2-6) and is also a measure of homozygosity (§2.2.2.1.4) for a population 
with diploid chromosomes. This is summed over all the different allele possibilities     (Not to be confused with A which is the total number of alleles across a 
population, for which the same allele may occur multiple times). 
                (2-6) 
Subtracting this from unity gives the probability      that two alleles chosen at 
random will be different and denotes the genetic diversity at a single locus    , 
which is given in Equation (2-7). For a population with diploid chromosomes this 
will be a measure of heterozygosity. 
                   (2-7) 
The final diversity index     is usually calculated by averaging the diversity 
across all loci (L) as given in Equation (2-8). The genetic diversity index has values 
between 0 where every individual in the population has the same set of alleles, and 
1 if every individual has a different allele at every locus. 
                (2-8) 
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2.3.2.2.3 The Shannon Diversity Index 
The Shannon Diversity Index [108] (Shannon entropy) was originally used to 
quantify the uncertainty of information content in strings of text. The greater the 
numbers of different letters, and the more equal their frequency within the text, the 
more difficult it is to correctly predict which letter will come next. The same concept 
can be applied to alleles where the more alleles there are at a locus and the more 
equal their distribution amongst the population, the more diverse the population 
becomes [44]. The Shannon entropy for a given locus      is given in Equation (2-9), 
and is firstly calculated in a similar manner to the Nei Genetic Diversity by 
measuring the frequency      of each different allele     at the locus.  Different 
logarithmic bases have been used for the index such as the natural logarithm, and 
the base 2 logarithm [109]. The equation is summed over all the different alleles 
possibilities    .  
                      (2-9) 
Similar to the Nei Genetic Diversity measure, the Shannon entropy     can be 
averaged across all loci     as given in Equation (2-10). 
              (2-10) 
The maximum diversity occurs when all alleles are equal in frequency. The upper 
limit for a single locus is governed by the number of different allele possibilities at 
that locus     and can be simplified to Equation (2-11). 
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            (2-11) 
2.3.2.3 Maximum Number of Unique Genotypes 
For a monoploid set of chromosomes, the maximum number of unique 
genotypes         that can be created is the product of the number of different 
allele possibilities     at each of the loci     as given in Equation (2-12). 
                (2-12) 
Where     is the total number of loci. Figure 2-9 (a) shows the number of unique 
genotypes for two loci having up to 10 alleles, and Figure 2-9 (b) shows the number 
of unique genotypes for four loci with the same number of alleles at each locus. 
From the opposite perspective, the number of loci and alleles needed to represent at 
least a specific number of genotypes will in general have a number of solutions.  
  
Figure 2-9 – Maximum number of unique genotypes 
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For example, to generate at least 50 genotypes, there needs to be at least 2 loci 
with 7 and 8 alleles (Figure 2-9 (a)) or 4 loci and 3 alleles in each (Figure 2-9 (b)). 
2.3.2.4 Comparison of Measures 
Figure 2-10 (a) and (b) show comparisons of the genotypic and allelic measures of 
diversity for a simulated population having genotypes comprising a single locus 
and four loci respectively. It is an illustration to support the mathematical equations 
highlighting differences between what they show. The number of different allele 
possibilities     is the same at each locus and is varied between 1 and 10. The 
population size     of 20,000 has been chosen such that it is twice the maximum 
number of possible genotypes         from a four locus, 10 allele combination. This 
is to allow the simulation of genotypes to occur at least twice and be evenly spread 
across the population so that maximum diversity is achieved and can be observed in 
Figure 2-10 (a) and (b). For a single locus as shown in Figure 2-10 (a), the Genotypic      and Allelic      Richness increase together linearly with the number of alleles 
since a single locus with one allele can have only one possible genotype, two alleles 
can have two genotypes, and so on. The Genotypic Diversity      also follows the 
same relationship, since when the genotypes are evenly distributed, its value is 
equal to the Genotypic Richness. It also follows from even distribution that the 
Genotypic Evenness      measure is flat at unity across any number of alleles. The 
Nei and Shannon measures both show the maximum allelic diversity values that 
can be achieved when the alleles, and hence genotypes are evenly distributed. The 
difference between the measures being that the Nei Genetic Diversity 
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asymptotically approaches unity as the number of alleles increases whereas the 
Shannon Index increases with the number of alleles. 
 
Figure 2-10 - Comparison of genetic diversity measures 
The Proportion of Genotypes      measure remains low for any number of 
alleles up to 10, indicating that although the alleles and genotypes are evenly 
distributed leading to maximum diversity under these constraints, the number of 
unique genotypes in comparison to population size is very small. 
With four loci as shown in Figure 2-10 (b) the averaged allelic measures across all 
loci are the same as that for a single locus since the chosen population size is large 
enough to achieve even distribution and maximum diversity given the locus and 
allele constraints. Differences are seen in the increased Genotypic Richness     , 
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Genotypic Diversity     , and hence the Proportion of Genotypes      in 
comparison to population size which reaches a half when four loci with ten alleles 
are used. 
Figure 2-10 (c) shows the same measures for four loci but with a limited 
population size of 100. Figure 2-10 (d) shows the Nei and Shannon measures 
separated out for each individual locus. The genotype assignment to individuals 
within the population is set so that the minimum number of alleles are used to 
achieve the maximum number of genotypes.  
As shown in Figure 2-10 (d) when there are up to three alleles within each locus, 
the population size is greater than the potential number of genotypes (see Figure 2-9 
(b)) and so all alleles occur within the population and are distributed as evenly as 
possible. Additionally, the Genotypic Richness      is limited by the number of loci 
and alleles. When there are four or more alleles in each locus the population size 
becomes smaller than the potential number of genotypes. Under this condition the 
Genotypic Richness      is limited by the population size. The actual genotypes of 
the population are a subset of those available for which there could be many 
different subsets, with potentially some alleles either not being expressed, or 
dominating at a particular loci. This means that even when every individual in the 
population has a different genotype, the allelic diversity (Nei and Shannon) may not 
necessarily be maximal. This is illustrated in Figure 2-10 (d) when only a minimum 
number of alleles are used to achieve richness. Domineering alleles in loci three and 
four reduce the diversity to zero at these particular loci when the number of alleles 
in loci one and two is increased to maintain genotypic richness. This thereby 
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reduces the overall allelic diversity measures of Nei, Shannon, and Allelic Richness 
as shown in Figure 2-10 (c). This example provides a key illustration of the 
differences between genotypic measures and allelic measures, where it may be 
possible to maximise genotypic richness and diversity without fully exploiting the 
potential allelic richness and diversity.  This makes the use of both types of 
measures important for assessing genetic diversity. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
An ecosystem comprises interacting organisms and their physical environment, 
resulting in distributed, self-organising, and emergent properties. Biodiversity 
encompasses the variety of genes, species, or functional traits within an ecosystem 
and is critical to the functioning of such ecosystems and the emergent services they 
provide. Ecosystem functions are the ecological processes that take place and the 
ecosystem services are the benefits provided to humanity. External influences, 
termed disturbances, can impact on biodiversity and function and affect these 
services. There are several mechanisms that link biodiversity to ecosystem function 
including niche differentiation (particularly functional complementarity), 
facilitation, interactions between trophic levels, and genetic variation. Ecosystem 
health, and in particular its relationship with biodiversity, is often assessed by 
looking at the outputs of ecosystem functions and services where productivity, 
stability, and disease transmission are measures often used within studies. Stability 
can have multiple meanings such as the variance of an attribute, or the ability to 
defy change in which the two dimensions resistance and resilience are often used. 
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The literature suggests that biodiversity loss can cause either dilution or 
amplification of susceptible individuals and thereby reducing or increasing disease 
transmission. These ecological concepts are mapped onto peer-to-peer networks in 
the form of an ecosystem model of an ad hoc network and are described in chapter 
5. Security attacks such as malware forms unwanted disturbances to the ecosystem 
model. 
Diversity measured at the genetic level can determine diversity within and 
between the species of whole ecosystems by considering differences in genotypic 
structure at the individual scale. There are two types of genetic diversity measures: 
those based directly upon genotypes as a whole entity, and those based upon alleles 
which make up the genotypes. Whilst genotypic measures are useful in identifying 
the uniqueness of the population and the distribution of genotypes, allelic measures 
can additionally show the distribution of alleles which can be analysed either 
independently at each locus or as an average across the whole genotype. When the 
measures are analysed together they provide a useful picture of the genetic diversity 
of the population from both genotypic and allelic aspects. The following measures 
are used as metrics in the measurement of diversity within the ecosystem model of 
an ad hoc network (defined in 5.3.2.1): Genotypic Richness, Genotypic Diversity, 
Allelic Richness, and Nei Genetic Diversity Index. The Genotypic Richness, Allelic 
Richness and the Shannon Index are referenced in section 3.4.4 during a review of 
diversity measures of computing systems for security. 
 
 
Chapter 3  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 42 of 357 May 2017  
3 Cyber Security and Diversity in Computing Systems 
Chapter 3 
Cyber Security and Diversity in 
Computing Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background material associated 
with: the practical viability of diversity, how greater numbers of connected devices 
is driving more peer-to-peer wireless networks, how malware and vulnerabilities 
are associated with different layers of the software stack, and what gaps there are in 
this field of research. This chapter is split into three sections: 
Computing Systems: The first section discusses enabling technologies of future 
computing systems that have the potential to aid in the realisation of biodiversity as 
a security mechanism. These include automated software generation and 
dissemination, virtualisation and hardware support, and the modularity of software 
stacks. Topology is considered with a focus on networks conducting peer-to-peer 
communication. 
Cyber Security: The second section on cyber security predominantly discusses 
malware, which is a form of cyber attack rife in monoculture software 
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environments. It summarises the different types of malware along with the stages of 
a successful malware attack. The location and types of vulnerabilities exploited by 
malware within the software stack are discussed. The implications of attacks using 
multiple and publically unknown exploits are highlighted.  
Diversity: The third section explores the literature on the current state of research 
associated with diversity within computing systems. Three main areas of research 
are reviewed including the diversification of software at the code level, 
diversification at the network level and the metrics used to evaluate diversity within 
such systems. This section concludes with an evaluation of the open areas of 
research within this field. 
3.2 Computing Systems 
3.2.1 Enabling Technologies 
The future of computing systems lies within a globally connected world of 
devices and people, and will combine advancements in enabling technologies to 
provide access anywhere and at anytime. Some of these enabling technologies could 
also be utilised to realise diversity. Particular attention is given to automated 
software generation, including dissemination and updating, virtualisation and 
hardware support, and the modularity of software stacks.  
3.2.1.1 Automated Software 
The dissemination of software traditionally involved a pre-installation on a new 
device, or through the purchase of a disk. Nowadays software can be readily 
downloaded via the Internet, updates are often automated, and users can choose 
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from a broad range of application software. Franz [110] identifies one of the 
fundamental enablers of diversity to be the ease of obtaining software, making it 
possible to distribute and patch unique versions. The advancement of dynamic 
software compilation and cloud computing could be harnessed to provide the necessary 
computing power to generate large volumes of these unique versions as and when 
required. In addition to this, efforts are being sought to prevent the need to restart 
software or computers when patches are applied. Much research has been 
conducted around dynamic software updating (DSU) which would allow the unique 
versions to be updated or modified without affecting functionality or run-time 
performance [111] [112]. 
3.2.1.2 Virtualisation 
Virtualisation is seen as one of the key enabling technologies for the future 
Internet. It is the artificial creation of a resource such as a hardware platform, 
storage device or server by combining or partitioning physical hardware or software 
and isolating it from the rest of the system [113]. For example the resources of a 
single computer could be partitioned so it appears there are two isolated computers 
available instead of one. Virtualisation has grown rapidly because of its use in cloud 
computing [114] and Bring Your Own Devices (BYODs) [115]. It has been used for 
many years in desktop computers, but more recently in mobile devices with 
software such as ȁHorizon MobileȂ by VMware [116], and open source software led 
by the Xen project and backed by AMD and Google [117]. Virtualisation has use in 
networks [118] [119], servers, services [120] [121], physical objects [122] [123], and devices 
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(embedded) [113], increasing hardware utilisation, security, and efficient 
administration [124].  
Virtualisation within devices could prove to be a useful tool in the realisation of 
software diversity due to its ability to switch between isolated software programs, 
operating systems, or entire software stacks, and could provide an alternative to, or 
complement the research field of dynamic software updating. Devices could be pre-
installed with only a low level virtualisation and management layer, so that the 
enabling technologies of dynamic software compilation and cloud computing could 
be used to provide hardware-independent functionality and individually tailored 
operating systems and drivers as and when required [113]. Virtualisation can also 
isolate malware prone applications by providing some protection against known 
and unknown viruses through protecting the disk and files. If an infection occurs 
software can be reloaded to its original, known good state and thus remove the 
malware. Virtualisation can be partial, for example through sandboxing (Figure 3-1 
(a)) of malware prone applications such as web browsers. Sandboxes examine 
certain system calls for malicious behaviour, then rewrite or block them as 
appropriate.  Virtualisation can also be full using virtual machines (VMs) (Figure 3-1 
(b)) to isolate whole operating systems [125]. VMs are created and managed by 
Hypervisors [126] which either sit directly on top of the physical hardware (type 1 
hypervisor) or sit on top of the host operating system (type 2 hypervisor). Although 
virtualisation has the potential to aid diversity, there are a number of design issues 
that would need to be addressed before it can be practically used (§9.3.2.4.) 
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Figure 3-1 – Virtualisation scenarios 
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could have the potential to accommodate diverse software onto a single chip [127] 
[128]. 
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with the introduction of ȁ“pp storesȂ but the increase in functionality is likely to 
extend to other layers of the stack as more emerging products enter the IoT. The 
ability to partition software into layers and functionality, whether source code or 
binary files, could be beneficial for creating diverse computing systems where 
alternative versions can be generated with the same functionality using the same or 
different techniques at each layer of the stack. 
Four different software stacks supporting computing devices are described here 
and shown in Figure 3-2 to illustrate the similarities between them in terms of 
software layers and functionality. The first three software stacks: the Android [130] 
[131], iOS [132] [133] and Windows 8 [134] [135] are all distinct operating systems 
that can be used with mobile devices. The Windows 8 architecture has a split 
software stack with a shared kernel. One half caters for a modern ȁStyleȂ with touch 
screen capability and the other half encompasses the old classic desktop structure. 
The fourth software stack: the generic open source Linux OS [136] [137] is designed 
as a modular structure so that different distributions such as Ubuntu or Debian can 
be used with the same underlying core libraries, with a pick and mix of different 
software packages and versions. Although the layers and software components 
across all four operating systems are named and partitioned differently, the general 
functionality remains consistent across the architectures. The layers can be 
partitioned into four main categories. Starting from the lowest layer that sits just 
above the hardware, the categories are: kernel, core OS libraries, application 
services, and applications. 
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Figure 3-2 – Comparing different operating system software stacks 
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to support the drawing of graphical user interface (GUI) windows, and 
communicates with the graphics card device driver in the kernel. Other notable 
libraries at this layer include networking and web support, database functions such 
as support for the Structured Query Language (SQL), media support such as 
multimedia streaming, video and audio capabilities including CODECs (Coder 
Decoder: coding and decoding of media files), and security such as Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) for establishing encrypted links between web servers and browsers.  
• The application services layer is the level at which application frameworks are 
created, with functionality such as window managers that control the position, style 
and timing of windows drawn on the display screen. The open source Linux 
software stack has separate windows managers and desktop software packages. The 
GNOME desktop, for example, uses the GTK+ toolkit containing a collection of 
applications to form a graphical environment which itself uses the X11 windowing 
application program interface (API). The multimedia streaming package in 
Windows 8 (Silverlight) is an application framework for browser multimedia 
applications and is used by Netflix for streaming films and television programs. The 
Android application framework is comprised of a number of managers controlling 
different aspects. 
• The applications layer is where all the user software is found. Applications 
utilise the application services layer of an operating system, and sometimes libraries 
in lower layers to create interactive user software. Internet browsers for example sit 
at this layer for which there can be different products that are compatible with the 
same operating system such as Firefox and Opera (plus others) for Linux, or 
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different versions of a product across operating systems such as Firefox for Linux or 
Firefox for Windows. 
There are compatibility issues between different software stacks due to 
dependencies on lower layer libraries, with often only one choice available for a 
specific function. It is only at the application layer where there tends to be more 
choice of software, particularly with the introduction of ȁ“pp storesȂ. The evolving 
suite of open source Linux software modules however at lower layers provides a 
wider choice of functions that can be mixed and matched as appropriate with the 
added benefit of being compatible. The development of open source software within 
the IoT is also growing [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] [145]. This increased use of 
open source could provide a natural method of software diversity since there can 
often be alternative choices of modules providing similar functionality. Additionally 
open source is constantly under scrutiny meaning bugs tend to be fixed quickly, and 
it costs less in monetary terms for the end user than proprietary counterparts 
making it a cost effective way of introducing diversity and fixing vulnerabilities. 
3.2.2 The Future Topology of Connected Devices 
In the past, society has seen the integration of mobile phone networks and the 
Internet using smartphone devices, third generation (3G) networks and protocols, 
local wireless access points using WiFi and wireless peer-to-peer communication 
using Bluetooth [146]. In the future, the IoT will combine enabling technologies with 
many different types of objects, for a vast range of applications requiring 
improvements in networks and services [8] [6] [147] (Figure 3-3). Traditional 
internet networks are based upon the application layer client-server model [129]. In 
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the future, the IoT is likely to be constructed from different topologies utilising a 
multitude of communication protocols, depending upon the connected devices and 
their application (Figure 3-3). There will be more localised peer-to-peer communication 
such as device to device (D2D) or machine to machine (M2M) making more use of 
protocols such as Bluetooth, or the fourth generation (4G) WiFi Direct and LTE 
Direct, or their fifth generation (5G) equivalents when they are released [146]. They 
may also be connected in an ad hoc fashion, as and when the services are required, 
such as in the case of moving phones or vehicles creating localised ad hoc networks 
[148].  
 
Figure 3-3 – Topology of the future Internet 
3.2.3 Peer-to-Peer, Ad hoc, and Sensor Networks 
Localised Peer-to-peer communication describes the direct communication between 
one device and another. This section describes different types of peer-to-peer 
networks and where mobile ad hoc networks fit in. Several networks communicate 
in a peer-to-peer fashion, although the underlying mechanisms and network 
topology may be different. 
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A peer-to-peer overlay network has a distributed architecture and generally operates 
at the application layer of a network protocol stack (§3.2.1.3) using the Internet as 
the underlying network and can operate over wired or wireless connections [149]. In 
a traditional client-server model, shown simplistically in Figure 3-4 (a) without 
including network detail, a user will communicate with a single server to transfer a 
whole file. By contrast, in a peer-to-peer overlay network (Figure 3-4 (b)) 
connections with multiple hosts are made with many small data requests to each. 
The peer-to-peer client then combines the data to recreate the file. BitTorrent is one 
of the most popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocols and is often used for 
downloading films [150].  
Whilst peer-to-peer overlay networks provide logical peer-to-peer 
communication, ad hoc networks provide physical peer-to-peer connections. They are 
formed at the lower network layer of a network protocol stack (§3.2.1.3). They also 
have a distributed architecture, but devices used within ad hoc networks tend to 
interact closely with humans often following human mobility patterns (§4.2). Each 
node in the network acts as a router and a host which self-configure to form an 
arbitrary topology [151] (Figure 3-4 (c)). Nodes communicate through single-hop 
and multi-hop paths to each other in a peer-to-peer fashion. For nodes that are both 
mobile and wireless with multi-hop functionality, they are generally referred to as 
Mobile “d hoc NETworks ǻM“NETȂsǼ [148] [152].  
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Figure 3-4 – Network topologies 
Mobile phones equipped with Bluetooth currently use single hop communication 
for transferring files directly between devices. In the future wireless communication 
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isolation, requiring some kind of gateway to the Internet. Mesh networks (Figure 3-4 
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scenarios such as mobile phone communication, rescue operations, health care, and 
much more [154].  
Sensor networks are sometimes discussed in the literature as a type of ad hoc 
network, but they can also be considered different from ad hoc networks [154] 
depending upon the type of network topology and application areas that are being 
considered [155]. Devices contain sensors and actuators and collaborate between 
themselves using wired and wireless technologies which may be static or mobile. 
They normally have a central device responsible for gathering sensed data called the 
sink or master and interact more closely with the environment for applications such 
as machine surveillance, tracking of goods, and precision agriculture [154]. The 
three most common topologies are mesh, star and tree (Figure 3-5), where the mesh 
topology could incorporate an ad hoc network if required for a specific application 
[155].  
 
Figure 3-5 – Sensor network configurations 
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3.3 Cyber Security 
3.3.1 Malware in a Monoculture Environment 
The increased use of computing devices and wide scale adoption of a limited 
number of operating systems (OS) and common protocols continues to pose a 
significant software monoculture threat. Malware is prolific in monoculture 
environments since it can spread over networks taking advantage of software, such 
as widely used operating systems, that all have the same vulnerability. Malware is 
any malicious software used to interfere with computer operations, access private 
data and systems, or display unwanted advertising. It can infect or delete files, deny 
services by flooding the network, enable remote access to control devices, modify 
system applications, prevent functions from working or even turn off security 
features such as antivirus tools. The main types of malware include:  
 Viruses: Attach to other programs to spread, and self-replicate when 
executed. 
 Worms: self-replicate without needing other programs to spread. 
Sometimes require user interaction to initiate the spread (e.g. Cabir Worm 
[156] ). 
 Trojans: Appear as legitimate software (e.g. hidden within ȁ“pp storesȂ 
[157]) and can harbour spyware, ransomware, or adware. 
 Spyware: Capture sensitive data or key presses to obtain login details. 
 Ransomware: Extract money by encrypting files or locking the device until 
a ransom is paid (ransomeware targeting mobile users is increasing [157]). 
 Adware: Launches unwanted advertisements. 
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3.3.2 Successful Malware Attacks 
Malware takes advantage of vulnerabilities unintentionally (mostly) created in 
the design and implementation of software code. Exploit code is written and used 
within malware to exploit a vulnerability. The exploit code can comprise a small 
piece of software, a block of data or a chain of commands. A successful malware 
attack requires several steps as shown in Figure 3-6. The first is an entry point for an 
exploit utilising a vulnerability through which there is redirection of control on the 
target computer to download a payload.  The payload could be the malware itself, 
or a downloader which then creates a backdoor for other types of malware to be 
installed. Malware then carries out its intended execution such as stealing data, or 
causing damage. If the malware has avoided detection and has been programmed to 
spread over the network, it will then start infecting other computers, either straight 
away, or after a trigger. Sometimes exploit kits are used which include pre-written 
exploit code targeting vulnerabilities in unpatched software. Some exploit kits run 
on web servers, with the purpose of identifying software vulnerabilities in client 
machines so that malware can be executed. 
 
Figure 3-6 – Steps of a successful malware attack 
3.3.3 Multiple Exploits and Zero-day Attacks 
The use of multiple exploits could pose a significant threat in the future. Exploit 
kits contain multiple exploits targeting known vulnerabilities to gain entry to a 
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to choose from. For example the ŘŖŗś mobile ȁGodlessȂ malware contains multiple 
exploits that can gain root access to various versions of Android-based devices. 
Once the malware has achieved root access it can receive remote instructions to 
download other malicious software [158].  
Some attackers however use exploits to target publically unknown 
vulnerabilities. These types of attacks are called zero-day and are growing more 
common. They can last up to 30 months [15] before the vulnerability is publically 
disclosed (Figure 3-7), and are often targeted at specific organisations such as the 
government. Additionally, these types of attacks can use multiple zero-day exploits 
to gain entry to the  network, access information, propagate to other devices and 
perform malicious tasks. The 2010 Stuxnet worm for example used four separate 
zero-day exploits to gain entry and cause disruption to an Iranian nuclear power 
plant [17]. The first exploit targeted an automatic file execution vulnerability in a file 
shortcut of Microsoft Windows OS which was used to inject the worm via USB 
sticks into a computer system. The second targeted a shared print-spooler 
vulnerability using remote code execution (§3.3.4) which was subsequently used to 
spread the worm. The third and fourth targeted system-level privileges to gain 
control even when computers had been locked down to only allow specified 
software to run. This was the first threat to use so many publically unknown 
vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 3-7 – Zero-day attack time line adapted from [15] and [14] 
A more recent example in 2016 was a piece of malware named Trident [159] 
incorporated into the Pegasus spyware, which used three zero-day exploits to target 
iPhone devices. As shown in Figure 3-8 the first exploit targeted a vulnerability in 
the Safari WebKit at the application layer leading to memory corruption allowing 
the device to be infected when the user clicked onto a link. The second exploit 
targeted a kernel mapping vulnerability of the iOS at the core OS layer that leaked 
information allowing the attacker to calculate the kernelȂs location in memory. The 
third exploit targeted a vulnerability at the kernel layer that caused kernel memory 
corruption allowing the device to be silently jailbreaked so that surveillance 
software could be installed. The three exploits targeted different layers of the 
software stack (§3.2.1.3), and all three vulnerabilities needed to be exploited for the 
malware to be successful.  
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the ȁHeartbleedȂ and ȁShellShockȂ zero-day vulnerabilities were disclosed in 2014, 
between thirty and thirty five thousand follow on attacks were recorded [14] (Figure 
3-7). A surge in attacks does not always happen this quickly but usually faster than 
vendors can deploy patches. Trident for example was patched in 10 days after it was 
disclosed [160], but many people still use old software that is no longer supported 
through patches such as Windows XP which accounts for around 18% of infections 
[161]. 
 
Figure 3-8 – Vulnerabilities in the software stack targeted by Pegasus exploits 
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software stack and that malware can be injected or propagated using a single 
vulnerability at any layer. The actual exploit code however will be different for each 
unique vulnerability discovered. Secondly, vulnerabilities described here are 
referenced later in the chapter. A full description of the vulnerabilities and their 
location is included in the study [2].  
Several of those listed relate to buffer or memory vulnerabilities (nos. 
3,12,14,17,18) which can occur at any layer of the software stack and lead to the 
execution of malware. For example a buffer copy without checking the size of the input 
(no.3) often leads to the classic buffer overflow attack where the attacker writes data 
outside the bounds of the buffer to an adjacent location. This can change the 
behaviour of the program, overwrite local variables or a function pointer, or change 
a return address to point to malware.  
In contrast, the leading vulnerability, improper neutralization of inputs during web 
page generation (no. 1) only affects Web applications but can lead to a range of 
attacks including an ideal entry point for malware. It occurs when untrusted inputs 
are not mitigated against. The most common attack method is via script injection, 
often called cross-site-scripting, where attackers inject JavaScript or other content 
into a web page that the web server application generates. The web page can then 
be accessed by other users, whose browsers execute the malicious script.  
Code injection attacks often target online SQL databases by modifying 
improperly checked SQL queries (no. 2). Additionally they can be used in 
conjunction with memory corruption to redirect execution to the injected code, for 
example for malware, by modifying a code pointer in memory. Code reuse attacks 
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can also be used, where instead of injecting new code small sections of legitimate 
code called gadgets are chained together to execute the exploit instead. 
Other vulnerabilities that improperly deal with external inputs (nos. 4,6,7,9,15,16) 
can allow an attacker to by-pass security mechanisms. Cross-site request forgery 
(no.4) for example occurs when a web application insufficiently verifies requests by 
the user allowing an attacker to trick a user into making an unintentional request to 
the web server which is then treated as authentic. Other errors leading to security 
mechanisms being bypassed, include the setting of improper access, restrictions and 
permissions (nos. 5,8,19,20,21,22,25) and can lead to code execution for the 
propagation of malware. 
 
Figure 3-9 –Location of vulnerabilities in the software stack [162] [2] 
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3.4 Diversity 
3.4.1 Diversity as a Security Mechanism 
In the 1970s, N-version programming was proposed within the field of fault 
tolerance to increase the reliability of systems that used software [28]. It was known 
that identical software running on independent systems would fail in exactly the 
same way with the same inputs, so the idea was therefore to create N-versions of the 
software. Since then the concept of diversity within computer networks has 
expanded, with the majority of research focused upon applications such as 
improving communications [163-165], avoiding security attacks [35, 37, 39, 166, 167] 
[168], designing fault tolerant systems for harsh environments [169-172] improving 
test simulations [173], and in developing enabling technologies to support such 
concepts [127]. Interest in the use of diversity as a security mechanism within 
computing developed as computers became ubiquitous, attacks became more 
common, and the risks of a software monoculture were acknowledged [19], [18]. A 
biological perspective on diversity as a security mechanism was touched upon by 
Forrest [174] who recognised that diversity is an important source of robustness in 
biological systems, and its beneficial effects in computing systems should be 
investigated. Later, Crandall highlighted that biological diversity for computer 
security needed an ecosystem perspective [29]. There has been very little 
development in this research area until recently since the development of key 
enabling technologies (§3.2.1) such as dynamic software compilation, cloud 
computing, and virtualisation is only now making it possible to produce, 
disseminate and maintain the different versions of software needed [20]. 
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Consequently there has been a renewed interest around diversifying software [175]. 
Diversity used as a security mechanism aims to make it more difficult for attackers 
to target multiple devices and networks during a single attack. The propagation of 
malware relies on being able to exploit the same vulnerability on multiple machines 
and so diversity makes attackers target each system individually. Without 
knowledge of the programs on a specific computer targeted attacks such as those 
using zero-day vulnerabilities become more difficult [14]. Diversity as a security 
mechanism is not just applicable to singular computers and their user software but 
may also manifest in other areas of defence such as network design [176] and 
network defence mechanisms. Diversity of network defensive techniques such as 
firewalls and intrusion detection systems is also related to the notion of defence in 
depth [177], which is a multi-layered defence strategy with complementary 
techniques to block, detect, monitor and remove suspicious activity to reduce the 
probability of a successful attack. 
Diversity research relevant to malware and the security of computers, their 
interconnected network (as opposed to diverse network defence), and user software 
can be broadly partitioned into three categories:  
1) Creating diverse code 
2) Creating diverse systems 
3) Measuring and analysing diversity 
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3.4.2 Creating Diverse Code 
Creating diverse code involves practical code level manipulation techniques such 
as obfuscation, insertion, and randomisation of code, data, or binary files to generate 
different versions of software with the same functionality. Some techniques have 
been designed that can be applied at the source, or compilation and linking stage, 
usually prior to software distribution, whilst other techniques have been developed 
to be applied after distribution such as during installation, loading, or program 
execution  [178]. Research has shown that diversifying software is possible using 
these techniques. Additionally, larger scale experiments have been carried out 
recently that prove diversity can actually be a viable method for wide scale use 
[179],[180]. There are some key types of attacks against which code level 
diversification is good at guarding. These include information leaks, memory 
corruption such as buffer overflows, as well as code injection and code reuse, the 
majority of which can allow the propagation of malware [181] [182] [178]. 
Vulnerabilities allowing these types of attacks are discussed in section 3.3.4. 
3.4.2.1 Source Code Transformations 
Generating different source code implementations has been widely researched 
within the field of fault tolerance, where the idea originated from N-version 
programming, and has often been a manual task [178]. Techniques for the automatic 
generation of source code are more recent. Source code transformations is a technique 
used to automatically create a diverse set of program variants by undergoing 
different transformations given a baseline source code. Some of the transformations 
are purely random while others involve program analysis [179], and are all based on 
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removing, adding or replacing statements in source code [180]. This technique has 
been demonstrated by performing diversity transformations on the server side of a 
client-server network [179]. Multiple cloned copies of the server software stack, 
called request handlers are generated to deal with incoming requests. Instead of 
using cloned copies, these multiple copies could all be different providing 
diversification.  
3.4.2.2 Compiler Transformations 
Compilers are used to translate high level source code into low-level machine 
code automatically. Some diversity techniques take advantage of this process 
already in place by extending existing compilers to automatically diversify machine 
code. 
The NOP insertion technique [33] [34] works by randomly inserting non-
alignment, no operation (NOP) instructions during compile time giving a large 
number of program variants. A NOP is an instruction that the processor fetches and 
executes without any effect on the processor register or machine memory. Although 
adding NOP instructions can positively impact diversity it can also negatively affect 
the performance of the generated binary file.  
Another proposed method utilises the compiler optimisation algorithm. 
Compilers usually try to find the best binary implementation to give optimum 
performance out of numerous possibilities. Instead of choosing the best solution, the 
alternative compiler solutions could also be used to generate alternative unique 
binaries [110] [183] [20]. 
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3.4.2.3 Address Space Randomisation 
Address space randomisation randomises the locations of data and code objects in 
memory [184]. Address space layout randomisation (ASLR) is one of the most well 
known diversity techniques which randomises the layout of a section of memory for 
an executing program. A compiler equips the code for base address randomisation 
and then the operating system changes the virtual memory addresses at which the 
code is loaded [178]. The idea is to provide some protection from memory 
vulnerabilities without needing to remove them from the system such as those 
involving code injection buffer overflow attacks (§3.3.4). Since the randomisation on 
each machine is different, any exploit that depends on a specific relative memory 
address will generally fail. ASLR is in widespread use within operating systems 
such as Google Android, Linux, Microsoft Windows, and iOS [185] [186]. 
3.4.2.4 Data Space Randomisation 
Data space randomisation (DSR) [187] is where the representation of different data 
objects or code in memory is randomised. Data space randomisation can be 
implemented in a variety of ways [185]. One way to modify the data is through 
encryption such as to logically XOR each data object in memory with a unique mask 
and then decrypt it before it is used. In the case of a memory vulnerability attack for 
example using code injection (§3.3.4), the attacker would only be able to write a 
random value into memory rather than the intended value [187]. 
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3.4.2.5 Instruction Set Randomisation 
Instruction set randomisation (ISR) creates a unique set of synthetic instruction sets 
randomly for each computer such as for the Intel x86 machine code [188] [189] [190] 
[191]. Translation from the synthetic instruction set to the instruction set of the 
actual target computer requires an interpreter or just-in-time compiler. Code 
injection attacks utilise the synthetic instruction set and therefore are unable to 
penetrate into the system.  
3.4.2.6 Executable Code Randomisation 
Randomisation techniques such as ASLR and ISR that rely on the 32-bit and 64-
bit architectures can potentially be open to brute force attacks [168] [192] where an 
attacker has many attempts with different combinations until successful. Executable 
code randomisation is where executable code is broken into many functional blocks 
that can be shuffled in memory just before execution [181]. The number of unique 
permutations is higher than ASLR. With 5ŖŖ blocks there are ȁśŖŖ factorialȂ 
permutations making a brute force attack difficult.  
Another technique named In-place code randomisation [193] is based on the 
randomisation of the code sections of binary executable files. Firstly code is 
extracted from the executable binaries using a disassembler, and then 
transformations are conducted on small sections of code such as substitution with 
functionally equivalent alternatives, reordering of instructions, and reordering of 
register preservation code. 
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3.4.3 Creating Diverse Systems 
Creating diverse systems, involves the creation of diverse networks or algorithms 
at a higher level of abstraction to analyse their behaviour in relation to either 
diversity alone, or the effectiveness of diversity against an attack model. There have 
been relatively few research papers associated with diversity algorithms to analyse 
overall network behaviour. Those that do exist are very wide ranging in their 
methodology and are often for a specific topology or purpose making them difficult 
to compare. Additionally some are preliminary studies or ideas and therefore have 
limited results in which to analyse the effectiveness of diversity adequately. These 
diverse systems are described below. 
3.4.3.1 Colouring Algorithms 
Colouring algorithms, which are widely investigated in graph theory [194] 
(§4.2.4), have been proposed [35],[36],[37] to try to minimize the number of 
neighbours running the same software package.  In this type of algorithm each 
colour is assumed to be a different software package where each node in the 
network runs a single software package but each can be the same, or different. 
Colouring algorithms however tend to require a global perspective of the network, 
where knowledge of all the links between nodes are needed in order to assign 
colours. In an ad hoc network where, nodes are moving, and links between them are 
constantly changing these types of algorithms would not necessarily be practical. 
Additionally the compulsory assignment of software packages to nodes would be 
difficult in these changing scenarios. Colouring algorithms proposed for software 
diversity involve a fixed number of colours, usually 3 or 4 [35],[37] and are based on 
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network topologies with fixed communication links. OȂDonnell [35] used a network 
topology generated from email traffic logged over a fixed time period to investigate 
4 types of colouring algorithms. The first is where each node randomly chooses a 
colour which remains fixed. The second is where each node at random intervals 
analyses its neighbours and chooses a new colour for itself if the current one is used 
frequently. The third allows pairs of nodes to swap their colours, and the fourth 
combines self updating and swapping which was found to produce the best colour 
distribution across the network. An attack was simulated by selecting one colour to 
be vulnerable with the goal of switching every node in the network to the 
vulnerable colour. This was achieved by introducing malicious nodes to lie about 
different aspects of the algorithm such as their colour or proposed swap. The 
analysis found that the fourth algorithm with the ability to switch between the two 
methods made it more difficult for the attacker because it was unclear which 
method the targeted node was going to carry out and proposed that diversity 
algorithms should contain diversity within them as well. 
Yang [37] focused on sensor networks by partitioning sensor nodes into cells of 
either tessellating hexagons with three possible colours or squares with four 
possible colours (Figure 3-10). The links between sensors were modelled using 
graph theory. Each hexagon or square contained sensors with the same colour. Once 
a cell colour is compromised more than one sensor is infected, with the intention 
that a potential worm attack could be quarantined. A worm attack was simulated 
using a standard Susceptible - Infected model (§4.3.2) where each sensor was able to 
adopt either of two states: susceptible where it is susceptible to the worm but not yet 
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infected, and infected where it has been infected by the worm. With four colours 
arranged in squares as shown in figure 3-10, the minimum distance between the 
same colour is the length of the cell (L). The number of connected sensors (which are 
assumed to be fixed in location) with the same colour is dependent upon L and the 
transmission range of the sensors R. When R is less than L the infection can be 
quarantined to a single cell so that the total number infected is dependent upon the 
number in the infected cell and their location of being within transmission range of 
each other. For a non-diverse system all sensors could potentially become infected 
(assuming R is large enough between individual sensors) since it would be 
equivalent to all cells having the same colour. 
 
Figure 3-10 – Four colour, colouring algorithm [37] 
3.4.3.2 Epidemic Based Attack Models 
Epidemic models are widely used within ecology to study the spread of diseases 
and have also been used to model the spread of malware in computer networks 
(§4.3). Introducing software diversity into epidemic models has been considered by 
Hosseini [195] who used a scale free network topology often considered as a 
common structure of the Internet, together with a discrete-time deterministic SEIRS 
epidemic model with   diverse software packages. The SEIRS epidemic model has 4 
Sensor location in squares Graph representation
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states: Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and Recovered, where once recovered the 
individuals become susceptible again to the same attack. The deterministic 
equations are modified such that by applying   diverse software packages, the rate 
of infection of propagation   is adjusted to    . Another similar model uses 
networks and epidemics to model the diversity and malware propagation of nodes 
[196]. The assumption is that compilers with ȃdiversity enginesȄ produce many 
different executable software variants to generate diverse node types. There are   
node types and   nodes with   malware. For homogeneous mixing networks, the 
total number of nodes infected is     . These equations assume that maximum 
diversity is being achieved so that the number of different software packages or 
node types are equally distributed, thus keeping the equations simplified. The 
colouring algorithm used by Yang [37] (§3.4.3.1) also included an epidemic 
Susceptible - Infected model to analyse how a worm might propagate in response to 
the diversity scheme developed. 
3.4.3.3 Biological-Inspired Models 
Genetic programming [197] is a large topic of research in which computer 
programs are encoded as a set of genes (§2.2.2.1.4) that evolve using an evolutionary 
algorithm to find programs that perform well against set criteria. Usually many 
programs are tested over lots of generations until a solution converges. It has been 
proposed that the parameters used to control how diverse the programs are can be 
used to develop a method for generating a pool of diverse programs (rather than 
converging to a single solution) [198]. It is unclear from the literature whether this 
method has been practically tested.  
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Holtschulte [199] describes a model inspired by the immune system of how 
computers on a network distribute and share patches to repair variants of software 
in response to an attack. The diversity being considered here is the diversity of the 
software patches generated by each node in response to an attack, rather than the 
diversity of the original software in the network which is the same. Nodes attempt 
to generate their own repairs or send requests to neighbours for software variants 
until a resistant variant is found. The research showed that the network topologies 
that allowed the largest amount of software sharing had the least diverse software 
variants, but were also the quickest to resist new attacks, presumably because when 
a resistant variant was found it could be distributed more quickly.  
 Another ecosystem related model, but does not fit into the epidemic model 
category, is that of Bi-partite relationships (Figure 3-11, individuals categorised into 
two sets with relationships between them). These observed relationships within 
ecosystems have been used to introduce ecological based diversity ideas into client-
server software architectures where one set represents the servers and the other the 
clients connected with relationships as shown in Figure 3-11 [175]. The project 
proposed (but not simulated or implemented at the time of this writing) the 
definition of evolution rules to generate diversity in the client server networks. They 
highlighted that the rules should consider a trade-off between providing more 
servers for redundancy and increased cost. 
 
Figure 3-11 – Client–server bipartite graph 
clients
servers
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3.4.3.4 Other Models 
The problem of deciding which software variants to assign to nodes in a network 
has been considered from an optimisation perspective so that the [200] overall 
network resiliency is optimised when placing diverse variants at routing nodes 
within a cloud based network consisting of routing nodes and client nodes (Figure 
3-12). An attack model assigns a probability of an attacker being able to exploit a 
vulnerability for a particular variant within a constrained time frame. Subsequently 
any routing node in the network with this variant becomes compromised. The 
resiliency metric was computed based upon the number of surviving client-to-client 
connections offered by the network when under attack. 
 
Figure 3-12 – Diversity assignment within a cloud 
Diversity for the prevention of software piracy has also been proposed as an idea 
(but not simulated or practically tested) [167]. The model suggests two levels of 
diversification. Firstly each distributed copy is different, and secondly each 
installation of a specific copy is different. It is proposed that a database keeps track 
of the legitimate copies. When a user requests an update, it is tailored to each 
unique copy.  
Instead of designing networks where devices differ from one another in terms of 
software, methods have been proposed to create diverse versions of software 
internally on a single device with a monitor analysing the outputs (Figure 3-13). 
routers
clients
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When the outputs differ an attack is assumed and the variants are reset to 
previously known good states. Using redundant programs has been widely studied 
within the field of fault tolerance. Using different versions of commercially available 
software has been investigated [201] as well as automatically generated software 
[202].  
 
Figure 3-13 – Internal device level diversity 
The use of virtual machines to create internal device diversity has also been 
proposed [203] [204]. A device level system named ChameleonSoft [203] partitions 
software programs into small chunks which run within separate capsules. A capsule 
is described as a smart micro sandbox/virtual machine encapsulating a single active 
code variant as part of a running application. The capsules manually or 
automatically use a pre-generated set of functionally equivalent variants which are 
intelligently shuffled at runtime to confuse the attacker. Confusing a targeted 
attacker can make it difficult to establish what vulnerabilities may be present or 
what resources are being used in a specific device at any given time. 
3.4.4 Measuring and Analysing Diversity 
A broad range of techniques have been proposed for measuring and analysing 
diversity of computer networks and are achieved either through the gathering of 
data, or through the use of diversity metrics. Some metrics are single statistical 
values, whilst others are multi-dimensional. Other techniques do not measure 
Variant 1 Variant 2
Monitor
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diversity directly but analyse other important properties such as the commonality of 
vulnerabilities between software. Descriptions of the methods used are detailed 
below. 
3.4.4.1 Shannon Index 
The Shannon Index (or Shannon Entropy) is used to measure species and genetic 
diversity in natural systems (§2.3.2.2.3). It has also been used for analysing diversity 
in a computer network after the response to an attack where diverse software 
patches and repairs were generated [199]. It has also been used to measure diversity 
(discussed as entropy) of a bipartite graph interconnecting hosts and vulnerabilities 
within a game theoretic model [40].  
3.4.4.2 Number of Variants 
A popular metric is just to simply use the number of different software variants. 
Hosseini [195] and Hole [196] both use the parameter   (number of software 
variants) within their epidemic models to describe the diversity. This metric is on a 
par with diversity richness (species, genotypic, or allelic) which is used as a 
diversity measure in natural systems (§2.3). This metric however does not take into 
account the distribution and number of each type used. 
3.4.4.3 Resiliency 
The Diversity Assignment Problem [200] as described in 3.4.3.4 was presented to 
specify how to optimize overall network resiliency when placing diverse variants at 
routing nodes. The resiliency metric was used as a measure of diversity and was 
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computed based upon the number of surviving client-to-client connections offered 
by the network when under attack. 
3.4.4.4 Multi-dimensional Properties 
Measuring diversity has also been considered from a multi-dimensional 
perspective. It was proposed that diversity should be measured by considering 6 
dimensions as shown in Figure 3-14 representing the functional capabilities of the 
network architecture [38]. Dimensions proposed were: operating systems, 
communications medium, service model, network protocol, transport protocol, and 
routing mechanism. The distance between network elements reflects their diversity, 
for example the distance between OSs Linux and Windows would be large and the 
distance between Network protocols IPv4 and IPv6 would be small. A point in the 
multi-dimensional space would be representative of the software stack on a unique 
device. Three dimensions have also been proposed representing aspects that are 
orthogonal to each other such as hardware, operating system, and application 
software.  
 
Figure 3-14 – Multi-dimensional diversity metric [38] 
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This is combined with the Shannon Entropy discussed in section 3.4.4.1 above so 
that the final entropy measure is the sum of the entropies of each dimension [39]. 
3.4.4.5 Analysing Software Binary Files 
An attempt at measuring the existing diversity of systems has been carried out 
by collecting data and analysing variants of software binary files [205]: Three 
metrics were proposed to measure diversity; 1) The probability of a successful 
targeted attack which is based upon the number of instances of the most frequent 
variant of a given file and the total number of instances of that file. 2) The ratio of 
the number of variants to the total number of instances of all the variants of a file. 
The bigger the ratio, the more variants the file has and subsequently more attacks 
are needed to compromise all the instances of the file. 3) The coefficient of variation. 
This is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. If the ratio is small the 
instances are distributed uniformly. 
3.4.4.6 Common Vulnerabilities 
Another approach to measuring diversity in current software has been through 
the analysis of vulnerabilities. One study analysed the commonality of 
vulnerabilities of 11 different operating systems over a 15 year period [206]. Data 
was extracted from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Every pair of OSs were analysed for 
common vulnerabilities. Common vulnerabilities were found to exist, and not 
surprisingly, there were more common vulnerabilities between different versions of 
the same OS such as between Windows 2008 and Windows 2003 than between 
completely different OSs. It was also found that one vulnerability affected nine OSs, 
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which related to a well known problem in the design of the TCP leading to denial of 
service problems. This means that vulnerabilities introduced at the design stage can 
propagate into the code no matter how it is implemented. In general though the 
commonality of vulnerabilities were deemed sufficiently low enough to declare that 
building a system with diverse OSs may be a useful security technique.  
Another study focused on application software during a one year period [207]. 
The research highlighted that the majority of the software products, including those 
providing the same service and those that ran on multiple operating systems, either 
did not have the same vulnerability or cannot be compromised with the same 
exploit. However it was noted that although different distributions of the same 
product could not be attacked by the same exploit code they had at least an 80% 
chance of suffering from the same type of vulnerability. In general, again it was 
concluded that using different commercial software applications could be an 
effective security technique. 
3.4.5 Diversity Open Research 
There are currently open research questions regarding where and when diversity 
should be introduced [208], or whether it should be applied everywhere at all levels 
and layers. There are currently a wide range of ideas and methodologies proposed 
for network level diversity often targeted at a specific topology or purpose, however 
the majority are limited to conceptual ideas and minimal analysis. Despite the 
growing research in this area there is still a large gap in understanding the actual 
benefits of diversity as a security mechanism [209], particularly from an ecological 
perspective. 
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There is no well defined metric for measuring diversity within computer 
networks. A broad range of techniques have been proposed but none capture both 
the granularity of diversity at different layers of a software stack and the 
distribution of diversity at the same time. Additionally none consider practical 
constraints associated with compatibility issues, user preferences or devices unable 
to participate due to hardware limitations. 
The tools and technologies enabling wide-spread software diversity to become a 
reality are slowing merging together, however many of the methodologies are still 
early stage proposals and larger scale experiments analysing their practical 
effectiveness are still limited or yet to be undertaken. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed three areas of technology and research. The first focused 
on the Internet. Software and protocols of the future are likely to remain 
modularised, perhaps with even more functionality and choice, particularly with 
the continuously evolving open source paradigm. Software stacks can be partitioned 
into four main layers, although these layers can be broken down further to define 
specific functionality. The modularity of software, together with improved 
virtualisation, and better automated software generation and dissemination, could 
allow individually tailored software stacks to be dynamically created providing a 
powerful tool for enabling diversity. The Internet will comprise different topologies 
utilising a multitude of communication protocols depending upon the devices and 
their application. There will be more localised peer-to-peer communication, with ad 
hoc networks featuring more prominently in the future. 
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The second section on cyber security focused upon malware which is prolific in 
monoculture environments since it can spread over networks taking advantage of 
software, such as widely used operating systems with the same vulnerability.  
Malware can exploit a multitude of different types of vulnerabilities which can 
appear at different layers of the software stack. Publically unknown vulnerabilities 
are particularly dangerous as they are used in zero-day attacks, where the damage 
can go unnoticed for long periods of time. The use of multiple exploits across layers 
poses a significant threat, especially if they are targeting zero-day vulnerabilities. 
The third section explored the current state of research of diversity within 
computing systems. Diversity as a security mechanism increases the difficulty for 
attackers to target multiple devices and networks during a single attack. It prevents 
the attacker from having detailed knowledge of each computer, forcing them to be 
targeted individually, and in turn increasing the difficulty of propagating malware. 
Research has shown that diversifying software is possible through diversification at 
the code level. Code level diversification however does not consider the dynamics of 
diversity at multiple layers of the stack or the dynamics at a network level in the 
face of an attack where it may not be possible for all devices to apply a diversity 
technique. Diversity analysis at the network level allows the effects of the creation 
and distribution of diverse code to be analysed using different methods, both from 
centrally generated sources and via distributed methods. It also enables the 
resistance of a network to be simulated under a range of different conditions in the 
face of a malware attack. There are currently open research questions regarding 
diversity. There is still a large gap in understanding the actual benefits of diversity 
Chapter 3  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 81 of 357 May 2017  
as a security mechanism and particularly from an ecological perspective. There is no 
well defined metric for measuring diversity within computer networks. Those 
proposed do not capture both the granularity of diversity at different layers of a 
software stack and the distribution of diversity simultaneously. Additionally none 
of the research considers practical constraints associated with compatibility issues or 
user preferences. 
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4 Modelling 
Chapter 4 
Modelling 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the modelling of peer-to-peer communication networks with 
an emphasis on mobile ad hoc networks, highlighting their comparability with 
natural systems. Compartmental based methods for modelling the propagation of 
malware at a system level are reviewed. These epidemic models are widely used for 
modelling the spread of diseases within natural systems. Details regarding the 
properties of the deterministic and stochastic SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) 
models are given which are used by development work in later chapters. Agent-
based epidemics are considered for modelling malware at the individual level as 
well as infection genetic models where matching algorithms are used to match 
pathogens to hosts. These principles are also used by development work in later 
chapters. 
4.2 Modelling Ad Hoc Networks 
Devices utilising direct peer-to-peer communication, particularly those within ad 
hoc networks can be compared with natural systems since the devices, for example 
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mobile phones, interact closely with humans following their mobility and 
interaction patterns [210]. Ad hoc networks are expected to become more prominent 
in the future Internet either as a separate topology or integrated with sensor and 
peer-to-peer overlay networks (§3.2.3), so the focus of this research will be limited to 
networks which are ad hoc. There are a number of methodologies for modelling 
such networks which are summarised in the following sections. 
4.2.1 Mobility Models 
Mobility models consider the movement patterns of devices within a mobile 
network and can be used to visualise individual or aggregated travel paths. There 
are two types of mobility models generally used: traces and synthetic models [211]. 
Traces are generated from observed data and can provide accurate information 
when using large datasets. Synthetic models attempt to represent the mobile 
behaviour realistically without the need for trace data. A number of synthetic 
models exist for ad hoc networks [211]. One model that is used in many simulation 
studies is the Random Waypoint model [212] [213] [214] [215] [216] [217]. It was 
developed to represent the mobility patterns of people with mobile devices within a 
confined environment such as a room [218]. As pictured in Figure 4-1 each node 
starts by remaining stationary for pause time seconds. It then selects a destination 
point within a bounded rectangular area. The node then moves to that destination at 
a selected speed. Values for the destination, speed and pause time are chosen 
independently and at random from uniform distributions between upper and lower 
bounds. When the destination is reached the cycle of pause, choosing a destination, 
and moving at speed is repeated until the end of the simulation. 
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Figure 4-1 – Random waypoint mobility model 
4.2.2 Simulators 
Mobility models are often integrated into event-based simulators to allow the 
detailed modelling of new or improved protocols such as those necessary to provide 
ad hoc routing. Simulators such as Opnet, NS3, and QualNet [219] are used to 
model detailed characteristics at different layers of the network stack under realistic 
conditions. As well as mobility models the simulators can include other realistic 
characteristics such as radio transmission, buffer space for the storage of messages, 
and data traffic models. A downside of these simulators is that much effort is 
required to learn the details of the simulator architecture and programming 
language. These types of simulators can be seen as a type of agent-based model with 
very detailed characteristics for the agents (nodes) in the network. 
4.2.3 Agent-Based Models 
Agent-based Models (ABM) attempt to capture the complexity of individual 
behaviour and have been widely used across a growing number of fields [220]. Such 
models, however, do not necessarily need the detailed characteristics used within 
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simulators, and can follow a set of simple rules at a higher level of abstraction, 
sometimes generating emergent behaviour [221].  ABMs allow a wide choice of 
design parameters and rules making each model different but tailored to each 
research question. They have been used for modelling ad hoc networks [219] [222] 
[223] and use software such as Netlogo and Matlab to model high level behaviour. 
4.2.4 Graph Theory 
Graph theory is another technique for modelling communication networks. A 
graph is made up of vertices (nodes or points) which are connected by edges (links 
or lines). Graph theory is used to measure properties such as the degree distribution 
(probability that a vertex chosen uniformly at random has degree k, where degree k 
is the number of edges connected to a vertex) or clustering coefficient (measure of 
how strongly nodes in a graph cluster together). Graph theory has been used to 
study the architecture of the Internet [224] and analyse the behaviour of routing 
protocols of ad hoc networks [225] [226]. 
4.2.5 Homogeneous Mixing Models 
When the networks to be analysed are considered to be large, homogeneous 
mixing models can be used to model the network as a whole entity. Here it is 
assumed the system is the average of the individual nodes where nodes make 
contact with each other in a peer-to-peer fashion at random. Such assumptions 
originated from the modelling of infectious diseases within human populations 
using deterministic and stochastic methods and have since additionally been used 
to model the propagation of malware within mobile wireless networks. This is 
discussed in more depth in the next section (§4.3). 
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4.3 Epidemic Modelling of Mobile Malware 
4.3.1 Mathematical Models of Epidemics 
There are two main types of mathematical models that are used to describe the 
spreading characteristics of epidemics: deterministic, and stochastic which can be 
used to make system level predictions [227] [228]. The deterministic model always 
performs the same way for a given set of initial conditions and is used to model 
large populations (or networks), whereas for the stochastic model randomness is 
present and the output result is a probability distribution. Stochastic models are able 
to model smaller populations and are often considered to be more realistic.  
A mechanism that links these models is the concept of compartments where 
individuals are assumed to be in one of a number of different compartments (states 
or classes) at any given time. These compartments represent the individualsȂ health 
status with respect to the disease. For example the population could be divided into 
those who are Susceptible (S), those who are Infected (I) and those who have 
Recovered (R). For both the deterministic and stochastic based models, the number 
within each compartment is simulated as the epidemic progresses. Malware epidemic 
models have used a multitude of different compartments. The SI variant has been 
used for modelling a mobile phone virus using two compartments where there are 
no recovery mechanisms [229]. The SEIS model includes an extra Exposed (E) 
compartment as there may be an incubation period before the virus attacks [230]. 
The extra susceptible (S) in the model name denotes the fact that instead of 
recovery, the devices become susceptible again. The SEIRD model was proposed to 
model virus propagation specifically via Bluetooth and MMS to investigate the 
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Commwarrior virus [231]. The additional Dormancy (D) compartment represents 
the condition when the virus drains the battery by sending out many MMS 
messages. The author of this thesis proposed a SEPTICOX model incorporating 
conditions where the phones were switched off or offline for Bluetooth based 
networks which required a number of additional compartments: Prevented (P), 
Treated (T), Contained (C), Offline (O), eXposed off-line (X) [3].  
Details regarding the properties of the deterministic and stochastic SIR models 
are described in the following text which are used as a reference for development 
work in chapter 6 of this thesis. Note that the work assumes that once devices have 
fully recovered from a particular malware (through patching or anit-virus tools) 
they cannot be re-susceptible to the same malware so that the 'R' compartment is 
designated the end state. Thus the closely related SIRS model [228], where there is 
no end state (compartment) and re-susceptibility can occur following recovery, has 
not been detailed within the background material (see chapter 6) 
4.3.2 The Deterministic SIR Model 
In the deterministic SIR [228], where individuals mix homogeneously (§4.2.5), 
and the population is considered to be large, the law of mass action is applied to the 
rates of transmission between two compartments where the rate of interaction is 
proportional to the product of the numbers in each compartment. The transition 
rates from one compartment to another are mathematically expressed as 
derivatives, hence the model is formulated using differential equations. 
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4.3.2.1 Model Equations 
The basic SIR model was initially developed by Kermack and McKendre [232] and 
is comprised of three compartments as shown in Figure 4-2. The   compartment 
represents those that are susceptible to a disease or virus but not yet infected,   
represents those that are infected and infectious with the disease, and   represents 
those that have recovered from the disease.   defines the total population size and 
is assumed to be fixed.  
 
Figure 4-2 – SIR model   is known as the infection rate (or effective contact rate) and is defined as [233]:  
      
(4-1) 
Where   is the probability of an infection given contact between a susceptible and 
an infected individual, and   is the average rate of contact between susceptible and 
infected individuals. The rate at which those susceptible become infected is 
attributed to the proportion of the population who are already infected     
multiplied by the infection rate  . 
  is the rate of recovery of an individual, and can also be written as: 
      (4-2) 
Where   is the duration of the infection. 
S I R
βI/N γ
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The model is described using differential equations, where the transition rates 
from one compartment to another are expressed as derivatives:            (4-3)               (4-4)         (4-5) 
4.3.2.2 Discrete Model 
The model can also be represented in discrete form using difference equations, 
where the number in each compartment at the next time step       is formulated 
by the rates and the number in each compartment at the current time step    . This 
approach is convenient for computer simulation of the model: 
                        (4-6) 
                              (4-7)                    (4-8) 
The total population size     is assumed to be fixed so that:   
                  (4-9) 
4.3.2.3 Deterministic Epidemic Example 
To illustrate the mathematics an example showing an epidemic following the SIR 
equations is given through simulation in Figure 4-3 (a) .When an epidemic occurs 
susceptible individuals become infected and move to the infected compartment 
faster than infected individuals can recover (where      creating a peak of 
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infections. Figure 4-3 (a) shows the number within each compartment as the 
epidemic progresses. The SIR model was simulated from difference equations 
(§4.3.2.2) using Mathworks Matlab. The number infected      increases and then 
falls as recovery takes place. To show an epidemic occurring the condition     
needs to occur as stated above. In this example values are chosen to represent this 
condition where       and       . With no recovery, the SIR model reduces to 
two states   and  , which is also known as the SI model. Under this condition all of 
those susceptible will eventually become infected, and stay infected as shown in 
Figure 4-3 (b). 
 
Figure 4-3 – Deterministic SIR model using difference equations. 
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states where ȕ=0.3,Ȗ=0.15. All those susceptible 
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4.3.2.4 End Time of the Epidemic 
When there is no chance of recovery, the dynamical equations can be simplified 
so that Equation (4-4) becomes:                      (4-10) 
where the time at which the epidemic reaches its final state has an analytical 
solution. Substituting       into Equation (4-10) results in a logistic equation for I 
[228]:               (4-11) 
With a solution [228]: 
                              (4-12) 
The end of the simulation    is specified to occur when the number infected is 
within 1 of its final value          so that Equation (4-12) becomes: 
                              (4-13) 
Rearranging for   : 
                           (4-14) 
 
4.3.2.5 The Reproduction Number R0 
A key metric used in epidemiology to determine whether a disease will spread or 
not is the reproduction number. It is defined as the number of secondary cases 
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produced by a single infection within a susceptible population [233]. The 
reproduction number can be derived by considering that an epidemic occurs if the 
number of infected individuals increases, where:        (4-15) 
Substituting in Equation (4-4) becomes:            (4-16)          (4-17)         (4-18) 
At the outset of an epidemic, where    , everyone except the initial infected 
individual is susceptible. At this point   can therefore be approximated to  , and 
the equation simplifies to:      (4-19) 
                                   (4-20) 
For    values greater than 1 an epidemic occurs, and for    values equal to or 
less than 1, the epidemic dies away. Figure 4-3 (c) shows the number of infected 
individuals for varying values of   when   is fixed at 0.3. When             , 
there is an epidemic as the number of infected individuals increases above the initial 
value of 1. As the value of   is reduced, the peak value of the infection is reduced, 
the time of the peak moves to the right and the spread of the infection increases. 
When              the epidemic dies away as the number of infected 
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individuals never goes above 1 as shown by the sub-graph in Figure 4-3 (c). When              the infection dies away even faster, with the corresponding curves 
reduced to zero very quickly. Figure 4-3 (d) shows the corresponding    
relationship with  , as   is varied between 0.1 and 0.5 (as given in Figure 4-3 (c)), 
additionally showing    when       for a fixed      . 
4.3.2.6 The Balance Equation 
Another important attribute of an epidemic is its final state, which is the total 
fraction of the population that was infected. A balance equation [234] can be derived 
that describes the final state of the system when t→ ∞, by dividing the differential 
equations of the SIR model (Equations (4-3) and (4-5)).                                          (4-21) 
This implies the solution: 
                    (4-22) 
During an epidemic those within the infected state will eventually move to the 
recovered state, so at the end of the epidemic there will only be those still 
susceptible     , or recovered     . This means that: 
            (4-23) 
Assuming that at    , no individuals have yet recovered, so that       , then            , and Equation (4-22) can be rearranged to: 
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                         (4-24) 
which can also be expressed as a fraction of  : 
                        
Where             (4-25) 
Solving for      determines the fraction that were infected at the end of the 
epidemic. This equation can be solved numerically using the approximation that         and is graphed in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 – Final size of the epidemic as a fraction of the population size 
4.3.3 The Stochastic SIR Model 
Stochastic SIR models are often described using discrete or continuous time 
Markov chains or stochastic differential equations [235]. A probabilistic model takes 
into account that there may be some element of randomness in at least one of the 
parameters. Predictions from that model are probability distributions, for example 
distributions of the possible numbers of those susceptible, infected or recovered. 
The Markovian standard stochastic SIR epidemic model [228] [234] assumes a closed 
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epidemic model (§4.3.2). An important feature of the stochastic model is that due to 
the inherent nature of randomness, a major outbreak is not always guaranteed when     . For example, during the initial outbreak the infected individual or a small 
number of individuals that have already become infected may recover by chance 
before they can infect others. This is termed an initial fade-out [236] or a minor 
epidemic outbreak [234]. An overview of the general stochastic SIR model is given 
here together with some important properties and approximations that have been 
developed in the literature, on the assumption of a large population. These are used 
as a reference for the developed model described in chapter 6. 
4.3.3.1 Rate of Contact 
For a stochastic SIR model the infectious individuals have contact with other 
individuals randomly in time at a constant average rate  . Each contact is with an 
individual selected uniformly at random from the population. The time between 
contacts is described by an exponential distribution which is a type of probability 
distribution that describes the time between events in a Poisson process that occur 
continuously and independently at a constant average rate. 
To coincide with the deterministic model the mean contact period    is the 
reciprocal of the deterministic contact rate  , so that the exponential probability 
density function (PDF): 
   :                            (4-26) 
A PDF of a   value of 0.3 is pictured in Figure 4-5. 
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Figure 4-5 – PDF for a c value of 0.3                             (4-27)                                    (4-28)                                           (4-29) 
4.3.3.2 Infectious Period 
Infected individuals remain infectious for a time period and then recover. As 
with the contact rate, the infectious period is described by an exponential 
distribution. To coincide with the deterministic model the mean infectious period    
is the reciprocal of the deterministic recovery rate  . So that: 
                                (4-30)                                      (4-31)                                               (4-32) 
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4.3.3.3 Discrete Time Markov Model for a Single Compartment 
These types of distributions can be modelled using a Markov process [228] which 
is used to develop stochastic epidemic models and form approximations of some 
important properties. As with the deterministic model, the stochastic Markov model 
analyses how the system progresses but will have different sample paths every time 
it is run.  
A discrete time Markov model is used to illustrate how the stochastic epidemic is 
modelled. Suppose an epidemic model has just one compartment, and hence one 
Markov process,      representing the number of individuals within that 
compartment at time  . For a discrete time model the processes are defined on a 
discrete time scale               and the states, each representing a possible 
number of individuals within the compartment, are discrete random variables             The times between successive jumps of the process are exponentially 
distributed with parameter  . The rate diagram can be drawn as follows: 
 
Figure 4-6 – Rate diagram for a Markov process 
Where state   represents the state where there are   individuals within the 
compartment      . The rate diagram can be expressed as a rate matrix   whose 
elements define the transition rates from one state to another. 
 
0 1 i-1 i i+1 N
α α α
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The probability   that within a small time interval    the number of individuals   within the compartment has increased by one is given by: 
                        (4-33) 
And the complement, where the probability   that within a small time interval    
the number of individuals   within the compartment has remained the same is 
given by: 
                          (4-34) 
The time step    is chosen sufficiently small such that the number of infected 
individuals changes by at most one during the time interval. This means that the 
rate matrix is largely zero valued otherwise it would need to include the rates to 
other states where the number of infected could change by more than one. To 
ensure that the transition probabilities lie in the time interval, the time step    must 
satisfy: 
      (4-35) 
The probabilities can be expressed as a probability matrix   whose elements now 
define the transition probabilities from one state to another. 
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The corresponding probability diagram is given: 
 
Figure 4-7 – Probability diagram for a discrete Markov process 
This process can be coded into software to visualise the different sample paths 
every time it is run. 
4.3.3.4 Discrete Time Markov Model for a Stochastic SIR 
With multiple compartments the Markov process becomes a vector, so that each 
Markov state has a vector component for each necessary compartment. With an SIR 
model it is considered that only the processes of   and   compartments are needed 
since        . Within a small time interval         , the probability   of an 
infection is given by the simultaneous transitions      , where one individual 
leaves the   compartment, and       where one individual enters the   
compartment. Similarly, within a small time interval         , the probability   of 
recovery is given by the simultaneous transitions      , where one individual 
0 1 i-1 i i+1 N
αΔt
1-αΔt 1-αΔt 1-αΔt 1-αΔt 1-αΔt 1-αΔt
αΔt αΔt
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leaves the   compartment, and              , where one individual 
enters the   compartment. The probability equations are therefore: 
                                                   (4-36)                                               
Where      is the infection rate and   is the recovery rate. (4-37) 
And the complement: 
                                                             (4-38) 
To ensure that the transition probabilities lie in the time interval, the time step    
must satisfy: 
                       (4-39) 
4.3.3.5 Stochastic Epidemic Example 
To illustrate the mathematics an example showing an epidemic following the SIR 
Markov process is given through simulation in Figure 4-8 using Mathworks Matlab. 
Parameters were set to show a comparison with the deterministic model (§4.3.2.3). 
When there is no recovery,    , the SIR behaves as an SI model. For an average 
contact rate of 0.3                    the mean result of a large number of 
runs (1000) is shown in Figure 4-8 (a) together with the deterministic solution. Fifty 
of the individual runs for those infected are shown in Figure 4-8 (b). When recovery 
is added, where        the mean result of 1000 runs is shown in Figure 4-8 (c). 
There is a large difference between the stochastic solution and the deterministic 
result. The reason for this can be seen by inspecting individual runs of the recovered 
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compartment in Figure 4-8 (d), where, for a proportion of the runs there is either 
very little or no recovery. These runs account for the condition where minor 
outbreaks have occurred and have resulted in the mean being very different from 
the deterministic result. Under the SI scenario there is no chance of recovery and so 
the possibility of a minor outbreak does not occur. Under these circumstances the 
mean of the stochastic SI model is closer to the deterministic SI model. 
 
Figure 4-8 – Stochastic SIR model. 
4.3.3.6 Important Stochastic SIR Properties 
The following summarises some important properties of the stochastic SIR model 
which are used during development work in chapters 6 and 8. 
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Probability of an outbreak, early stage approximation: When the number in the 
population is considered to be large, the initial phase of the epidemic can be 
approximated by a homogeneous branching process [234], which shows that when      the final size of the epidemic is bounded in probability and the epidemic will 
only be minor. However when      the epidemic will have both a minor element, 
which is bounded with a probability  , and a major element, which is unbounded 
with a probability    . For a standard stochastic model with a closed 
homogeneous uniformly mixing population and one initially infected,           the 
probabilities can be summarised as: 
                                                           (4-40) 
                                                         (4-41) 
Final size approximation: The final fraction infected      are those that end up in 
the recovered state at the end of the outbreak. This fraction is a solution to the 
balance equation (§4.3.2.6), which is the same equation as for the deterministic 
model, except it is assumed that a negligible fraction of the population is initially 
infected, so that: 
                (4-42) 
This equation always has the solution       , corresponding to a minor 
outbreak, and when     , there is another unique solution of      between 0 and 
1 corresponding to a major outbreak [234] (Figure 4-4). 
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Final size distribution of a major outbreak: The final size of a major outbreak will be 
normally distributed around the final size approximation. The notation for a normal 
distribution is defined here as: 
             
Where      denotes a normal distribution,   denotes the mean, and    denotes 
the variance which is the square of the standard deviation. The threshold theorem [234] 
derives the normal distribution of a major outbreak as: 
                                                                             (4-43) 
Where   is the number of individuals,        is the mean final size with   
individuals (excluding initial infectives) and where                    so that the mean   becomes zero, and the variance is defined by the second term.    is the squared 
coefficient of variation of the infectious period. 
            
                                                                         
(4-44) 
4.3.4 Agent-Based Epidemics 
The concept of compartments used in the mathematical models can also be 
incorporated into other models such as agent-based models. SI and SIR variants 
have been incorporated into mobile phone models [237]. Within agent-based models 
nodes are modelled as separate entities so that the result of individual interactions 
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and their behavioural rules determine the spreading dynamics of the epidemic. As 
pictured in Figure 4-9 each node maintains its own health status which can also be 
aggregated into a network level perspective depending upon the nature of the 
simulation model. Agent-based models tend to be difficult to compare since the 
design of agents, their interactions, and behavioural rules depend upon the specifics 
of the scenario being modelled. Agent-based models can also have stochastic 
elements generating output results that are probability distributions. 
 
Figure 4-9 – Epidemic agent-based model 
4.4 Infection Genetics 
It may not just be individual interactions and behaviours that determine the 
spread of diseases. Another set of models that try to mimic infection are those 
studied within evolutionary ecology. These types of models attempt to analyse the 
mechanics of the infection at the individual scale and assume that individuals differ 
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in terms of their genetic make-up. Both the individuals (potential hosts of the 
disease) and the parasite or pathogen causing the infection are modelled. Matching 
algorithms are used to match the pathogens to hosts which subsequently then cause 
them to become infected. Two prominent models are gene-for-gene [238] [239] [240] 
which is based on plant-pathogen interactions and matching-alleles [239] [241] [240] 
[43] [99] based on self/non-self recognition systems in invertebrates. Both models 
include a genotype for the host and a genotype for the pathogen or parasite. Figure 
4-10 shows host and parasite genotypes with two loci each, where A1 and A2 
represent two different alleles at locus 1, and, B1 and B2, represent two different 
alleles at locus 2. Within the gene-for-gene model the parasite alleles within the 
parasite genotype are labelled as either a - avirulent (weakly infectious) or v - 
virulent (highly infectious), and the host alleles within the host genotype are 
labelled as either s - susceptible or r - resistant. A host can resist (R) a parasite if the 
host has a resistant allele at any locus for which the parasite has an avirulent allele 
at the corresponding locus, otherwise infection occurs (I). For the matching-alleles 
model a parasiteȂs genotype must exactly match a hostȂs genotype to successfully 
infect the host. For example genotype A1, B1 of the host matches genotype A1, B1 of 
the parasite.  
These general principles of genetic matching are incorporated within 
development work of later chapters to model malware propagation in diverse 
computing devices and form a novel aspect of the work.  
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Figure 4-10 – Two different infection genetic models 
4.5 Summary 
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They can be compared with natural systems since devices such as mobile phones 
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Mobility models consider the movement patterns of devices, with one reference 
model that is widely used being the Random Waypoint. Mobility can be combined 
with simulators or other agent-based models to analyse individual and network 
level behaviour. Homogeneous mixing models can be used to model the network as 
a whole entity, and have particularly been used within epidemic models to analyse 
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network level behaviour of malware propagation. These models use compartments 
to signify the health status of the network. Properties of the deterministic and 
stochastic SIR epidemic models have been reviewed. Compartmental methods can 
also be incorporated into agent-based models where the result of individual 
interactions and their behavioural rules determine the spreading dynamics of the 
malware. Another class of models used to analyse disease spread study the 
mechanics of infection at the genetic level. They assume both individuals and 
pathogens differ in terms of their genetic make-up. Matching algorithms are used to 
match pathogens to hosts which subsequently become infected. These modelling 
concepts are used during development work of later chapters. Specifically 
homogeneous mixing and the RWP model is integrated together with a 
compartmental approach of monitoring device infection status in a high abstract 
level ABM. Additionally matching algorithms are used to match malware to device 
configurations. Mathematical modelling of malware incorporating both 
deterministic and stochastic methods are also used during development work.
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5 Ecosystem Model of an Ad Hoc Network 
Chapter 5 
Ecosystem Model of an Ad Hoc 
Network 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter links the background material presented in chapters 1 to 4 with the 
work that follows, and is comprised of two sections: 
An Ecosystem Perspective of an Ad Hoc Network Environment: The first section 
describes an ad hoc network environment as an ecosystem using comparable 
terminology and relationship analogies to natural ecosystems as described within 
chapter 2.  
A Diverse System Model: The second section firstly outlines the requirements for a 
diverse system model applicable to ad hoc networks together with constraints that 
highlight the first steps taken in proving the hypothesis of this thesis. Secondly a 
threat model of malware utilising multiple exploits across layers of the software 
stack is defined. Thirdly an overview of two developed models is described. The 
first is based upon the mathematical epidemic approach, and the second is an agent-
based approach. 
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5.2 An Ecosystem Perspective of an Ad Hoc Network 
Environment 
Organisms within natural ecosystems (§2) and devices within ad hoc networks 
(§3) both interact in a peer-to-peer fashion, are distributed, and self-organise. It is 
likely that peer-to-peer wireless networks such as ad hoc networks will become 
more mainstream than they are currently and therefore forms the basis of the 
network topology in which to investigate diversity (§3.2.2). If an ad hoc network, 
together with its users and application environment, is regarded as an ecosystem as 
shown in Figure 5-1 then comparable terminology can be defined and relationship 
analogies can be made to natural ecosystems. Note that the definition of an 
ecosystem here should not be confused with the term ȁsoftware ecosystemȂ which 
has recently been used to describe the progressive development of a software 
product or service incorporating development framework tools, organisations, 
external developers and users such as the Android platform [242]. 
 
Figure 5-1 - Ad hoc network ecosystem 
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Figure 5-2 shows the ecosystem diagram equivalent to that pictured in Figure 2-1 
of Chapter 2, but for an ad hoc network environment, showing its relationships with 
software and hardware diversity. Within natural ecosystems, biodiversity is linked 
to functions and services and its ability to maintain them when faced with 
unwanted disturbances. It is proposed that by applying biodiversity strategies 
within an ad hoc network, the destructive effects arising from security attacks can 
be counterbalanced with the constructive effects of biodiversity to maintain 
ecosystem function and services, and hence benefit overall resistance and resilience. 
Although the focus here is on ad hoc networks, many of the principles described are 
also applicable to computer networks in general. Analogous relationships between 
software and hardware diversity and ad hoc network ecosystem functions and 
services are described in the following text. 
 
Figure 5-2 - Diversity relationships in an ad hoc network ecosystem 
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5.2.1 Scales and Diversity Definitions 
An ad hoc network environment can be partitioned into three scales on a par 
with those discussed in natural systems: Individual (I), community (C) and 
ecosystem (E). The individual scale comprises the independent devices (or nodes) 
and includes software stacks, protocol stacks, physical hardware, and individual 
behavioural characteristics and constraints. The community scale includes 
communities of nodes forming part of a network, or a complete network. This scale 
is concerned with topology and node distribution, data flow and community 
behaviours. The ecosystem scale incorporates multiple clusters of nodes or multiple 
networks and interactions between them, the environment and the users. It also 
includes beneficial outputs such as the resulting services. 
Many principles of diversity are applicable at multiple scales (§2.2.2), with some 
diversity metrics relevant to both species and genotypes (§2.3). Ecologists tend to 
describe diversity in relation to species since it is the easiest to measure and 
experiment with however there is growing evidence that the same relationships 
have been observed at the genotypic level. Partitioning individuals by genotype 
composition or common characteristics into species is well defined in natural 
systems, however categorising elements of an ad hoc network, in theory can be 
conducted on a sliding scale depending upon the chosen granularity. For example a 
software program could form a genetic element of an ad hoc device, or it could be 
categorised into a species of software. The most important aspect is the relevant 
diversity relationships that exist regardless of the scale. For an ad hoc network 
ecosystem the definitions of diversity are partitioned as follows, however the 
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relationships in 5.2.6 are described where they are analogous to that observed in 
nature regardless of the partition. 
(1) Genetic Diversity: This describes the variance in structural composition of 
devices in terms of software and hardware components and is applicable at the 
individual scale. There are methods for defining and measuring diversity in terms 
of genetics that is applicable to defining and measuring the diversity of software 
composition across devices (§2.3) which is discussed further in this chapter (§5.2.6, 
§5.3.2) and used in subsequent chapters (§6.3, §7.4). 
(2) Species Diversity: Species diversity could potentially have multiple meanings 
depending upon the chosen granularity and focus as described above. When 
categorising ad hoc devices as complete entities, species could mean a type of 
device, such as a local ad hoc router or a gateway to the internet, and would be 
applicable at the community scale. Alternatively, when describing software as 
individuals from a pool of available programs, species could mean a type of 
software program, such as a web browser, or an instant messaging application. This 
is because there are analogies between natural species diversity mechanisms and the 
way in which software is developed and adopted by users. Relationship analogies 
are described further in section 5.2.6. 
(3) Ecosystem Diversity: This is the diversity between distinctly separate groups 
or networks of devices, or the diversity incorporating both networks and users and 
the environment. It is applicable at the ecosystem scale and can be measured in 
terms of genetics or species. 
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(4) Functional Diversity: This is the variance and breadth of functionality and 
services, as a result of software, hardware, devices or networks interacting with 
their users and the environment. Consequently functional diversity spans 
individual, community and ecosystem scales. 
5.2.2 Software and Hardware Functions 
As with natural ecosystems, an ad hoc network ecosystem is comprised of many 
interacting components; not just the devices themselves, but interacting layers of 
software and hardware generating a range of processes and functionality at 
different scales. For example functions can arise from single or multiple interacting 
software and hardware modules, or be generated by single or multiple devices. 
Functions can be partitioned into regulating, supporting, and provisioning categories 
as they share similar analogies to those described within natural systems (§2.2.1.2). 
Table 5-1 gives some examples for each type. Network access, for example, is a 
regulating function since it controls how and when the network can be accessed for 
data transmission. Data and program storage is a supporting function since it allows 
all of the software programs to be stored in memory along with any data that is 
generated or shared: without it the devices would not be able to operate as 
intended. The sending of text messages is a provisioning function since it can be 
viewed as a product that is produced from within the ad hoc network. 
5.2.3 Network and User Services 
Network and User Services are the beneficial services provided by the interaction 
of all the components in the ad hoc network ecosystem, and, like natural systems, 
are derived from multiple underlying functions. Services can also be partitioned 
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into regulating, supporting, and provisioning categories (§2.2.1.3) as shown in Table 
5-1. Examples of regulating services include the quality of service of data or 
communication traffic, or, in the broadest sense, the control of malware spreading. 
Supporting services include distributed data storage and data gathering which is 
driven by the natural topology of an ad hoc network. Provisioning services include 
the beneficial product outputs such as an electronic health care service, or a 
multimedia data streaming service. 
Table 5-1 – Ad hoc ecosystem functions and services 
 
5.2.4 Security Attack Disturbances 
5.2.4.1 Disturbance Regime vs Disturbance Events 
Within the ad hoc network ecosystem it is necessary to distinguish between the 
natural disturbance regime and a single disturbance event (§2.2.1.4). The 
disturbance regime, on a par with natural ecosystems, shapes an ad hoc network 
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environment over long time scales such as changes in technological advances, 
trends in user habits, business markets, and application areas which will contribute 
to evolving functions and services. A single disturbance is an event of intense stress 
occurring over a relatively short period of time potentially causing large changes to 
the dynamics of the ad hoc network. Security attacks such as malware can be 
thought of as single disturbance events creating destructive effects at varying 
speeds and severity depending upon the specific attack. 
5.2.4.2 Malware Disturbance Events 
As with natural ecosystems where diseases can spread quickly in monoculture 
populations (§1), so too can malware under similar conditions where there is wide 
spread use of identical software (§3). Examples of the effects of different malware on 
functions and services [243] [244] [245] [246] at different scales is shown in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2 - Malware effects on functions and services 
 
Depending upon the type of malware and the motivation of the attack, effects at 
the individual scale can range from slowing down the operation of a device, to 
completely shutting down the device. At the community scale, malware such as 
some worms and viruses replicate and forward themselves as fast as possible 
creating bursts in network traffic or a reduction in network availability for 
communication. This may result in either a general reduction in quality of service at 
the ecosystem scale such as speed of retrieving data, or no service at all. Other types 
of malware such as Trojans, spyware, and adware are often installed by mistake, 
hidden within genuine programs and slowly extract personal data without affecting 
the functioning of the device or network. Ransomware can restrict access to data, 
software or general functionality of the device. 
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
d
e
v
ic
e
 s
lo
w
s 
d
o
w
n
A
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 o
r 
p
ro
to
co
l s
o
ft
w
a
re
 s
to
p
s 
w
o
rk
in
g
, 
   
o
r 
b
e
h
a
v
e
s 
in
co
rr
e
ct
ly
D
a
m
a
g
e
 t
o
 s
to
re
d
 d
a
ta
C
o
m
p
le
te
 d
e
v
ic
e
 s
h
u
td
o
w
n
 /
 r
e
b
o
o
t
In
cr
e
a
se
 in
 r
e
ce
iv
e
d
 m
e
ss
a
g
e
s 
/ 
d
a
ta
In
cr
e
a
se
 in
 t
ra
n
sm
it
te
d
 m
e
ss
a
g
e
s 
/ 
d
a
ta
U
n
a
b
le
 t
o
 t
ra
n
sm
it
 m
e
ss
a
g
e
s 
/ 
d
a
ta
U
n
a
u
th
o
ri
se
d
 c
o
lle
ct
io
n
 o
f 
d
a
ta
R
e
d
u
ce
d
 a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
 f
o
r 
n
e
tw
o
rk
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
In
cr
e
a
se
d
 o
r 
b
u
rs
ts
 in
 n
e
tw
o
rk
 t
ra
ff
ic
S
e
rv
ic
e
 is
 n
o
t 
a
cc
e
ss
ib
le
S
e
rv
ic
e
 is
 s
lo
w
 (
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 in
 Q
u
a
lit
y
 o
f 
S
e
rv
ic
e
)
Virus            
Worm            
Trojan            
Spyware 
Ransomware     
Adware 
Individual Functional Effects
Community 
Functional 
Effects
Ecosystem 
Services 
Effects
Effects on Function and Services
Malware 
Disturbance
Chapter 5  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 117 of 357 May 2017  
5.2.5 Measured Outputs 
Productivity and stability are two important output measurements of natural 
ecosystems because they consider the effects on function, and the impact on 
resistance and resilience, of disturbance. When the spread of disease is considered, 
additional transmission characteristics are also analysed.  
Within ad hoc networks, and networks in general, the term productivity is not 
discussed directly, instead the overall functional performance of a service, termed 
Quality of Service (QoS), is often used [129] [247] [248]. QoS can be considered 
through a number of functional outputs associated with performance such as 
throughput (amount of data successfully transferred within a fixed time period), bit 
error rate (number of transmission bit errors per unit time), and network delay (time 
taken for a bit of data to be transferred). It often depends upon the context as to 
which is used. Estimation of such characteristics can often be achieved through 
network simulators (§4.2.2). Additionally, it would be possible to analyse these 
functional outputs in response to malware so that the resistance and resilience of the 
networkȂs quality of service could be inferred and is discussed further in section 
6.4.1. 
5.2.6 Natural Biodiversity Mechanisms 
5.2.6.1 Software at the Individual Scale 
In order to form analogies between natural diversity mechanisms and underlying 
ad hoc ecosystem functions a device is framed in terms of genetic software 
components. This is because genetic diversity can inform the diversity between 
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individuals, species, or ecosystems (§2.3.1). Additionally, in order to devise 
biodiversity strategies based on local interactions and multiple layers of software, 
whilst incorporating multi-exploit malware, it is necessary to focus on the 
individual scale of a device and its structural composition. Figure 5-3 shows an ad 
hoc ecosystem with devices (Figure 5-3 (a)) comprised of individualised software 
stacks (Figure 5-3 (b)) generated from a pool of available software (Figure 5-3 (c) and 
(d)). This pool of software can be stored locally in whole or in part but is assumed to 
be separate from the realised software stack.  
The structural composition of each deviceȂs individualised software stack (Figure 
5-3 (a)) can be considered from a genetic perspective by representing this structural 
composition as a genotype (§2.2.2.1.4). The pool of available software (Figure 5-3 (c)) 
contains a bounded number of functions and variants with which to configure the 
genotype. The genotype is split into four layers representing the four general layers 
of the software stack (§3.2.1.3): applications (Layer A), application services (Layer 
B), core OS libraries (Layer C), and kernel (Layer D). Each layer is comprised of one 
or more software functions representing genes, termed software gene functions (F). 
Each function is situated at a specific locus (L) within the software stack. 
Software gene functions for example may include web browsing, window 
management, graphics rendering, or hard disk interfacing. Each software gene 
function can be represented by one of a number of possible software gene variants 
(alleles in a biological systems), such as web browser type 1, or web browser type 2. 
Here a monoploid set of chromosomes is assumed (§2.2.2.1.4) so that only one 
variant is allowed at a locus within a single genotype at any given time.  
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Figure 5-3 – Software at the individual scale 
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Software gene variants are defined from the perspective of propagating malware 
and are assumed to be sufficiently different, whilst remaining functionally 
equivalent, to warrant the necessity of different exploit code to penetrate the 
vulnerability. 
In addition to this, each layer has a bounded functional niche space (§2.2.2.1.1) as 
shown in Figure 5-3 (d) by a third axis, where the variant axis has been rotated. Each 
software gene function has a position within the functional niche space 
representative of the functionality of that gene. There may be both overlapping and 
non-overlapping functions between loci. For example non-overlapping functions 
could be web browsing and document writing, whereas overlapping functions 
could be text messaging and email, both of which enable the sending and receiving 
of plain text communication. In principle, software genotypes can be of varying 
lengths encompassing different functions, allowing functional diversity to exist 
within the ad hoc network ecosystem. 
Software is defined here in terms of genetics with two components of gene 
function and gene variant. However, as mentioned previously biodiversity 
mechanisms researched within ecology, predominantly associated with species, are 
also relevant at multiple scales, and are particularly relevant from the perspective of 
software functionality, and are described below. 
5.2.6.2 Niche Differentiation 
A niche for a particular software program is defined here by its functionality. As 
with natural ecosystems, when software overlaps in terms of functionality, 
sometimes competition or temporal conditions can reduce the softwareȂs 
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fundamental niche to a realised niche (§2.2.2.1.1). For example text messaging and 
email overlap in sending text communication. When users have access to both, 
competition of usage and adoption by users results in each of the two mechanisms 
being better suited under different conditions leading to two different niches. It is 
quite possible that text messaging is used for sending short amounts of text because 
it is quick and instant, whereas email is used for sending larger amounts of text 
often in a more formal manner.  
Ecological research suggests that both perfect complementarity (no functional 
overlap) and functional redundancy (functional overlap) greatly benefit ecosystems 
(§2.2.2.1.1). If software systems were designed with this in mind then perfect 
complementarity would generate greater functionality more rapidly as more 
software programs are developed. The downside would be a total dependence on a 
specific program to provide a certain function. Malware targeting a specific 
program type such as email could therefore cause loss of critical functionality, and 
hence redundancy is also needed. Within current software systems, where software 
for the user or application is the focus, both perfect complementarity and functional 
redundancy exist, but it is not evident from the literature if this has ever been 
analysed. Additionally, different software variants providing the same functionality 
exist, such as different web browser software or different email software 
applications. Functionality of software may not always remain static and could 
dynamically change during operation. Self-modifying code such as software 
reflection, where software is able to examine its own operation and modify its 
functionality at runtime, could potentially cause changes in the realised functional 
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niche space at a particular locus (figure 5-3 (d)) over time (albeit that this represents 
only a part of the larger fundamental niche space to which it has access), which 
could also differ on different computers. One question is whether the changes could 
significantly impact the overall functional goal of the loci. Small changes may be 
beneficial for diversity as it could lead to slightly different approaches, different 
ordering of lower level commands and different memory locations of data, whilst 
still achieving the same goal. Significant changes however could mean that two 
variants at the same locus could no longer be considered as having the same 
functionality and would violate the concept of functionally equivalent software 
variants. 
5.2.6.3 Facilitation 
Software programs seldom operate in isolation of each other and facilitation 
(§2.2.2.1.2) is a natural process in software systems. Two or more pieces of software 
interacting together can cause a positive benefit for at least one of the software 
programs. An example would be of two software programs: a scanner driver 
software interfacing directly to the scanner hardware, and a software program to 
view and save the scanned image. Without the scanner driver, there would be no 
scanned image to view. Within ecology, increasing diversity in the presence of 
facilitation is thought to increase ecosystem function but the exact mechanisms and 
effects, particularly at the genetic level, are largely unknown (§2.2.2.1.2). However 
this type of arrangement is normal within software stacks where there are many 
dependencies between software functions at different layers. 
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5.2.6.4 Trophic Levels 
The dependence between software functions at different layers of the software 
stack can also be viewed as being similar to the interaction between trophic levels of 
natural systems (§2.2.2.1.3). Similar to the lowest trophic level, the lowest software 
layer contains primary functions that interface to the outside world such as drivers 
for hardware and other low level functions (kernel). The next layer (core OS 
libraries) is built upon the kernel. The third layer (application services) is built upon 
the core OS libraries or sometimes the kernel as well. The top layer (applications) 
utilises the lower layers to provide functional software for the user. It is known in 
ecology that diversity at lower layers can increase the number of species at higher 
layers. In terms of software this would indicate that the more diversity in software 
functionality in the kernel, the more diversity there is, or can be at the application 
layer. This makes sense since devices with only a disk driver functionality in the 
kernel would have very limited application software. On the other hand if the 
kernel had drivers for a range of different sensors and actuators then a multitude of 
different application software would exist, and this is seen in practice with large 
volumes of ȁ“ppsȂ available in ȁApp StoresȂ [249] [250]. As well as dependencies 
across layers there may be dependencies within layers at a finer level of granularity, 
for example between software programs and dynamic libraries. For the scheme 
proposed in Figure 5-3 this would mean dependencies between loci. The implication 
being that in order for particular loci to be operational, specific lower level loci 
would need to be present, limiting genotype configurations. However, a software 
program and the dynamic libraries it uses remain decoupled until the program 
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actually runs. This is beneficial for diversity because patching and updating of the 
library can be conducted without recompiling or re-linking the software program, 
but more importantly different variants of the same library can be used on different 
computers. 
5.2.6.5 Genetic Variation 
Within ecology, genetic variation is the driving force behind functional 
differences between individuals (§2.2.2.1.4). Using the assumption that the software 
stack of a device can be represented as a genotype with multiple loci representative 
of multiple layers of software as shown in Figure 5-3, then the genetic variation of a 
group of ad hoc devices can be defined. The genetic variation is the number and 
frequency of different software variants across each locus and the number and 
frequency of different software stack genotypes. For one software gene function at a 
single locus, as the number of variants increases so too does the possible number of 
different genotypes. For example if there are five possible web browser variants, 
there are five possible genotypes. Although web browsers are inherently prone to 
being an initiating source of an attack (e.g. users unknowingly clicking onto 
malicious links), variants are considered to be sufficiently different with respect to 
propagating malware to warrant the necessity of different exploit code to penetrate 
the vulnerability (§5.2.6.1). As more gene functions are added, and hence more loci, 
the possible number of different genotypes increases according to Equation (2-12). 
Genetic variation of software variants determines the genetic diversity of the ad hoc 
network for which there are numerous measures used within ecology (§2.3.2). These 
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methods could equally apply to the diversity of software composition across 
devices. 
5.3 A Diverse System Model 
5.3.1 The Requirements for a Diverse System Model 
5.3.1.1 Requirements Overview 
There is a large gap in understanding the benefits of diversity as a security 
mechanism from an ecological perspective (§3.4.5). Additionally there is no well 
defined metric for measuring diversity of computing systems. Ad hoc networks will 
feature more prominently in the future Internet (§3.2.3) and possess similar 
characteristics to natural ecosystems such as localised interactions, distributed 
architecture and the production of analogous functions and services to those of 
ecosystems. The spread of malware, similar to the spread of diseases, is rife in 
monoculture environments (§1.1.2), where it takes advantage of vulnerabilities at 
different layers of the software stack.  
To investigate the benefits diversity brings against disturbances, such as malware 
spreading events within an ecosystem context, a model of a diverse system (§3.4.3) is 
required. It will need to simulate the injection of malware events whilst 
incorporating multiple layer exploits, diversity schemes based upon local 
interactions, mobility, and the peer-to-peer nature of ad hoc networks. It should also 
consider practical constraints such as user preferences (§3.4.5) and software 
compatibility, where there may be dependencies between specific variants at 
different loci (§3.2.1.3). Dependency between the presence of one locus and another, 
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such as dependency on specific lower layer libraries, is not included (§5.2.6.4) 
however the model could be extended to allow different loci, and different numbers 
of loci on different computers. It will need to assess important outputs of an 
ecosystem such as the quality of service as a measure of productivity, resistance and 
resilience components of stability, as well as malware transmission characteristics. 
In addition to this, metrics for measuring diversity is required that captures the 
granularity of different functions and layers of a software stack and their 
distribution across devices in the network.  
Most of the diverse system models developed in the literature (§3.4.3) treat each 
node as a complete entity. For example, treating nodes as different colours, or 
different single variants of software. As a result, and in general, malware modelling 
tends to simulate the targeting of single software variants as a complete entity on a 
device. The primary contribution of the model is to incorporate diversity whilst 
accounting for malware that uses multiple exploits targeting different 
vulnerabilities at different layers of a software stack, which is a growing concern 
within cyber security (§3.3). The model also allows the evaluation of different 
diversity strategies and is able to compare single and multiple exploit malware 
whilst using the same diversity strategy. 
5.3.1.2 Model Constraints 
The following assumptions and constraints have been applied as a starting point 
in modelling such a system, but the model could be extended at a later date to 
include further aspects. 
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• Within the natural biodiversity-ecosystem relationship, biodiversity can both 
affect the response to disturbance events, and can be affected by disturbance events 
(§2.2.2). This research only focuses on the effect of biodiversity on the response to 
disturbance events as a first step in modelling such complex relationships. 
• Additionally this research focuses strictly on disturbance events over short 
time scales and ignores the effects of natural changes over long time scales caused 
by a disturbance regime (§2.2.1.4). This includes considering only closed networks 
where the number of nodes remains fixed so that there are no nodes entering or 
leaving the network. 
• The disturbance event studied is constrained to malware since this is known 
to be rife in conditions where there is wide spread use of identical software and is 
on a par with disease spread in natural systems. 
• The structural composition of each deviceȂs individualised software stack is 
considered from a genetic perspective by representing the structural composition as a 
genotype. Specific constraints are outlined in section 5.3.1.3 below. Malware and its 
exploits are also considered from a genetic perspective with the ability to target one 
or more software variants. 
• Modelling of behaviours and node interactions remains at a high level of 
abstraction so that event based simulators, where data flow and detailed 
functionality of software is modelled, is not necessary. 
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5.3.1.3 Genotype Structure Constraints 
To simplify modelling and to demonstrate the concepts of both diversity and 
malware targeting multiple layers, one function is included from each of the four 
layers of the defined software stack (§3.2.1.3) leading to genotypes with a fixed 
length of four loci. It is not necessary to model untargeted loci since they have no 
impact on malware propagation at an abstract level. This means that malware 
carrying exploits is limited to targeting at most four loci, one per layer, with any 
number of software variants being bounded only by the simulation parameters. This 
is a reasonable constraint to make since even the well known multi-exploit malware, 
Stuxnet (the first to use so many unknown cross-layer exploits §3.3.3), only targeted 
as many as four layers of the stack. It is additionally implied that at the time of 
initial infection the exploits are unknown and cannot be detected or blocked by anti-
virus software as in the case of a zero day attack (§3.3.3). It demonstrates both the 
concept and the applicability of the current practical scenario of four exploits in the 
AND configuration. The OR configuration is applied to both cross layer and within 
layer and so the total number of exploits modelled can be far greater.  Secondly, it is 
assumed that every device in the network has the same set of functionality (i.e four 
lociǼȄ and this functionality does not change ǻi.e through self-modifying code) so 
that the niche space remains fixed throughout the simulations and the variants at 
each locus are considered to be functionally equivalent. Thirdly, it is assumed that 
there is no functional overlap between the four chosen loci. Fourthly, although 
facilitation and trophic levels are inherent in interacting software programs and 
layered software stacks, their interacting mechanisms are not included in the model. 
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These constraints allow the model to initially focus upon the effects of gene 
variation with respect to software variants whilst fixing the number of functions. 
This is because individual malware code predominantly targets specific variants 
with individualised exploits. With non-overlapping functions and a fixed number of 
loci across all genotypes, functional diversity is limited to the definition of the 
number of loci representing the different gene functions. However, the model could 
be extended at a later date to include the effects of functional variation such as 
varying the number of loci and functional overlap, making it additionally possible 
to categorise malware into types that target certain functions. Additionally the 
model could be extended to include relationships between layers impacting 
vulnerability using multi-stage Boolean logic. This will encompass dependencies 
between layers that contribute to software becoming vulnerable or not (see future 
work §9.3.1.3). 
 Figure 5-4 shows an example genotype with four loci. The first locus represents 
software relating to an application layer functionality such as web browsing. The 
second locus represents an application services layer functionality such as window 
management, which may be used by the web browser application to manage the 
style and position. The third locus represents a core OS library such as graphics 
rendering which may be used by the window manager to process 2D and 3D 
graphics. The fourth locus represents a kernel layer functionality such as low-level 
hard disk interfacing which may be used to manage downloaded files. For every 
genotype on every device, each locus can have one of a number of different variants, 
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so for example locus 1 could have one of a limited number of different web 
browsers. 
 
Figure 5-4 – Constrained genotype with four loci 
The example shows a possible scenario, but equally represents any defined stack 
or partial stack at an abstract representation, where it is assumed that the 
granularity chosen and the functionality defined is in relation to the attacking 
malware. The variants at each locus can be automatically generated variants using 
diversity techniques or comprised of already available software (COTS), but are 
assumed to be sufficiently different from the perspective of the malware to warrant 
the necessity of different exploit code to penetrate the vulnerability (§5.2.6.1). For 
example, if the vulnerability lies within the source code implementation or design of 
an automated set of diverse binary files then the vulnerability may exist in all files, 
but the exact exploit code would need to be different for each variant. This is one of 
the fundamental benefits of diversity – to prevent vulnerabilities that exist from 
being exploited on a wide scale. If variants consist of different COTS software (e.g. 
Linux OS, Windows OS) the vulnerabilities are more likely to be different in the 
variants. However if the COTS variants were different versions of the same software 
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(e.g. 10.12.5, 10.12.6) they could still be considered as different if different exploits 
are required, even if targeting the same vulnerability. The model takes into account 
the ability to infect different versions of the same software by specifying exploits 
within a locus (as opposed to across loci). The malware threat model and types are 
defined in §5.3.3. 
5.3.2 Diversity Measures 
There are many diversity measures in the literature for natural systems (§2.3), 
several of which have been used in isolation to define diversity in computing 
systems, or new multidimensional ones have been defined (§3.4.4). It is proposed 
here that diversity of computing systems is not defined by a single measure, but 
through several, all providing a different but necessary perspective (§2.3.2.4).  
The diversity measures defined here along with the defined genetic composition 
of software described above captures the principles of all those proposed in the 
literature. For example multidimensional functions (§3.4.4.4) is captured in terms of 
software gene functions and functional overlap, where the partitioning of gene 
functions into different loci form the dimensions and are only limited by the 
granularity of the defined functions. The necessary measures are all currently used 
to assess genetic diversity within natural systems and are defined here (in terms of 
computing devices and software stack genotypes) for clarity which are used by the 
models (§6, §7). Additionally defined is the process for increasing diversity in 
relation to the metrics and the definition of maximum diversity. 
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5.3.2.1 Measures Definition 
Genotypic Richness      – This is the number of different software stack genotypes 
currently in use across all devices within the ad hoc ecosystem (§2.3.2.1.1). 
Genotypic Diversity      - This takes into account the frequency of all the different 
software stack genotypes across all devices and is calculated using Equation (2-2) 
(§2.3.2.1.3). 
Number of Variants     - This is the number of software gene variants at a 
particular locus across all devices. 
Variant Richness      - This is the average number of different software gene 
variants per locus across all devices. This is the same as the allelic richness (§2.3.2.2.1) 
and is calculated using Equation (2-4). 
Variant Diversity      – This takes into account the frequency of software gene 
variants across all devices and can be calculated independently at each locus or 
averaged across loci. The Nei Genetic Diversity index is used as a measure of variant 
diversity as given by Equation (2-8) (§2.3.2.2.2). 
5.3.2.2 Increasing Diversity 
Diversity at a single locus can be increased in two ways by either: 
1) Increasing the number of software gene variants, or 
2) Equalising the distribution of variants across all devices 
Diversity of multiple loci can be increased in three ways by either: 
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1) Increasing the number of loci (software gene functions / software stack 
layers) 
2) Increasing the number of software gene variants at any locus, or 
3) Equalising the distribution of either, or both variants and genotypes. 
5.3.2.3 Maximum Diversity Definition 
Maximum Number of Unique Genotypes: The number of variants at each locus 
dictates the maximum possible number of genotypes that could exist (Equation 
(2-12)). 
Maximum Genotypic Diversity: This is the maximum diversity that can be achieved 
for a given set of genotypes, where they are evenly distributed across all devices. 
The given set of genotypes does not necessarily have to be the maximum number of 
unique genotypes (Equation (2-2)). 
Maximum Variant Diversity: This is the maximum diversity of a given set of 
variants at a locus where all the available variants are evenly distributed. The Nei 
Genetic Diversity index (§2.3.2.2.2), (as well as the Shannon index), assess each locus 
independently and so maximum variant diversity at every locus may not 
necessarily need to utilise all of the possible unique genotypes. Figure 5-5 shows 
two examples where maximum variant diversity is achieved with three variants in 
each of the two loci (A1 to A3 and B1 to B3). In Figure 5-5 (a) even though only three 
genotypes are present in a network with nine devices, the three variants in each 
locus are evenly distributed, where each genotype appears three times. Figure 5-5 
(b) shows an alternative solution where all the maximum number of nine unique 
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genotypes are fully utilised and the three variants in each locus are also evenly 
distributed. 
 
Figure 5-5 - Maximum variant diversity with nine devices and three variants 
Absolute Maximum Diversity: To guarantee absolute maximum diversity within an 
ad hoc ecosystem there are four conditions that need to be fulfilled. 
1) For a given number of variants and loci there exists a maximum number of 
unique genotypes, all of which need to be utilised across the devices of the ad hoc 
ecosystem. 
2) The maximum number of unique genotypes needs to be evenly distributed so 
that maximum Genotypic Diversity occurs. 
3) It follows that if the maximum number of unique genotypes are evenly 
distributed so too are the variants within each locus so that maximum Variant 
Diversity is also achieved. 
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4) To allow absolute maximum diversity to be achieved practically, the minimum 
number of ad hoc devices needs to be equal to the maximum number of unique genotypes, 
or a multiple of, to achieve an even distribution. 
5.3.3 Malware Threat Model 
The malware threat model is defined at an abstract level and depicts a theoretical 
representation regarding the way in which malware uses exploits to target different 
layers of the software stack to infect and propagate. The threat model is based upon 
the background research of malware (§3.3) applied to the previously defined 
software stack genotype (§5.2.6). 
Within this threat model, malware is defined by three parameters: 
1) The number of exploits targeting different software variants at each locus (e1 
to eL). 
2) The number of different loci targeted by the exploits (L). 
3) The logic function defining the relationships of the exploits in order to carry 
out its malicious intention (AND, OR). 
The malware representation is shown in Figure 5-6 showing exploits, loci and the 
logic function block. A single exploit is assumed to only be able to penetrate a single 
software variant. In practical terms this means that if an exploit is capable of 
penetrating two non-identical but similar software program stacks with common 
components, then they would be considered as being the same variant at the loci of 
the common components where the exploit is targeting. If different exploit code is 
needed then they would be considered as being different variants. It is possible for 
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malware to carry multiple exploits at each loci to enable it to penetrate different 
variants of the same function. The number of loci defines the number of different 
software stack layer functions targeted by the malware in order to successfully carry 
out its malicious intention. The logic function defines the relationship of the exploits 
across the loci and is based upon two types: the logical AND type and the logical OR 
type. The AND and OR logical functions (together with inversion) form the basic 
blocks for which all other logical functions can be created and has therefore initially 
been limited to these two types. 
 
Figure 5-6 – Malware threat model 
The logical AND type, is representative of malware that uses one or more exploits 
across loci to infect and propagate, and thus creating an AND relationship across 
these loci. In this case at least one of the variants in each of the loci targeted by the 
exploits must be present on a device to cause an infection. This means that the AND 
malware type only targets loci for which it has an exploit for. All other loci are not 
affected. 
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As an example the AND malware type is mapped to the Pegasus malware 
(§3.3.3) that targeted iPhone devices in 2016 and is shown in Figure 5-7. Here three 
exploits are used in an AND relationship across loci, where all three software 
vulnerabilities have to be present in order for the malware to be successful. Other 
multi-exploit AND malware exist, for example the self-propagating Stuxnet worm 
(§3.3.3) requires four separate exploits to infect and propagate. Although these 
malware do not have the capability to propagate over peer to peer wireless 
connections (e.g like the Cabir worm over Bluetooth [156], it does demonstrate the 
principles of using multiple exploits in an AND relationship. As the rise in mobile 
malware continues, multiple exploits are likely to become equally applicable to ad 
hoc networks with propagation over peer to peer wireless connections. 
Additionally, these malware examples only targeted one variant at each of the loci 
but it could have been theoretically possible to have used alternative exploits 
targeting different variants at the same locus if it was deemed worthwhile by the 
attackers, and suitable vulnerabilities were found. In 2017 for example at least eight 
vulnerabilities were identified across different OS implementations (potential 
variants) of the Bluetooth software stack [251] (at the Kernel layer) potentially 
leading to the automated spread of malware over peer to peer Bluetooth 
connections without being detected. It is just a matter of time before these are 
exploited by malware in unpatched versions of operating systems. 
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Figure 5-7 – Pegasus malware AND threat representation 
Using alternative exploits to target old and new versions of software is becoming 
increasingly common as many users infrequently install updates or not at all. The 
CopyCat malware [252] for example iterates through six exploits, mostly at the 
kernel level, using several well-known Android vulnerabilities in order to gain 
access to root privileges of a device. When these alternative exploits target different 
functionality at different loci, an OR relationship is created. This can include 
malware with the ability to infect and propagate via alternative mechanisms. The 
logical OR type, is representative of malware that needs only one exploit to infect and 
propagate, but carries multiple exploits which are available for use. With the 
CopyCat malware for example, exploits targeted vulnerabilities in the camera 
driver, the IPV4 communications function, and user calls in the API library. Figure 
5-8 shows an example based upon three exploits of the CopyCat malware showing a 
comparative OR threat representation to the Pegasus AND malware. 
Applications
Safari web kit exploit
Kernel
Kernel memory 
exploit
Core OS 
libraries
Kernel mapping 
exploit
Application 
services
Infect
Locus 1
Locus 2
Locus 3
Locus 4
Three exploits 
across three loci
AND 
function
Chapter 5  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 139 of 357 May 2017  
 
Figure 5-8 – OR threat representation example based upon the CopyCat malware 
The reviewed epidemic models of computer security (§3.4.3.2) perceive malware 
as a single entity attacking a particular type of device. In comparison with the 
malware threat model this would be equivalent to a single locus without any logic 
function block, and is compared mathematically in chapter 6 (§6.3.2). 
The threat model is currently scoped only for single stage logic using the two 
AND and OR functions, but could be extended to include multi stage logic to model 
more complex malware exploit functions. For example a first stage AND function of 
two loci, and a second stage OR function with a third locus. This could be used to 
represent a case where malware may propagate using two exploits at different loci, 
or using a single exploit at a third locus. Although not all of these combinations 
have been seen in practice, the threat model could allow scenarios to be portrayed 
that may happen in the future allowing their impact to be determined. 
Additionally, the threat model is abstractly representative of any malware with 
exploits targeting software vulnerabilities and is applicable to any computer system 
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that can be partitioned into layers of functions. However within this research it is 
applied only to the ad hoc network environment under the assumption that the 
malware is capable of propagating via peer to peer connections as shown by the 
malware data flow in Figure 5-9. This is representative of current and future real 
world scenarios such as those described in §3.2.2, where examples include moving 
inter vehicular communications, mobile sensor networks and other mobile devices. 
 
Figure 5-9 – Malware data flow in an ad hoc peer to peer environment 
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5.3.4 Diverse System Model Overview 
5.3.4.1 General Overview 
This section describes the general architecture at a high-level of two diverse 
system models that have been developed to incorporate software diversity and 
malware at the genetic level of an ad hoc network ecosystem. The intention of the 
overview is to highlight the key differences between the models and what each 
method offers. The mathematical content and simulation processes are detailed 
within the individual chapters for each model (§6,7). The model with the greatest 
flexibility to incorporate distributed dynamic diversity algorithms, realistic features 
and constraints follows an agent-based approach (§4.3.4). The model is 
predominantly simulation based following defined processes that are applied to 
each and every individual. Under certain constraints this model is comparable to an 
enhanced mathematical epidemic model, which has also been developed to 
incorporate software diversity and malware at the genetic level. The epidemic 
model is predominantly derived and calculated mathematically at a system level 
without knowledge or control of individual behaviour, and is a key difference 
between the two models. The epidemic model also provides a means for 
comparison against standard epidemic models (§4.3.1) as well as the agent model. 
The two models are outlined below with details of their design and implementation 
documented in chapter 6 for the epidemic based model and chapter 7 for the agent-
based model. 
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5.3.4.2 Constrained Diverse System Model: Mathematical 
Epidemic 
The mathematical based approach is comprised of a network model, a 
susceptibility model and a malware model as shown in Figure 5-10 and represents a 
system level view of the whole network.  
 
Figure 5-10 – Architecture of the epidemic based diverse system model 
Network model: The network model assumes wireless communication protocols 
are employed utilising peer-to-peer communication with ad hoc devices that move 
around with their users. Devices can have the same or different software stack 
genotypes leading to diversity in the network. It is assumed the functionality of the 
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devices combine to produce the ecosystems network and user services. At least one 
wireless access point is assumed to be present providing a connection to the Internet 
and an entry point for malware. The inherent nature of a mathematical approach 
assumes homogeneous mixing of devices and so does not offer the flexibility of the 
agent-based approach which can incorporate mobility modelling with geographic 
waypoint information and location based constraints. This highlights another key 
difference between the two models. However, with the epidemic approach, an 
analytical result can be achieved under the assumption of average system level 
conditions. 
Susceptibility model: The susceptibility model mathematically derives the 
susceptibility of the network for a given diversity and malware configuration. The 
diversity of the network is set or derived at a system level (unlike the agent model 
where genotypes are individually set at each device). Malware with multi-locus 
exploits, as defined by the threat model (§5.3.3), is assumed to be capable of 
spreading within the network. The example malware in Figure 5-10 shows a single 
exploit targeting variant 3 at locus 2, but could consist of any number of exploits at 
different loci. The diversity and exploits are used to mathematically determine the 
proportion of devices that are susceptible to a pre-defined malware. The diversity of 
the network within a given time frame is constrained to being static so that once a 
diversity-malware configuration has been created it does not change throughout the 
dynamics of a simulation (unlike the agent model where the genotype 
configurations and hence diversity can change). This follows the assumptions made 
by currently proposed mathematical epidemic models involving diversity (§3.4.3.2). 
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The difference in this proposed model is that a genetic approach is taken to include 
different software functions at different layers of the stack together with malware 
utilising multiple exploits. Current methods assume each node comprises a single 
software variant and additionally malware targets a single software variant. The 
principles of genetic matching between exploits and genotypes is similar to the 
ideas used within infection genetic models (§4.4), but is matched through analytical 
calculations and is targeted specifically for the malware types defined by the threat 
model (§5.3.3). With static genotypes, the susceptibility of the network and the 
average rate of contact (§4.3) between those that are susceptible is pre-calculated 
before applying the malware model. 
Malware model: Parameters generated from the susceptibility model are fed into 
the malware model to obtain simulated ecosystem outputs. The mathematical 
malware model can be either deterministically or stochastically based and currently 
supports either the SI or SIR compartmental models (§4.3). This approach is 
different to the agent model where individual devices keep track of their own health 
status which is determined by the dynamics of the individual simulation (rather 
than the mathematical equations). 
The mathematics of the epidemic model is detailed in chapter 6. 
The constrained epidemic model offers a method of: 
(a) Comparing the proposed genotype structure which consists of software gene 
variants at different loci that can be targeted by multi-exploit malware with current 
epidemic models of diversity, where a genotype or node is considered as a complete 
entity. The model developed can additionally simulate non-maximally diverse 
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scenarios (not considered by other diversity based epidemic malware models 
§3.4.3.2), allowing the diversity of current networks or networks with domineering 
software variants, to be analysed in response to malware and compared to the 
maximally diverse case. 
(b) Verifying the agent-based model under homogeneous mixing and static 
diversity constraints. 
(c) Comparing the mathematical model with the agent-based model, which can 
include additional features such as dynamic diversity, additional security 
mechanisms, geographic mobility and realistic constraints. 
(d) Modelling abstract ecosystem outputs of resistance and resilience and 
maintaining functional performance (Quality of Service) in response to diversity 
and specific types of malware attacks. 
5.3.4.3 Diverse System Model: Agent-Based 
Unlike the epidemic approach where the general architecture (Figure 5-10) is 
representative of the whole network at a system level, the general architecture of the 
agent-based approach as shown in Figure 5-11 (of the diversity and malware 
interaction) represents a single device, and is the same for every device. The agent-
based approach is comprised of a network model, a diversity model and a malware 
model.  
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Figure 5-11 – Architecture of the agent-based diverse system model 
Network model: Each agent represents an ad hoc device with software variants 
performing functions that contribute to the ecosystemȂs network and user services. 
As with the epidemic approach, the network model assumes wireless peer-to-peer 
communication with at least one entry point for malware. With the agent approach 
however, location based mobility can be modelled. An additional feature, that is not 
possible with the epidemic approach, is that during local encounters (contact 
between devices) it is possible to exchange with the contact both genotype 
information and malware, if it is present. Users may also influence the mobility 
pattern of devices, or place constraints on the use of certain software variants. The 
agent-based approach can be additionally constrained to model homogeneous 
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mixing of devices so that verification and comparisons can be made to the epidemic 
model (§7). 
Diversity model: The diversity model uses the genotype structure outlined in 
section 5.3.1.3 to represent the software composition of a device. The diversity of the 
network within a given time frame can be either described as static like the 
epidemic model, where the genotypes remain fixed in each device, or dynamic, 
where the genotypes may change based upon device level decisions from 
information obtained during local encounters and is described further in §7. The 
software genotype on each device is self determined by the diversity model. The 
diversity controller within each device has its own perspective on the diversity of 
the network based upon its local encounters, and in response, determines what 
software genotype should be chosen in order to maximise diversity, subject to any 
constraints. Practical constraints can be applied together with additional security 
mechanisms to explore the effectiveness of diversity as an integrated security 
approach. Whilst the concept of static diversity assignment and dynamic diversity 
assignment are similar to ideas proposed by colouring algorithms for diversity 
(§3.4.3.1), the colouring algorithms have been fixed to 3 or 4 colours (software 
programs) and are simulated on networks with fixed communication links. The 
algorithms developed here are for ad hoc networks with continuously changing 
communication links, are multi-layered, and are unbounded in the number of 
potential software programs. 
Malware model: Devices keep track of their own health status which may be 
susceptible, infected or recovered following the basic SIR epidemic compartments 
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(§4.3.4), but does not follow the mathematical equations like the epidemic model. 
Successful genetic matching between the deviceȂs own genotype and exploits only 
occurs if malware is received by the device and the exploits match to vulnerable 
software components. The malware model uses computational genetic matching 
between the deviceȂs own genotype and a propagating piece of malware, which also 
takes into account the malwareȂs logical function as defined by the threat model 
(§5.3.3). If a match occurs the device is deemed to have become infected, and this in 
turn can change the internal state of the device from susceptible (S) to infected (I). 
An aggregation of the states of the individual devices provides the system level 
perspective. These computational matching methods are similar to those used 
within infection genetic models (§4.4), but as with the epidemic model, is tailored 
specifically for the defined malware types (§5.3.3).  As a result of the interaction of 
the devices, incorporating genotypes and malware, diversity is measured along 
with ecosystem outputs such as resistance and resilience. 
The agent model offers a method of: 
(a) Exploring diversity and malware beyond the limitations of the epidemic 
approach, through dynamic diversity based on local interactions, user influence and 
constraints, additional security mechanisms, and geographic mobility. 
5.3.4.4 Modelling Environment 
The modelling environment used for both models is Mathworks Matlab since it 
provides a computational environment for modelling the high level abstraction of 
device behaviours, as well as matrix manipulation for performing simultaneous 
device operations. Its ability to aid in the generation of GUIȂs is useful for creating 
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fast modelling interfaces for retrieving, generating and saving settings and 
simulation data. The built-in libraries help reduce the need to spend time debugging 
low level code which could otherwise be needed. Disadvantages however are the 
simulation times and memory usage when simulating large networks. To improve 
this, manipulation of data types and controlled saving of data during simulations is 
required. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented an ecosystem model for an ad hoc network, making 
analogies between natural biodiversity mechanisms relating to functionality within 
ecosystems, and natural diversity mechanisms relating to functionality within ad 
hoc networks. Malware can be thought of as destructive disturbance events 
affecting the function and stability of the ad hoc environment. Although the focus 
here is on ad hoc networks, many of the principles described are also applicable to 
computer networks in general. In an ad hoc network ecosystem, functionality is 
predominantly generated by underlying software and hardware components which 
can be captured in terms of genetics at the individual scale of devices. There are two 
key components of software at the genetic level affecting ecosystem functionality: 
That is software gene function and software gene variant. The analogous 
relationships described imply that the fundamental enabling mechanisms for 
enhancing diversity already exist within the current structure of software and ad 
hoc networks. There are methods for measuring diversity at the genetic level that 
could equally apply to the diversity of software composition across devices. 
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A diverse system model is required to simulate these mechanisms where 
individualised software stacks can be represented as genotypes. Some constraints 
have been applied such as limiting the number of loci to four, with one non-
overlapping function being represented from each of the four layers of the software 
stack. This allows the model to focus upon the effects of gene variation with respect 
to software variants and malware targeting specific variants with individualised 
exploits. Single measures of diversity in computing systems have been defined in 
the literature; however it is proposed here that several metrics are necessary to 
define computing diversity at the genetic level, all of which provide a different but 
necessary perspective. A threat model has been defined, focussing upon two types 
of malware; the logical AND and the logical OR which are representative of 
malware using multiple exploits to gain entry and propagate. Two system models 
have been proposed: the mathematical epidemic model, which is detailed within 
chapter 6, and the agent model which is detailed within chapter 7. 
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6 Constrained Diverse System Model: Epidemic Based 
Chapter 6 
Constrained Diverse System Model: 
Epidemic Based 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the architecture and mathematical derivation of the 
constrained diverse system model. The constraints as a result of using an epidemic 
model are described, together with some fundamental questions that the model can 
address under these constraints. The main aspect is the susceptibility model which 
generates both diversity and malware and subsequent analytical genetic matching. 
Two types of malware as defined in the previous chapter have been incorporated, 
each with varying numbers of exploits. Susceptibility equations are derived for the 
two types of malware for software stack genotypes having up to four loci. Outputs 
of the model are defined including resistance and resilience components of stability, 
along with input constraints so that an optimum diversity can be calculated to either 
tolerate or prevent a specific type of malware attack.  
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6.2 System Model Overview 
6.2.1 Overview and Constraints 
The constrained diverse system model builds upon the basic mathematical SIR 
epidemic model (§4.3.1) to investigate diversity and malware propagation at the 
genetic level. The mathematical approach is constrained by four key aspects:  
1) Homogeneous mixing, where the system is the average of the individual 
devices (§4.2.5). 
2) Static diversity, where the genotypes present on each device remain fixed 
throughout a malware epidemic. 
3) Software functions are assumed to be compatible with each other so there are 
no constraints regarding genotype configurations.  
4) Individual users have no influence over the choice of genotypes which are 
predetermined by a centralised source.  
Despite these constraints some key mathematical results have been established to 
answer the following questions under the given constraints: 
1) What security protection or mitigation is offered by biodiversity? 
2) How much biodiversity is needed to overcome specific attacks and is there 
an optimum biodiversity level? 
A key feature of this mathematical approach is the susceptibility model which 
defines the diversity and the malware, and subsequently the susceptibility. 
Additionally, to incorporate diversity into the SIR an equivalent malware model is 
defined and is described below. 
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6.2.2 Equivalent Epidemic Model with Diversity 
6.2.2.1 Without Diversity 
Using the SIR as the underlying model (either deterministic or stochastic), it is 
assumed that a large number of ad hoc devices      exist, and the devices mix 
homogeneously where they make wireless contact with each other at an average 
rate     , as shown in Figure 6-1 (a). 
 
Figure 6-1 - Equivalent epidemic model 
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For a basic SIR model as shown in Figure 6-1 (a), where there is no diversity 
between devices, the entire network is assumed to be susceptible to the malware so 
that the number of devices      within the network equates to the number of 
susceptible devices. During an epidemic simulation, which is modelled by the SIR 
equations (§4.3.2.1), those susceptible may become infected, before recovering 
through various mechanisms, if they are available, such as malware detection and 
removal after antivirus updates. The sum of the devices within the S, I and R 
compartments equate to the number of devices within the network      which 
remains fixed throughout an epidemic simulation. The rate of infection       is the 
product of the contact rate      and the probability of transmission    .  
6.2.2.2 With Static Diversity 
6.2.2.2.1 Extra Immune Compartment 
For a network where there is static diversity, only a proportion of the network      is susceptible, since only those genotypes with exploit matched vulnerable 
software variants can ever become infected. The remaining devices are considered 
immune as shown in Figure 6-1 (b). The malware model could be extended so that 
those devices that are immune could be given another compartment labelled as ȁZȂ, 
where the sum of the devices within the S, I, R and Z compartments equate to the 
number of devices within the network       However, since the rate of entering or 
leaving the compartment is zero for each specific malware attack, the Z 
compartment is fully detached from the SIR compartments. This results in those that 
are immune not participating in the dynamics of the epidemic spread, and leaving 
only those susceptible      being included. 
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6.2.2.2.2 Equivalent Model 
An equivalent malware model as shown in Figure 6-1 (c) can be defined with the 
inclusion of a susceptibility model to calculate the proportion of devices that are 
susceptible      given a specific type of malware attack and diversity scenario. This 
can then be used to identify the number of susceptible devices      participating in 
the spreading dynamics of a known model. The number of susceptible devices 
within the network      can be defined as:         (6-1) 
And those immune      as:             (6-2) 
Additionally, assuming that the density of the network, and hence the contact 
rate of the network      remains unchanged, it follows that the average rate of 
contact between only those that are susceptible     , is also a proportion     , but of 
the total network contact rate      so that:         (6-3) 
Resulting in a modified infection rate     :        (6-4) 
These results can then be fed into the standard SIR model to simulate the output 
dynamics. 
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6.3 Susceptibility Model 
6.3.1 Overview 
Susceptibility is described here as either the proportion      or number of devices      which could potentially become infected by a particular malware. The 
susceptibility model calculates the susceptibility for a given diversity and malware 
scenario. It is assumed there is a statically diverse network so that pre-computing 
the susceptibility in this way is valid for the constrained diverse system model. The 
susceptibility, as shown in Figure 6-2, will depend upon both the diversity of the 
software gene pool generated by the system diversity generator, and the malware 
generated by the system malware generator. The term system is prefixed here to signify 
that the diversity and malware are generated and controlled at the system level for 
the constrained epidemic model. The diversity of the software gene pool depends 
upon several parameters including the number of loci, which has been limited to a 
maximum of four (§5.3.1.3), the number and frequency of software gene variants at 
each locus, and hence the number of possible unique genotypes (§2.3.2.3). The 
specific type of malware attack generated depends upon the number of exploits, the 
targeted loci and variants, and one of two types of malware which are defined in the  
malware threat model(§5.3.3). The example malware in Figure 6-2 shows a single 
exploit targeting variant three at locus two, but could consist of any number of 
exploits at different loci. Genetic matching between these two aspects determines 
the susceptibility, for which an analytical result has been derived (§6.3.2). 
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Figure 6-2 – Susceptibility model 
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number of susceptible devices is then equivalent to the number of times the 
susceptible genotype (software package or node type) occurs within the network    . Additionally the security models either assume each device has a unique 
genotype, or the genotypes are equally distributed so that maximum diversity is 
assumed, thus equating the susceptibility with one exploit to a value of   .  
The definition used by Lively [43] for a non-computing genetic diversity 
epidemic model defines the number susceptible in terms of susceptible genotype 
frequencies so that maximum diversity is not necessarily assumed. Using this 
definition the number of devices susceptible in the network      for a single locus 
and a single exploit can instead be defined as: 
         (6-5) 
Where    is the frequency of the  th genotype that is susceptible and    is the 
total number of devices in the network. The single layer models will subsequently 
be referred to as the ȁone locus modelȂ since they are equivalent to a software stack 
genotype model with one locus. 
For software stack genotypes with multiple loci, together with viruses using 
multiple exploits (within or across loci for the AND and OR types) the above 
equation will not hold since more than one genotype may become susceptible.  
 
Figure 6-3 - Single locus genotypes – one locus model 
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6.3.2.2 Multiple Loci and Multiple Exploits (Genotypic 
Perspective) 
The remainder of this analytical result describes new work that has been 
developed. To consider multiple loci and multiple exploits, firstly consider 
susceptibility from a purely genotypic perspective. Figure 6-4 shows genotypes with 
multiple loci (up to a maximum of four) with upper bounds on the number of 
software gene variants at each locus. The number of genotypes     is the product of 
the number of software variants at each locus (§2.3.2.3), which are all assumed to be 
used in the network. 
 
Figure 6-4 - Multiple locus genotypes 
The single locus Equation (6-5) can be rewritten for malware with multiple 
exploits in a multiple locus network. The number of susceptible devices    is now 
the sum of the frequencies of all the susceptible genotypes   (genotypes that match 
to an exploit) multiplied by the total number of devices in the network. Note that h, 
which is the number of susceptible genotypes and determined by the  number and 
targeting location of exploits, should not be confused with G, the total number of 
possible genotypes which can be derived from v and the number of loci. 
1 VA12 Web Browser
Application 
Layer A
1 VB12 Window Manager
Application 
Services 
Layer B
1 VC12 Graphics Library
Core OS 
Libraries 
Layer C
1 VD12 Disk Driver
Kernel 
Layer D
Locus 1
Loci
Web browsing
FunctionsLayer
Window Management
Graphics rendering
Hard disk interfacing
 variants
Locus 2
Locus 3
Locus 4
Web Browser 5
Window Manager 2
Graphics Library 1
Disk Driver 3
Example 
Genotype
Community of available software
(genotype configuration options)
Chapter 6  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 160 of 357 May 2017  
                             (6-6) 
In a static network that is at absolute maximum diversity (§5.3.2), the frequency of 
all the genotypes will be equal and the equation simplifies to: 
                                (6-7) 
Where   is the number of susceptible genotypes, and   is the maximum number of 
unique genotypes. 
Both Equations (6-6) and (6-7) follow the general Equation (6-1) of the 
susceptibility model where 
        
                                                                        
(6-8) 
This gives a general result for the proportion susceptible    in terms of 
susceptible genotypes where    is the sum of the frequencies of the susceptible 
genotypes in the general case or the ratio of 
   for the maximally diverse case. The 
proportion susceptible    however can be defined more specifically in terms of loci, 
variants, and exploits so that for a given malware and diversity scenario the 
susceptibility can be calculated. The equation for    will also change depending 
upon which of the two, logical AND, or logical OR, malware types is being 
considered. These equations are derived as follows and forms the analytical method 
of genetic matching. 
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6.3.2.3 Sp for Multiple Loci and Multiple Exploits (Logical AND 
type) 
Figure 6-5 gives examples of susceptibility for the AND case when there are three 
software variant choices at each of two loci (A1 to A3 and B1 to B3). In all examples 
there are nine (3 x 3) possible genotypes. As shown in Figure 6-5 (a), when an 
exploit targets one software variant on one locus (A1), the proportion of nodes that 
become susceptible is the frequency      of A1. Under maximum diversity this 
equates to 3/9ths (1/3) since it is assumed that the frequency of all genotypes is 
equal. When two variants are targeted by two exploits (A1 or A2) at the same locus 
(either of the two variants need to be present in the genotype, equating to both 
being susceptible), as shown in Figure 6-5 (b), the susceptibility increases to         or 6/9ths (2/3). However, when one variant is targeted on each of the two 
loci (A1 and B1), as shown in Figure 6-5 (c), the susceptibility changes to        or 
1/9th (1/3 X 1/3), since both variants must be present to become susceptible. As 
shown in Figure 6-5 (d) when either of two variants on both loci are targeted, the 
susceptibility increases to                , or 4/9ths (2/3 X 2/3).  
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Figure 6-5 - Examples of susceptible genotypes for the AND type 
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independent event. Additionally the proportion susceptible at each locus for a given 
exploit scenario defines the probability of those susceptible. 
The probability     of one independent event occurring on one locus   is 
therefore given by 
                               (6-9)                                       (6-10) 
Where     is the frequency of variant   of those susceptible,     is the number of 
exploits targeting locus  , and    is the number of variants in locus  . 
Multiple Loci: For multiple independent events occurring (multiple loci targeted 
by exploits) the probability AND rule (multiplication rule) given in Equation (6-11) 
can be applied 
                                           
             
(6-11) 
Where   is the number of loci targeted by an exploit.  
This equation defines    for the AND type and holds for any number of loci. 
Logical AND type 
Multiple Loci: 
               (6-12) 
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6.3.2.4 Sp for Multiple Loci and Multiple Exploits (Logical OR 
type) 
Figure 6-6 give examples of susceptibility for the OR case. When an exploit 
targets one or more software variants on one locus, the OR case is identical to the 
AND case as shown on Figure 6-6 (a) and (b). For multiple loci the two cases 
become different. When an exploit targets one variant on either of the two loci (A1 
or B1) as shown in Figure 6-6 (c) the susceptibility becomes             , where 
the subtraction accounts for the genotype that is double accounted for in the 
summation. Maximum diversity is 5/9ths (1/3 + 1/3 – 1/9). As shown in Figure 6-6 
(d) the susceptibility increases to                               , or 8/9ths 
(2/3 + 2/3 -4/9) when two variants on either of the loci are targeted (A1 or A2, or B1 
or B2). 
 
 
Figure 6-6 - Examples of susceptible genotypes for the OR type 
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Unlike the logical AND type where equation (6-12) holds for any number of loci, 
the analytical derivation of the OR type results in different equations for different 
number of loci.  
One Locus: The OR case can also be derived using probability theory. For one 
locus the OR case is identical to the AND case.  
The probability     of one independent event occurring on one locus   is given by 
                               (6-13)                                       (6-14) 
Where     is the frequency of variant  ,    is the number of exploits targeting 
locus  , and    is the number of variants in locus  . 
Logical OR type: 
(one locus) 
         (6-15) 
Two Loci: For two independent events occurring (two loci targeted by exploits) 
the probability OR rule (General Addition Rule) can be applied as given in Equation 
(6-16). 
                                             (6-16) 
And therefore the proportion susceptible    for a two locus network becomes 
Logical OR type: 
(two loci) 
                           (6-17) 
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For multiple independent events (multiple loci targeted by exploits) the OR rule 
can be generally applied iteratively based on the number of loci. The three and four 
locus derivations are documented in Appendix A (A.1) and (A.2). The result for the 
four locus is used extensively and referenced within the results (chapter 8) since the 
underlying model is based upon a software stack genotype with four loci. 
6.4 Outputs 
6.4.1 Outputs of Current Epidemic Models 
Whilst mathematical models of epidemics focus on transmission characteristics 
and epidemic thresholds, they rarely consider or link these to ecological 
productivity and stability directly. Also, terminology used within the literature in 
reference to ecosystems such as stability and resistance has different meanings for 
epidemic models. For example Stability analysis of epidemic models investigates the 
reaction of the system to small perturbations around equilibrium points (fixed 
points) determined from the actual equations of the system model [254]. The 
analysis determines if the points are stable (system moves towards the point) or 
unstable (system moves away from the point). The term resistance either means drug 
resistance which develops when micro-organisms no longer respond to a drug to 
which they were previously susceptible [255], or host resistance which describes how 
susceptible a particular host is to a particular disease or pathogen [256] [257]. These 
two aspects are both incorporated within the equations or design of epidemic 
models so that transmission characteristics and resultant effects can be analysed at 
the system level.  
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However, it is possible to infer ecological outputs from epidemic models in some 
cases. For example the final size of an epidemic (§4.3.2.6) describes the system level 
perspective of the total proportion of individuals that were infected [234]. If instead, 
the total proportion of individuals that were not infected is considered, then this can 
be used as a measure of system level resistance. Some models inherently incorporate 
recovery parameters such as the classic SIR model (§4.3.1) for which system 
recovery times, usually discussed as the duration of the epidemic [234] or the 
extinction time of the epidemic [258], can be simulated under different conditions.  
The duration of the epidemic can be used to infer engineering resilience since it 
indicates how quickly the system can recover from a given scenario. An advantage 
is that these stability parameters can be measured at a high level of abstraction 
without the need to simulate user data flow to measure functional performance. 
6.4.2 Outputs Overview of the Developed Model 
This section defines the outputs from the model using the high level abstraction 
described above for the two key components of ecosystem stability: resistance and 
resilience (§2.2.2.2.2, §5.2.5). An overview of the outputs is shown in Figure 6-7. The 
resistance component      can be calculated and constrained analytically, and 
compared to the simulated output. The resilience component      is determined 
from simulation since it has no analytical solution (§4.3.2.4), and is described further 
in §6.4.5.2. However when there are no recovery mechanisms for the malware, the 
peak infection time      can be calculated for the deterministic SI case. Additionally, 
an optimum diversity can be determined for a specific type of malware attack given 
one of two constraints. The first constraint relates to the maintenance of ecosystem 
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function when faced with malware so that an acceptable Quality of Service (QoS) is 
still guaranteed (§5.2.5). A QoS Tolerance      is used to determine a required 
malware resistance from which an optimum diversity can be determined. The 
second constraint which is only applicable when recovery mechanisms are in place 
is to determine the optimum diversity to prevent a major outbreak of the malware. 
This occurs when the reproduction number is below the critical threshold        
(§4.3.2.5). The calculated optimum diversity necessary to tolerate or overcome a 
specific malware attack also leads to the quantification of the minimum number of 
devices required to uphold this optimum diversity requirement. 
 
Figure 6-7 - Overview of outputs, constraints and optimum diversity 
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recovery in the timescale of the epidemic, the SIR model reduces to an SI model 
(§4.3.1). The resistance      of the ad hoc ecosystem to the malware becomes 
critical, where there may be a tolerance     , below which ecosystem functions and 
services become severely degraded (§2.2.2.2.2). The time taken to reach the 
maximum degradation in services can also be calculated     . 
6.4.2.2 Malware with Recovery (SIR) 
When recovery mechanisms for malware are available within the timescales of 
the epidemic such as software patching or antivirus signature detection to remove 
and recover the infected devices, resilience      as well as resistance      becomes 
important. As well as using diversity to maintain QoS, it can also be used to 
maintain the reproduction number below the critical threshold        and prevent 
a major epidemic outbreak. 
The analytical calculations and optimisation methods to determine the necessary 
diversity to tolerate or mitigate an attack are described in the remainder of this 
section. 
6.4.3 Resistance to Malware (MR) 
6.4.3.1 Resistance to Malware (MR) with no recovery (SI) 
As shown in Figure 6-8 (a), without recovery (SI model), all of the susceptible 
devices      will eventually become infected over time and the resistance      is 
the number that do not become infected out of a total number     , or the number 
immune     , so that for a deterministic or stochastic SI model the malware 
resistance is defined as: 
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            (6-18) 
6.4.3.2 Resistance to Malware (MR) with recovery (SIR) 
Resistance to malware with recovery is defined in the same way as no recovery: 
as the number that do not become infected. However with recovery mechanisms in 
place, resistance is not just attributed to by those immune. The rate of infection and 
the rate of recovery that make up the reproduction number     , have an effect on 
the final size of the epidemic (§4.3.2.6 , §4.3.3.6), and hence those that do not become 
infected. This reproduction number relationship (note the difference in the axis 
between Figure 6-8 (a) and (b)), as pictured in Figure 6-8 (b) is shown in relation to 
the final size of an epidemic      and the total network size   . The malware 
resistance for a deterministic model and approximated for the stochastic model is 
defined as: 
                 (6-19) 
 
Figure 6-8 - Resistance to malware (MR) with and without recovery 
Sections 6.4.3.3 and 6.4.4 further describe the mathematics of Figure 6-8. 
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6.4.3.3 Quality of Service Tolerance (QT) 
As discussed within section 5.2.5 the overall functional performance of services 
generated by an ad hoc network ecosystem is termed Quality of Service (QoS). In 
the absence of network simulators to measure specific functional outputs associated 
with QoS, the best the epidemic model can do is to assume that an infected device 
has a defined amount of impact on functional performance which in turn degrades 
the overall QoS. This can be considered particularly true for malware such as 
viruses, worms, and Trojans (§5.2.4). In the simplest case it can be assumed that 
infected devices contribute nothing to the overall QoS, whereas uninfected devices 
contribute fully. This means that once a device has become infected it looses normal 
functionality, and is only left with the ability to re-transmit the malware to other 
devices. An infected device degrades QoS in proportion to the number of devices in 
the network. If only a single device is infected there will only be a small impact, and 
if all devices in the network are infected the QoS becomes zero. Under this 
assumption the QoS is represented by the network level output of resistance to 
malware. However the model could be extended to incorporate the general case 
where the contribution to QoS is dependent upon the defined specifics of the 
malware, including both the damage caused, and the mechanisms by which 
propagation occurs (§5.2.5). The models have not been designed to depict behaviour 
of the network fabric, however improved techniques for measuring QoS using 
network simulators is discussed in §9.3.1.2. 
The Quality of Service Tolerance      is defined here as the required resistance 
level in order to maintain an acceptable QoS for an ad hoc ecosystem when faced 
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with a malware attack. The QoS, or functional performance of the ad hoc ecosystem 
may become severely impacted below this resistance level. For example, a    of 0.8 
would imply that the ad hoc ecosystem needs to be at least 80% resistant to the 
malware to maintain an acceptable QoS. 
   is the proportional tolerance level of resistance as shown in Figure 6-8 so that 
when constrained: 
        (6-20) 
6.4.4 Optimum Diversity for a Specific Malware Attack 
For a specific malware attack it is possible to determine the optimum diversity in 
terms of the number of software gene variants required at each locus for either a 
specified Quality of Service Tolerance level     , or the reproduction number 
threshold        to prevent a major malware outbreak. Firstly it is required to 
determine the resultant constrained susceptibility     , given a specified   ,  which 
can subsequently be used with the AND type    or the OR type    equations (§6.3.2) 
to find the optimum diversity (§6.4.4). 
6.4.4.1 Constrained Sp With no Recovery (SI) and specified QT 
For a constrained    with no recovery the constrained susceptibility    can be 
determined as follows. 
Chapter 6  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 173 of 357 May 2017  
Using the constraint 
              
Substitute in                     
Divide through by   and rearrange for            
(6-21) 
6.4.4.2 Constrained Sp With Recovery (SIR) and specified QT 
For a constrained    with recovery the constrained    can also be determined. 
Using the constraint 
                    
Substitute in                      (from Equation (4-25))                  
Divide through by                
Rearrange for      
            
(6-22) 
 
Substitute      into the final size Equation (4-25):  
                        
(6-23) 
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And substitute              
                                     
Rearranging for    
                                                   
This gives the required proportion susceptible    for a specified    and      . 
There are however three bounds as shown in Figure 6-8 (b). The asymptotic 
bound (A) occurs for high values of    where the final size of the epidemic 
approaches all those devices in the network that are susceptible where         in 
relation to   . This will happen when the recovery rate is very small relative to the 
infection rate and resembles the SI model where there is no recovery. 
Rearranging Equation (6-22) for    
Bound A as shown in Figure 6-8 (b) 
                              
(6-24) 
At this point    is defined as its lowest possible value to maintain the specified 
tolerance. The resultant diversity required to maintain this    will be at its highest. 
The bound (B) occurs when     . At this point the rate of recovery is so high 
relative to the infection rate that all of the devices can be susceptible and the 
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required tolerance can still be achieved. The resultant diversity will be at its lowest 
for a specific type of attack. Using Equation (6-22) 
Bound B as shown in Figure 6-8 (b) 
                            
(6-25) 
The bound (C) is a critical value of        , which must not be exceeded when all 
devices are susceptible to maintain at least a specified QoS to keep within the 
bounds of A and B for a specified quality of service. Using the final size Equation 
(4-25) with the approximation that       , and substituting in the bound B for     : 
Bound C -    as shown in Figure 6-8 (b)                                   
Rearranging for                                       
                     
(6-26) 
 
Additionally          
                      
(6-27) 
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Therefore        
It is also worth noting that when all devices are susceptible the model reduces to 
a standard SIR model so that when    is reduced further beyond    to below a 
value of 1 a major malware epidemic will be prevented. For a specified    therefore 
there is a trade off between the speed of recovery and diversity. The faster the 
recovery (lower    value), the higher the tolerated susceptibility and hence less 
diversity is required. At the bounds B/C (the critical value of        ) the minimum 
amount of diversity is required, whilst at the bound A, the maximum amount of 
diversity is required. Figure 6-9 shows the relationship between    and   . When    is 100%, maximum resistance is specified which can only be achieved when 
either the susceptibility      is zero, or when      to prevent a major malware 
epidemic (§6.4.4.3). 
 
Figure 6-9 - Critical value Rc for a specified Quality of Service Tolerance 
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6.4.4.3 Constrained Sp With Recovery (SIR) and specified R0<1 
To mitigate a specific malware attack by preventing a major outbreak the 
reproduction number must be less than 1. Again this can be used to constrain the 
susceptibility    and optimise the diversity. 
Using 
           
Rearranging for    
       
(6-28) 
6.4.4.4 Optimisation of Diversity 
To optimise diversity three assumptions are made:  
1) Variants are evenly distributed amongst devices for all loci so that in order to 
achieve the Quality of Service Tolerance level or reproduction threshold it is 
assumed absolute maximum diversity can be achieved with the calculated optimum 
number of variants.  
2) The number of variants at each locus has a minimum bound such that the 
number must be equal to or greater than the number of exploits, since without the 
least number of variants present the exploit would not exist. 
3) The optimum number of variants is defined as the minimum number needed 
such that variant richness is minimised: 
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                          (6-29) 
The resultant number of genotypes necessary is 
            (6-30) 
6.4.4.4.1 For the AND malware type (General) 
Assuming maximum diversity can be achieved for a given number of loci and 
variants then using Equations (6-10) and (6-12) where 
                                      (6-31) 
Rearranging, and assuming    is constrained 
                                                    (6-32) 
The product of the number of variants at each locus equates to the maximum 
number of unique genotypes (or genotypic richness) (§2.3.2.3, §5.3.2). The number of 
variants at each locus that satisfies this number of genotypes and minimum bounds, 
can have multiple solutions (§2.3.2.3). The optimum solutions for a given malware 
and QoS tolerance, can be defined from the minimisation of the variant richness     .  
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Worked example for two loci AND, with no recovery: 
                                                                              
The potential solutions for v1 and v2 are given in Table 6-1 and Figure 6-10 (a) 
showing the bounds of the solutions. The optimum solutions are shown by the 
shading in Table 6-1 with a value of 6.5 and in Figure 6-10 (b) by the minimum of 
the curve of the variant richness solutions. 
Table 6-1 - Worked example for the two locus AND type 
 
 
Figure 6-10 - Diversity optimisation example for the two locus AND type 
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The computational result of an example where there are no malware recovery 
mechanisms with two loci is given below (results for four loci are given in §8.2.2). 
Malware is specified with two exploits at locus one, and four at locus 2, with a 
Quality of Service tolerance of 80%. The result indicates a number of possible 
optimum solutions with an average of 6.5 variants required. With 40 genotypes, the 
minimum number of ad hoc devices participating in the network would also need 
to be 40 in order to satisfy absolute maximum diversity. 
6.4.4.4.2 For the AND malware type (Average) 
For a practical system it may not be possible to specify the exact number of 
exploits at each individual locus that the network must tolerate or mitigate, instead 
it may be possible to specify an average number of exploits to obtain an average 
number of variants at each locus (variant richness). Assuming the number of 
exploits and variants are the same in each locus, so that                          then Equation (6-32) can be simplified to: 
Variant Richness:             (6-33) 
For the average equation there is only one solution and so minimisation is not 
required. 
6.4.4.4.3 For the OR malware type (General and Average) 
The OR malware type has been defined for up to four loci. Assuming the 
absolute maximum diversity can be achieved for a given number of loci and 
variants then the following optimisations can be defined. 
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Single locus: 
The result for the single locus case is identical to the AND malware type but has 
been included here for clarity and completeness. Using Equation (6-15) for one locus 
where 
                   (6-34) 
Then by rearranging for   and assuming     is constrained the number of 
variants required can be easily solved for a fixed number of exploits and tolerance. 
                    (6-35) 
The result gives one possible solution for   . 
Two Loci: 
Using Equation (6-17) for 2 loci where 
                                                        (6-36) 
Rearranging the equation for    and assuming     is constrained. The general 
equation is: 
                                               (6-37) 
This will give different solutions for    when    is varied above the minimum of   , with the optimum solutions satisfying the minimum variant richness     . 
The computational result of an example with no malware recovery mechanisms 
with two loci is given below (results for four loci are given in §8.2.2). Malware is 
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specified with two exploits at locus one, and four at locus 2, with a Quality of 
Service tolerance of 80%. As with the two locus AND example, the result has a 
number of possible optimum solutions with an average of 28 variants required 
generating 720 to 780 genotypes.  
Worked example for the two locus OR: 
                                              
                         
The minimum bounds for the number of variants are shown in Figure 6-11 (a) 
leaving only valid solutions in the top right quadrant, with optimum solutions 
being the minimum variant richness as shown in Figure 6-11 (b).  
 
Figure 6-11 - Diversity optimisation example for the two locus OR type 
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of exploits and variants are assumed to be the same in each locus, so that                  then equation (6-36) can be reduced giving the average equation: 
            (6-38) 
Which can be solved numerically for  . 
A similar derivation for the general and average equations can be shown for 
three and four loci, and is documented within Appendix A (A.3) and (A.4). The 
determination of the exact number of variants can be solved computationally, 
results of which are documented in chapter 8 (§8.2.2). 
6.4.4.4.4 For the OR malware type (Approximation) 
When the number of variants     at each locus becomes large relative to the 
number of exploits     at each locus, then the summation term dominates the 
resultant susceptibility     . So that for relatively large values of   or correspondingly 
small values of   , the OR susceptibility equations can be approximated by: 
                                                                          
(6-39) 
For given values of           and   ,    can be computed for a range of            
values to find the valid solutions satisfying the minimum variant richness     . 
Variant Richness (average number of variants for an average number of exploits): If the 
number of exploits and variants are assumed to be the same in each locus, Equation 
(6-39) can be simplified to: 
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Giving: 
        
(6-40) 
Approximations and exact solutions for up to four loci are compared in Figure 
6-12 for one exploit per locus (Figure 6-12 (a)) and eight exploits per locus (Figure 
6-12 (b)) when all loci have the same number of variants. The graphs show the 
example when a specified QoS tolerance of 80% with no recovery equates to a small 
value of susceptibility with a large variant richness. In this region the exact solutions 
are close to the approximated solutions (dashed lines). 
 
Figure 6-12 - Exact and approximation curves for the OR malware type 
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diversity). The required minimum network size to achieve the required constraint is 
therefore no longer governed by the number of genotypes, but the variant richness 
so that a smaller number of devices are needed to achieve the required constraint 
such as QoS Tolerance. 
6.4.5 Resilience to Malware (ML) 
For a malware model with no recovery, there is no resilience component; 
however the time at which the peak infection occurs can be calculated. For a 
malware model with recovery the resilience can be measured under differing 
scenarios. 
6.4.5.1 Peak Infection Time T1 of Malware with No Recovery (SI) 
For an SI deterministic model the time    at which the infection peaks has an 
exact solution, when the number infected gets to within 1 of its final value. Equation 
(4-14) in section 4.3.2.4 defines    as:  
                             (6-41) 
For a partially susceptible network with static diversity, the equation becomes: 
                                                                       
                                        
(6-42) 
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6.4.5.2 Resilience to Malware with Recovery (SIR) 
For an SIR model, the reciprocal of the time at which the epidemic ends and all 
devices have recovered to their original operational state signifies the system level 
rate of recovery, or resilience   . However, there is no analytical solution for the 
end time (§4.3.2.4), but can be measured from the SIR simulation when the number 
recovered is within 1 of its final value. Equation (6-43) defines   as:  
                     (6-43) 
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter describes a mathematical epidemic approach to a diverse system 
model that has been developed to incorporate software diversity and malware at the 
genetic level of an ad hoc network ecosystem. The mathematical approach is 
constrained by four key aspects: 1) homogeneous mixing, 2) static diversity, 3) 
compatible software functions, and 4) non–influential users. Despite these 
constraints some key mathematical equations and methods have been established to 
investigate the security protection or mitigation offered by diversity and how much 
diversity is needed to tolerate or overcome specific attacks under these constraints. 
The mathematical approach has been developed with the standard SI/SIR epidemic 
models and can be used with both deterministic and stochastic methods. 
A key feature of this mathematical approach is the susceptibility model which 
defines the diversity and the malware, and subsequently the susceptibility. Two 
types of malware have been incorporated; the logical AND and the logical OR 
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which are representative of malware using multiple exploits to gain entry and 
propagate. Equations have been derived using probability theory for the 
susceptibility of both the AND and OR types for multiple exploits, loci, and 
software gene variants. The AND and OR methodology of matching exploits to 
genotypes is different from the standard gene matching algorithms used in ecology 
since the method used here is more appropriate to malware and the different types. 
It is more generalised but can also be constrained for specific malware and diversity 
scenarios. Under any specific malware and diversity scenario the resulting epidemic 
can be simulated. Current epidemic based malware models of diversity have been 
referred to as the ȁone locus modelȂ since they are equivalent in this model to a 
software stack genotype with one locus.  
Outputs from the model developed by this work include the two key 
components of ecosystem stability: resistance and resilience. An optimum diversity 
can be determined to either tolerate a specific malware attack given a specified QoS 
tolerance, or overcome an attack when recovery mechanisms such as software 
patching and antivirus detection are in place. For a specified QoS tolerance there is a 
trade off between the speed of recovery and diversity. The faster the recovery, the 
higher the tolerated susceptibility and hence less diversity is required. Under certain 
constraints approximations can be used to simplify, yet still determine, the optimum 
diversity required. Worked examples are included showing how diversity 
optimisation can be computationally determined. The calculated optimum diversity 
necessary to tolerate or overcome a specific malware attack informs upon the 
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minimum number of devices required to uphold this optimum diversity 
requirement. 
In relation to the hypothesis (§1.2), the development of the epidemic model gives 
some insight into how incorporating biodiversity concepts into computer networks, 
specifically ad hoc networks, can make them more resistant to cyber attacks. The 
model can inform the amount of security protection offered by biodiversity in the 
form of either tolerance to a specific type of attack, or mitigation to a specific type of 
attack when recovery mechanisms are available. Under such scenarios the optimum 
level of diversity necessary to provide the required security protection can be 
determined. 
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7 Diverse System Model: Agent-Based 
Chapter 7 
Diverse System Model: Agent-Based 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the architecture of the agent-based diverse system model. 
Firstly an overview of the system is given, highlighting which aspects are comparable 
to the epidemic model. Each of its three components; network model, diversity model, 
and malware model are then described over several sections detailing their design and 
modes of operation. A section on outputs describes a number of measured properties 
including resistance and resilience and how an optimum diversity can be measured 
for a given scenario. Finally a description of the implementation framework is given. 
7.2 System Model Overview 
The agent-based diverse system model has been designed with greater flexibility 
than the epidemic based method (§6) with the inclusion of dynamic genotype 
configuration, geographical location, integration with some existing security 
mechanisms, and realistic constraints associated with software configuration 
limitations as a result of users, hardware, or compatibility. However, it is also 
capable of simulating the same conditions as the epidemic model to allow the 
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comparison of results between the diversity methods and for the comparison of 
results where the inclusion of additional mechanisms is made. 
The agent model has several modes of operation as shown in Figure 7-1 which 
can be described by the selection of a network model, a diversity model, and a malware 
model. Selection of those circled by a dashed line indicates the modes that are 
comparable to the epidemic approach. 
As with the epidemic approach, the network model assumes that ad hoc devices 
move around with their users. Devices have the same or different software stack 
genotypes that, in this agent-based approach, are either fixed for a period of time or 
are dynamically changed in response to new information. Additionally in the agent 
approach it is possible for devices to exchange genotype information upon contact 
with each other (In the sense of observation of software configuration on the 
contacted device). A malware source initially infects one device which can then lead 
to malware propagating within the ad hoc network. 
In the agent-based approach there are two choices of network model. The first uses 
the homogeneous mixing assumption (§4.2.5) where random encounters are 
generated between devices. The second uses the random waypoint (§4.2.1) approach 
to inform the physical locations of devices to determine which, when, and for how 
long nearby devices are in range. The network model is further described in section 
7.3. 
There are two types of diversity model, static diversity where the genotypes present 
on each device remain fixed throughout a malware epidemic simulation, and 
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dynamic diversity where the genotypes may change in response to information. The 
two models are described further in sections 7.4 to 7.6. 
The malware model is responsible for the generation of malware exploits, genetic 
matching, and the monitoring of health states. It has two modes of operation, one in 
which it is assumed there are no recovery mechanisms in place for the malware. In 
this case each device has two health states of susceptible or infected (SI), which is 
comparable with the SI compartments of the epidemic model (§6.4.2.1). The second 
mode of operation is when there are recovery mechanisms in place where each 
device has an additional recovered (R) state, which is comparable with the SIR 
compartments of the epidemic model (§6.4.2.2). The inclusion of additional security 
mechanisms alters the dynamics between states and is described further in section 
7.7. Outputs from the model are covered in section 7.8. 
 
Figure 7-1 – Agent-based diverse system model showing modes of operation 
7.3 Network Model 
The network model has two modes of operation: random encounters and random 
waypoint, both of which result in a non deterministic pattern of encounters and are 
described as follows. 
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The dashed ovals indicate the modes comparable to the mathematical approach
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7.3.1 Random Encounters 
The random encounters method of homogeneous mixing uses randomisation of 
encounters between devices that is comparable to the stochastic epidemic model. 
This network model has been implemented to enable direct comparisons between 
the epidemic approach and the agent approach with the same input conditions. 
Additionally, at the same time it incorporates an element of realism that stochastic 
models try to represent (§4.3.3). The flow chart is given in Figure 7-2. The 
encounters occur stochastically with an average rate of contact   to model the 
Poisson process (§4.3.3.1). A random number is chosen for each device from a 
uniform distribution with a value between 0 and 1. This is used within an inequality 
equation to validate an encounter against the contact rate   at each time step. The 
binary result determines whether an encounter has occurred (encounter flag). The 
number of the randomly encountered device is selected from a uniform distribution 
of those devices in the network. The randomly chosen device is selected such that it 
cannot be itself. On a successful encounter it is assumed that both genotype 
information and malware, if it is present, are transmitted, so that the probability of 
transmission    . With the random encounter method there is no consideration to 
the locality of devices, or the length of time taken to transmit the genotype or 
malware data. This is inherent in the specified average rate of successful contact. 
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Figure 7-2 - Random Encounters implementation 
7.3.2 Random Waypoint 
7.3.2.1 Calculation of Waypoints 
The random waypoint algorithm has been implemented as described in section 
4.2.1 to model the mobility of devices within a confined rectangular area where the 
selected destination, speed and a stationary time period (pause) of each device is 
chosen randomly from a uniform distribution. The result is a set of waypoints (x 
and y coordinates) defining the location of every device at every time step of the 
simulation. The flow chart of the implementation is given in Figure 7-3. During the 
calculation process there are small differences between the randomly selected 
destinations and the actual destinations during each segment of a devices travel 
path. This is due to integer rounding of the incremental x and y coordinates (delta x 
and delta y) and therefore the true destination, distance and angle are recalculated. 
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Figure 7-3 - Random Waypoint implementation 
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The random waypoint model has the flexibility to be extended to include other 
geographically shaped areas of interest or modified to incorporate non-random 
waypoints. Additionally the random waypoint algorithm could be replaced with 
real waypoint data of mobility patterns and is therefore a first step toward 
modelling geographical location of devices. 
7.3.2.2 Selection of Devices in Range 
Communication between devices in practical ad hoc networks is controlled 
through routing protocols (§3.2.3), which form part of a larger network protocol 
stack (§3.2.1.3). There may be several factors that determine which devices exchange 
data, and when this occurs, including the requirement to be in range, availability to 
provide the necessary bandwidth, link strength and link duration. Routing 
protocols store routing information in routing tables to instruct where particular 
data is to be sent. In the absence of a simulator (§4.2.2) to model realistic network 
traffic and routing a more abstract approach is taken based upon several relevant 
factors as described below. 
To model a successful encounter between devices they must be within 
communication range, a parameter which can be configured for the simulation run, 
for a period of time long enough to transmit genotype information and malware. 
The method for selection of devices in range has been modelled as one of the 
following (pictured in Figure 7-4). 
1. Nearest in range 
2. Random in range 
3. Available in range 
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Figure 7-4 – Selection of devices in range 
The first two selection methods account for those cases where a device can 
communicate with another device, if it is in range, at any point in time. This results 
in devices receiving data from only one other device at a time, but allows them to 
send data (and potentially malware) to more than one device at a time. This is 
directly physically possible in a multi-user (MU) communication system such as the 
Multi-User Multiple Input Multiple Output (MU-MIMO) method [259] where there 
can be separate communication channels between devices. Even protocols with 
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allows for comparison with the random encounter model representative of a 
homogeneous mixing system (§4.2.5) where a device can be selected randomly by 
more than one other device at any point in time. The nearest in range selection 
method is an alternative where the likelihood of better link strength and link 
duration is favoured by the model for the transmission of data.  
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The third selection method only selects devices that are both in range and are 
available to provide the maximum link bandwidth since they are not currently 
communicating with any other device. This could represent a routing protocol 
where the availability of a device is a favoured factor. 
7.3.2.3 Successful Data Transmission 
Successful data transmission between a pair of devices can only be achieved if 
the communication link can be maintained long enough. In this model it is assumed 
that the genotype data and malware are transmitted in an order consistent with a 
hierarchical network protocol stack (§3.2.1.3), where the malware cannot be sent 
prior to link establishment; moreover it is assumed that the entirety of the 
packetised genotype or malware data must be communicated for successful receipt. 
The transmission of data between devices is modelled using a tagging system where 
the selected device in range is tagged to signify the start of data transmission.  The 
tag is released if the device goes out of range or if the data is transferred 
successfully. The implementation method that determines which devices are in 
range and when they are tagged is given in the flowchart of Figure 7-5 (a). Euclidian 
distances between devices are calculated using their x and y coordinate positions to 
determine if they are in range. The tagging process is described using the state 
diagram pictured in Figure 7-5 (b). The time required to successfully transmit 
genotype data and the time required to successfully transmit the malware exploit 
are two parameters that can be set in the model. When the device is tagged the end 
times of successful transmissions of genotype (genotype end time) and exploit data 
(exploit end time) are calculated. If there is no malware then the tag is released at the 
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end of the genotype data transmission (state 3: Transmit genotype). If the tagged 
device goes out of range before one of the end times then the tag is released and the 
transmission of related data is unsuccessful. Since it is assumed that the genotype 
data is transmitted before the malware, it may be possible to successfully transmit 
genotype data, but not the malware.  
 
Figure 7-5 - Successful data transmission implementation 
The resultant output of the Matlab function to the wider model is two single flags 
per time-step, where one determines if genotype data is successfully transmitted 
(Genotype encounter), and the other determines if the exploit data is successfully 
transmitted (Exploit encounter). A genotype time out period is defined to allow a 
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minimum time before genotype information is captured again from the same device 
(genotype time out). This prevents repeated data capture of the same genotype 
information in a slow moving scenario. However, if a repeatedly encountered 
device becomes newly infected, the infection is transmitted assuming it remains in 
range for long enough. 
7.4 Diversity Model - Measuring and Calculating 
Diversity 
7.4.1 Achieving Maximum Diversity in a Practical Ad hoc 
Network 
It is recognised that the more software gene variants and loci there are within a 
system, the greater the number of possible genotype configurations there are, which 
could become large (§2.3.2.3, Figure 2-10). It quickly becomes impractical to model 
network sizes capable of achieving absolute maximum diversity for one instance of a 
network. Additionally, network sizes in practice may range from being very small 
to very large. When simulating malware propagation, it is sufficient to only include 
enough genotypes to adequately model the proportion susceptible. Since it is only 
those susceptible that can ever become infected (§7.5.1).A condition of maximum 
diversity is that all variants are distributed evenly at each locus (§5.3.2.1). The 
measured distribution of variants is incorporated into the Nei diversity index 
calculation (§2.3.2.2.2) and is referred to as variant diversity within this research 
(§5.3.2.1). To achieve maximum variant diversity at a single locus there needs to be 
sufficient devices      to represent all of the available variants    . When the 
number of devices is large enough that all possible genotypes can be evenly 
Chapter 7  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 200 of 357 May 2017  
represented as well then the absolute maximum diversity condition can also be 
achieved. The agent-based model therefore aims to maximise diversity by 
maximising variant diversity at each locus independently, regardless of the network 
size. 
7.4.2 Calculating the Maximum Obtainable Variant Diversity 
The maximum value of the Nei Genetic Diversity for the monoploid genotype 
case (§5.6.2.1) occurs at one locus when the number of devices      is the same as 
the number of available variants     such that every variant is only used once. This 
leads to the frequency of each variant being 
   . The maximum diversity index of 1 
(§2.3.2.2.2) however is only achievable for large network sizes (and a 
correspondingly large number of variants), where, using the substitution for the 
number of different alleles     with the number of variants     in equation (2-7) of 
the Nei diversity Index gives: 
                     
                                   
                 
Substitute in     , to give the Nei diversity as 
                               
(7-1) 
However, for the ad hoc network being modelled, the number of devices is likely 
to be greater than the number of variants available at a locus, which may be few in 
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number for practical reasons. In this case the maximum obtainable diversity will be less 
than the maximum diversity (given a fixed network size) and less than 1. At the 
maximum obtainable diversity the variants are evenly distributed across the 
devices, so that the frequency of each variant is     resulting in the probability (Nei 
diversity) at a single locus as: 
                   
                                               
(7-2) 
For example when the number of variants is only two, the maximum obtainable 
variant diversity is 0.5, regardless of how many devices (subject to a minimum of 
two) are present in the network which means that half of the devices will have one 
variant and the other half will have another variant. When     , equations (7-2) 
and (7-1) are equivalent. This calculable value provides a reference as to the level of 
diversity that can be achieved given a finite number of variants under ideal 
conditions. 
7.4.3 Practical Constraints Limiting Variant Diversity 
In an ideal scenario it is assumed that all devices are able, and all users are 
willing, to use any of the different versions of software available at every locus. 
Additionally, the ideal scenario assumes that software across loci is compatible, 
such that any genotype can be possible given a fixed number of variants at each 
locus. In practice however, generating the ideal scenario may be difficult. For 
example if diversity is achieved through readily available versions of software 
programs providing the same functionality (§3.2.1.3) they may not be compatible 
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across loci (e.g. operational only with a specific operating system), they may differ 
in terms of quality and efficiency, and both user desirabilities and hardware 
limitations may have an influence over which ones are chosen for a specific device. 
Additionally user desirabilities may differ, depending upon whether they are 
imposed at a community scale, such as from an IT department where groups of 
devices may be constrained, or at an individual scale through personal preferences. 
Additionally, producing automated diverse versions of software or binary files is 
still in its infancy (§3.2.1.1), and even when implemented there may still be 
problems interfacing between the different products. These practical constraints 
could lead to variant or genotype configurations that are unusable or unfavourable, 
which will influence diversity patterns in the network. The inclusion of constraints 
in the agent model is detailed in sections 7.6.1.1, 7.6.2.2, and 7.6.2.4. 
7.5 Diversity Model - Static Diversity 
7.5.1 Distribution of Software Gene Variants 
The diversity model has two modes of operation, the first of which is static 
diversity. Static diversity can either be fixed for all runs of a simulation with a pre-
computed data set to achieve a specific distribution of variants and hence 
genotypes, or the variants can be assigned randomly at the start of every run. The 
random assignment of variants is used to achieve the maximum diversity possible 
for a given number of devices, loci and variants. At the start of each simulation run, 
each device chooses a software variant from the available pool at each locus using a 
uniform random distribution so that on average the software variants are 
distributed evenly across devices independently at each locus. This method of 
Chapter 7  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 203 of 357 May 2017  
random assignment is comparable to the epidemic model of static diversity under 
maximum conditions (§6.3.2.2). Figure 7-6 (a) shows the measured variant diversity 
from simulation against the calculated maximum obtainable under ideal conditions 
(§7.4.2) for a given variant richness with four loci and 1000 devices averaged over 10 
runs. The maximum genotypic richness (number of genotypes) (§5.3.2) and 
genotypic diversity (§5.3.2) that can be achieved is 1000, as shown in Figure 7-6 (b), 
which is as expected with 1000 devices.  
The maximum number of unique genotypes (§5.3.2) surpasses this when     , 
however when simulated with enough devices, or averaged over a sufficient 
number of runs, all unique genotypes will be utilised with equal probability. For a 
large variant richness a sufficient number of devices or runs become impractical to 
simulate as described in section 7.4.1, so that a proportion of genotypes will not be 
represented. However when simulating malware propagation, it is sufficient to only 
include enough genotypes to adequately model the proportion susceptible. The 
proportion susceptible is determined by the malware defined. If 50% of the 
genotypes are susceptible then a network size capable of adequately simulating this 
could be smaller than if only 1% are susceptible. If only 1% are susceptible the 
network would need to be relatively bigger (or more runs would be needed) so that 
on average the susceptibility is adequately represented. In practice for such a 
scheme it may be both true that there are more genotypes available than currently 
being used in the network of interest, or less genotypes available than the number of 
devices. For example ten variants at each of the four loci would generate 10,000 
genotypes. For a small network it may be true that only a subset of these are realised 
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at any given time. For static diversity simulated over a number of runs (or different 
network instances, where genotypes are assigned randomly) would average out so 
that all genotypes are equally used, even though in a single instance not all would 
be used. 
 
Figure 7-6 - Diversity measures in static diversity mode 
7.5.2 Susceptibility 
For the agent-based model the health status of every device is initially set to 
susceptible (§7.7.1) at the start of a simulation run regardless of genotype 
configuration. However the true susceptibility of the network can be measured 
under static diversity conditions by matching the generated genotypes against a 
specific malware attack type, and summing all those that match. Whilst the 
susceptibility should closely match the result of the epidemic model, under the 
same diversity and malware conditions, the dynamics of the infection and specific 
parameters will depend upon the network model. For the random encounter 
network model, the dynamics of the infection should closely match the epidemic 
model with the same input parameters.  
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Variant Richness (V
R
)
V
a
ri
a
n
t 
D
iv
e
rs
it
y
 (
N
e
i)
 
 
Maximum obtainable (calculated)
Variant Diversity (simulated)
a) Variant Diversity (Nei) at each locus with 1000 
devices, over 10 runs
b) Genotypic measures for 4 loci with 1000 devices, 
over 10 runs
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Variant Richness (V
R
)
D
iv
e
rs
it
y
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 
 
Genotypic Diversity (simulated)
Maximum number of unique genotypes
 (calculated)
Genotypic Richness (simulated)
Chapter 7  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 205 of 357 May 2017  
7.6 Diversity Model – Dynamic Diversity 
This section describes two dynamic diversity algorithms, both of which aim to 
maximise variant diversity given a fixed number of variants, devices and loci. The 
first is based upon the random selection of available variants and is an extension to 
the static case that forms a baseline in which to make comparisons. The second 
algorithm allows individual devices to select variants based upon information 
obtained during local encounters with other devices and incorporates the 
geographical locality of devices. The flow charts for the two algorithms are given in 
Figure 7-7, with the differences highlighted by the double-lined boxes.  
The literature suggests that a degree of dynamism in a diversity scheme can be 
beneficial to confuse a targeted attacker (§3.4.3.1 and §3.4.3.4), however in a moving 
network where communication links are continuously changing, and in a future 
Internet where software and malware can rapidly evolve, together with access to 
vast quantities of data affecting local decisions, the need to be real-time dynamic 
may be essential. 
The algorithms can optionally incorporate two additional mechanisms, as 
indicated by the dashed lines, of current technology to explore the benefits of a 
dynamic scheme when integrated with existing security mechanisms such as 
vulnerability data and virtualisation (VM update). These are in addition to the 
standard recovery mechanisms included by the epidemic model (§6.4.2.2) and 
implemented by the agent model (§7.7.3.2). In addition, practical constraints, as 
indicated by the dotted lines, such as software compatibility and user influence can 
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be switched on to see the effects a realistic scenario may have. The algorithms and 
the additional mechanisms are further described below. 
 
Figure 7-7 - Dynamic diversity algorithms 
7.6.1 Dynamic Diversity Algorithm– Random Selection of 
Variants (RV) 
The most simplistic dynamic algorithm, the random variant (RV), attempts to 
maximise variant diversity by randomly selecting a variant for each locus. This is 
similar to the static case, except that genotypes on each device can be reselected in 
response to input triggers such as time (RV-T), encounters with other devices (RV-
E), or other system triggers. The flow chart for the random variant algorithm is 
given in Figure 7-7 (a). Only constraints (§7.6.1.1) or vulnerability data (§7.6.3) can 
vary the restriction of variant choices at each device.  
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7.6.1.1 Constraints – User Influence 
User constraints can be applied to both algorithms, but differ in the flexibility of 
the constraints that can be applied. For the RV algorithm, variants are constrained 
such that they are either available or not available for selection. This coincides with 
the way in which variants are selected randomly from those available without any 
bias. For example individual constraints such as physical hardware restrictions or 
user software preferences may limit those available for selection. When a device is 
constrained, such that only one variant can be selected, the result is a device with 
static diversity. Incorporating constraints into the dynamic model will limit the 
achievable variant diversity (§7.4.3) that the ad hoc ecosystem can achieve when 
maximisation is being sought. 
7.6.2 Dynamic Diversity Algorithm– Favourability Score (FS) 
The favourability score algorithm (FS) attempts to maximise diversity by 
allowing each device to make variant choices based upon local encounters with 
other devices and exchanging genotype information. Each device independently 
maintains its own perspective on the local distribution of software variants and 
variant diversity, and adjusts its own genotype accordingly. The agent model in 
dynamic diversity mode assumes that the genotype information of encountered 
devices is visible. For the scheme to become practically viable both a discovery 
protocol and a trust model would need to be developed to provide the necessary 
reliable information. There are many discovery protocols in existence for the 
automatic detection of devices, their services and parameters to connect them. The 
Bluetooth service discovery protocol for example determines which Bluetooth 
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profiles are supported to determine compatibility [260]. A discovery protocol for the 
exchange of genotype information would discover software variants rather than 
profiles. Additionally a trust model would be needed to establish trust relationships 
between devices to both authenticate the validity of the genotype information, and 
maintain privacy between trustees. Trust models for ad hoc networks determine 
trustworthiness of other devices without central authorities [261] allowing devices 
to participate in various protocols, for example determining trustworthy routes for 
forwarding data packets [262]. The work in the thesis does not develop a discovery 
protocol or evaluate trust models for the exchange of genotype information; instead 
the research firstly considers whether allowing software variant information to be 
visible upon contact would be of benefit to both diversity and security against 
existing forms of malware propagation. It also considers whether there are 
advantages of dynamic diversity using this methodology over static diversity or 
random assignments of variants.  
The flow chart for the FS algorithm is shown in Figure 7-7 (b). During the 
diversity maximisation period, as each device encounters another device 
successfully, the genotypes of the encountered devices are recorded. When enough 
encounters have been made, a parameter which can be set, a diversity metric 
(§7.6.2.1), is calculated based upon the genotypes of the encounters. If necessary the 
device will adjust the genotype to a different software variant configuration in an 
attempt to improve diversity within the network (§7.6.2.3, §7.6.2.4). If restrictions 
are set such as through vulnerability data (§7.6.3), software compatibility (§7.6.2.4), 
or user constraints (§7.6.2.2), this will affect the chosen genotype. 
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7.6.2.1 Calculating the Diversity Metric 
The diversity metric (dm) is formed independently by every device and indicates 
which variants could be chosen to improve diversity. Firstly, genotype data is 
stored by every device in a running buffer with a first in – first out (FIFO) 
arrangement, the depth of which can be set. The frequency of each recorded 
software variant      at every locus is calculated by summing the occurrence of each 
variant stored in the buffer and dividing by the number of encounters. This 
indicates how many of each variant is being used locally. To obtain a metric 
indicating which variants could be chosen to even out their distribution, the 
frequency is subtracted from unity and then normalized across each locus to 1. This 
results in variants used frequently being assigned a low metric value and variants 
used infrequently being assigned a high metric value up to a maximum of 1.  
                           (7-3) 
It is assumed that each device only stores the most recent genotype information 
so that the diversity metric is calculated from only those stored in the buffer. If all 
genotypes were stored and used, the data would not be representative of the current 
local network since both network and software stack configurations will change 
over time. 
7.6.2.2 Constraints - Individual and Community User 
Desirabilities 
The application of user constraints is more flexible in the FS algorithm, than the 
RV algorithm, but can also be limited to match the RV case. The constraints are 
based around two aspects that limit the maximum obtainable variant diversity 
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(§7.4.3); a) community scale desirabilities, and b) individual scale desirabilities. The 
levels assigned are used to influence the software choices of the algorithm when 
selecting genotype configurations. Unlike the binary constraints of the RV 
algorithm, here the constraints are applied in the range 0 to 100. Table 7-1 shows an 
example of how these two aspects could be initialized.  
Community scale desirabilities      – Each software variant has a community scale 
desirability level, which could be based on the specification of an IT department, or 
accommodate realistic data for a network such as 70% of users prefer, in an indirect 
sense, the Google Android core OS library. A number is assigned for each software 
variant in the range 0 to 100, where the sum of these desirabilities totals 100 for each 
locus. The community scale desirabilities impose a system level constraint without 
attributing software to specific individuals. This means that the variant diversity 
level will be maintained, even though devices are making individual and local 
decisions. 
Individual scale desirabilities      – The individual scale desirabilities are attributed 
to specific individuals. There is no difference in dynamic variant diversity levels 
from the community scale desirabilities when the same aggregated percentage of 
software is set. However, differences in the dynamics of the malware propagation 
will occur when specific individuals are constrained, for example, to never select the 
vulnerable software variants. Additionally, differences will occur when either 
location based constraints are imposed on specific individuals or devices move in 
non-random mobility patterns. Each software package has an individual desirability 
level based on the current userȂs desirability for the software. For example the user 
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desirability may be to use the software represented by variant 1 of locus 1 most of 
the time, but with a willingness to switch to variant 2, 3, or 4 if necessary. 
Additionally users may have specific requirements relating to specialised software 
in order to efficiently perform their responsibilities.  In this case it is possible to 
constrain specific individuals to use a fixed (static) software variant or variants, 
whilst the remainder of the network tries to maximise diversity. It is important that 
the diversity scheme does not negatively impact the user experience and so there 
may be the need to maintain a proportion of specific individual desirabilities whilst 
maximising diversity of the ad hoc ecosystem. The desirability value is also a 
number between 0 and 100 for each software package, but may be different within 
each device. The sum of these desirabilities totals 100 for each locus.  
The constraints of user and community desirability data cannot be applied in the 
same way to the RV algorithm as the FS algorithm due to the random selection of 
variants. A configuration comparable to the RV constraints would be to apply a 
desirability value of zero to those variants that are unwanted and apply equal 
values to those variants wanted. When a device is constrained in the FS algorithm 
such that only one variant can be selected, the result, as with the RV algorithm, is a 
device with static diversity. 
Chapter 7  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 212 of 357 May 2017  
Table 7-1 - Setting desirability values example 
 
7.6.2.3 Favourability Score 
The favourability score     combines the diversity metric (§7.6.2.1), the 
constraints (§7.6.2.2), and the vulnerability data (§7.6.3). The equation given in (7-4) 
is termed the favourability score because it ȁfavoursȂ rather than determines 
particular software choices. 
                        (7-4) 
Where    is the diversity metric,    and    are constraints (§7.6.2.2), and                are weighting factors to weight the importance or inclusion of each 
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summation term. For example to perform diversity maximisation only, both     and     are set to zero.   is a binary matrix of vulnerability data (further described in 
§7.6.3) with a ȁŖȂ representing variants that should be blacklisted, and a ȁŗȂ 
representing variants that are deemed low risk and safe to use. The binary matrix is 
used to completely mask out unsafe variants from the list. The model currently 
assumes that each device has knowledge of the variants available to it to make an 
informed choice (§5.2.6.1). In practice however different devices may have 
knowledge of different variants, depending upon how they are generated and 
stored. For example all devices may have knowledge of COTS variants such as 
alternative commercial software or open source software modules (§3.2.1.3) as they 
would be readily accessible, however variants generated via automated code 
diversification techniques (§3.4.2) may not necessarily be widely available. 
7.6.2.4 Probabilistic Variant Choice and Compatibility Filtering 
The chosen variant at each locus of the genotype is selected probabilistically and 
independently based upon the favourability score where a higher score results in a 
higher probability that it will be chosen. This prevents all devices from choosing the 
same solution if there is a ȁbestȂ option. In an ideal scenario where all variants are 
compatible across loci this selection method is capable of always choosing 
operational genotypes. In a realistic scenario however, not all configurations of 
software may be compatible and so the option of compatibility filtering can also be 
included. The four steps involved in the decision process for updating a genotype 
with compatibility filtering are shown in Figure 7-8. In general it is often the 
operating system that dictates compatibility (§3.2.1.3) and so the core OS library is 
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used as the reference locus in this example, however it could be applied to any 
locus. Firstly the software variant choices are split into subsets where a mask is 
created for every OS core library variant to identify compatible software. In the 
second step an OS core library variant is chosen probabilistically from the OS core 
library locus using the favourability score. The third step applies the mask of the 
chosen OS to obtain a filtered favourability score. In the fourth step the remaining 
locus variants are chosen from the filtered favourability score using the same 
probabilistic approach. 
 
Figure 7-8 - Updating a genotype with software compatibility filtering 
7.6.3 Using Vulnerability Data - Blacklisting of Vulnerable 
Variants 
Using diversity as a stand-alone security mechanism is probably unlikely in 
practice, and so making use of already available, but untapped security data as part 
of an integrated approach could better support the benefits of a dynamic diversity 
scheme. When vulnerabilities and corresponding exploits are first publically 
declared there is often a race between cyber attackers to further exploit the 
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vulnerability and antivirus/software companies to produce antivirus signatures and 
software patches (§3.3.3). The level of threat perceived by the disclosed vulnerability 
dictates the amount of time, effort and speed in which antivirus signatures and 
software patches are released. Even the fastest developed patches may not be 
enough to prevent a surge in attacks which can occur within a few hours of 
disclosure (§3.3.3). With dynamic diversity it is possible to temporarily prevent 
software variants perceived as a security risk due to exposed vulnerabilities from 
being chosen as a valid variant solution. The term blacklisting is used here to denote 
the mechanism of preventing specific vulnerable variants from being chosen. 
Software vulnerability information is currently stored in publically accessible 
databases such as the NIST National Vulnerability Database (§3.4.4.6), or the CVE 
database (§1.1.2). The automated dissemination of vulnerability information could 
be released as soon as it becomes available and this would be a lot sooner than the 
corresponding antivirus signature and software patch, and more importantly, 
potentially faster than the response from cyber attackers (assuming users allow the 
diversity scheme to act upon the vulnerability data). 
Blacklisting is introduced into the model stochastically with an average rate   at 
which the blacklisting information is disseminated. This can be set as an 
independent rate, or a rate dependent upon the contact rate between devices. For 
example it can be set such that an average of 1 in 10 contacts made are with an 
access point capable of providing updated blacklisting information. Blacklisting of 
software variants within the model is undertaken by all devices in the network, 
however it is acknowledged that in practice some users may wish to avoid changing 
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configurations, for example due to compatibility implications. As shown in Figure 
7-7, for both algorithms, as soon as new vulnerability data becomes available it is 
applied immediately by constraining the choice of variants and re-updating (§7.6.4) 
the internal genotype. For those that are still susceptible, blacklisting provides a 
temporary immunity until new antivirus signatures or patching is applied. The 
effects of blacklisting on the malware model are detailed in section 7.7.3. 
7.6.4 Stopping and Starting the Genotype Update Process 
The genotype update process is required to make an intelligent genotype 
selection in order to maximise the variant diversity of the network, subject to the 
available variants and applied constraints. Whilst frequent changes of variants at 
some loci may be hidden and go unnoticed by the user, others may disrupt the user 
experience. Additionally if there is malware already propagating in the network, the 
act of switching to a vulnerable genotype could spread the malware even further. 
Therefore once diversity is maximised it may then be beneficial to update genotypes 
less often, such as only updating when there are new constraints, variants, or other 
information as shown in the flow chart of Figure 7-7. The start-stop state diagrams 
for the update process of the RV algorithm and the FS algorithm are shown in 
Figure 7-9 (a) and (b) respectively. 
For the RV algorithm, the local genotype information is not collected and so the 
only triggers for stopping the update process as shown in Figure 7-9 (a) is either time 
based, or encounter based. For example it can be possible to select the genotype once 
in a single update cycle and then remain static by not updating until a system trigger 
occurs for the device such as the availability of new variants, different constraints, 
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or vulnerability data allowing temporary blacklisting. For the FS algorithm the 
decision to stop updating is based upon each deviceȂs individual perception of the 
optimisation of the locally measured variant diversity. The local measurements are 
calculated using the Nei Index equation (2-8) from the recorded genotypes stored in 
the buffer as shown in the flow chart of Figure 7-7 (b). The running standard 
deviations of these measurements are calculated over a number of samples to 
determine how much the diversity level is changing; when optimised there is very 
little change. As shown in Figure 7-9 (b) when there is at least a sufficient number of 
samples and the standard deviation has progressed below a minimum threshold, a local 
minimum is found by comparing the previous standard deviation value to the 
current value before stopping the update process. If the standard deviation goes 
above a maximum threshold due to changes in the network by other devices, or a 
system trigger occurs, then the device restarts updating its own genotype again. 
 
Figure 7-9 - Stop-start update states for the RV and FS algorithms 
Start Stop
Time / Encounter Trigger
System Trigger
(new variants, constraints, vulnerability data, 
recovery)
Start Stop
Sufficient number of samples
AND
Standard Deviation < min threshold
AND
Standard Deviation local minimum
System Trigger
(new variants, constraints, vulnerability data, 
recovery)
OR
Standard Deviation > max threshold
a) Stop-start genotype update process for the 
RV dynamic diversity algorithm
b) Stop-start genotype update process for the 
FS dynamic diversity algorithm
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The time evolution of a stop-start update sequence from one device using the FS 
algorithm is shown in Figure 7-10. The variant choice for a single locus, the standard 
deviation of the locally measured diversity (Std.) and relevant trigger signals are 
shown. Firstly the data buffer fills with variant diversity measurements (Buffer full) 
which are used to calculate the running standard deviation. During this period 
variant choices are being selected as part of the update process. When the local 
minimum is found below the minimum threshold the device is triggered to stop 
updating (1. Stop updating). At this point variant number one is chosen. Sometime 
later an encounter is made with a device with vulnerability data which triggers the 
blacklisting of vulnerable variants. This also provides a system trigger to re-start the 
update process, which then halts when the stop conditions are true (2. Blacklisting 
and update). In this scenario variant one is blacklisted and therefore becomes 
unselected. When a new patch for the vulnerable variant is installed (Patch 
download), the device stops blacklisting and re-starts the update process where any 
of the variants can be selected (3. Patch and update). In this scenario the device had 
become infected prior to blacklisting and subsequently moves to the recovered state 
(Recovery). 
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Figure 7-10 - Time evolution of a stop-start update sequence from one device 
7.6.5 Virtualisation – Deleting Infected Genotypes 
Virtualisation is seen as one of the key enabling technologies for the future 
Internet (§3.2.1.2). It also has the potential to become a practical platform for the 
realisation of dynamic diversity, particularly through the use of virtual machines 
(VMs). Its two key attributes are: firstly the ability to isolate a full or partial software 
stack from the rest of the deviceȂs computer system and data memory; secondly, it is 
able to run more than one isolated software stack at a time. These two aspects 
together mean that VMs can be used to configure software genotypes dynamically 
in the background before swapping with the current configuration. Because each 
VM is treated as a separate isolated entity, the destruction of an out-of-date VM will 
also destroy (most) malware since it will be contained within the VM. This is also 
based on the assumption that new VMs are always created from known malware free 
sources. This is currently the case since known good versions are usually stored by 
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the virtualisation tools which can be reloaded at any specified time (§3.2.1.2). Using 
virtualisation to swap small chunks of functionally equivalent software has been 
practically tested (§3.4.3.4) by one research group proving that the concept is 
feasible, however using virtualisation to manage complete software stacks 
seamlessly would require further development of the technology and is discussed in 
future work (§9.3.2.4).  
On the assumption that VM technology could provide a practical platform, the 
dynamic model also incorporates an optional element which, when enabled, models 
that every time a genotype is updated, any malware present in the current 
configuration is also deleted. Unlike blacklisting, this does not make the device, 
temporarily immune: It could still become infected in the future with the same 
malware. The effects of virtualisation on the malware model are detailed in section 
7.7.3. 
7.7 Malware Model 
The malware model generates the exploits, genetically matches them to 
genotypes and monitors the health state of each device at every time step of the 
simulation using the SIR compartments. The health states are aggregated and used 
to assess the malware attack as it propagates through the network. Unlike the 
epidemic model, in the agent model the malware can be introduced at any time in 
the simulation, so that it may be introduced before, during, or after specific 
mechanisms have been introduced. 
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7.7.1 Susceptibility 
In the agent model all devices are assumed to be initially susceptible. This is 
different from the epidemic model which requires that the susceptibility is pre-
computed (which remains fixed) in order to assess the dynamics of the malware. 
This is because within a dynamically diverse network all of the devices are 
potentially susceptible to any specific malware attack, since any device is capable of 
adopting any possible genotype. However, in the agent model the time window in 
which each device is truly susceptible will be variable and dependent upon local 
information, individual decisions and the constrained choice of different variants. It 
is not necessary to compute this true instantaneous susceptibility to progress the 
dynamics of the simulation since the mechanism of genetic matching accounts for 
this by only allowing those instantaneously susceptible (those currently with a 
vulnerable genotype) to become infected given a successful malware encounter.  
7.7.2 Contact Rate and Probability of Infection 
For the agent-based model the contact rate    is determined by the network 
model. For the random encounters approach (§7.3.1) the contact rate can be set and 
is comparable to the epidemic model. It is assumed that once an encounter has been 
made with an infected device there is a successful transmission of the infection so 
that      For the random waypoint approach there are several parameters that 
determine the contact dynamics and successful transmission of the malware (§7.3.2).  
Regardless of the network model, it is assumed that once the propagating malware 
has successfully entered into a device and has been matched to a deviceȂs genotype, 
the infection is transmitted. This can happen if there are either no antivirus 
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mechanisms in place to detect or block the malware, or the malware is unknown 
such as in the case of a Zero-day attack. 
7.7.3 SIR Compartments 
Each device is accountable for its own SIR state. The transitions between the 
states on any particular device are determined by the interaction of the devices in 
the network, the diversity of the genotypes, the malware exploit data, and the 
instantaneous rate values. The flow sequence of the SIR state machine for each 
device is shown in Figure 7-11. There are four mechanisms that determine the 
movement between states. The first two mechanisms of genetic matching and 
recovery are present in the epidemic model. In the agent model however, genetic 
matching can be influenced by more than just the exploits and contact rate. 
Additional mechanisms such as changing genotypes, data transmission times, and 
device locality will also cause an effect, and increasing the realism of the model. The 
dotted lines represent additional flow mechanisms that are not present within the 
epidemic model and include the effects from both blacklisting and virtualisation 
when in dynamic diversity mode. The effects of these four mechanisms are further 
described below. 
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Figure 7-11 - Flow sequence of the SIR compartments in the agent-based model 
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The malware exploit data is constructed in a similar arrangement to the software 
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infected. For the random encounter network model (§7.3.1), a successful malware 
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Figure 7-12 - Genetic matching flow chart 
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with a value between ȁ0Ȃ and ȁ1Ȃ and is used within an inequality equation to 
validate the recovery against the recovery rate   at each time step.  
7.7.3.3 The Effects of Blacklisting 
Blacklisting is applied to any device regardless of which state it is in (since the 
device itself cannot detect an infection in this model §9.3.1.2), however it is only of 
use when devices are still susceptible and would be equivalent to an extra temporary 
immunity state as that pictured in Figure 7-11, where the device is prevented from 
becoming infected. The SȂ state denotes that the actual effect of blacklisting for those 
that become temporarily immune is to remain in the susceptible state. The start of 
blacklisting information dissemination may be at the point of initial malware 
infection if the vulnerability has just been disclosed but could equally have been at 
some point in the past if prior knowledge of a potential threat was received, or 
further in the future if it models a zero day attack where the vulnerability and 
knowledge of an exploit is still unknown. For those already infected blacklisting 
offers no protection and it is assumed these devices remain infectious, even though 
the vulnerable variant is no longer used. When the signatures or software patches 
are released to detect and remove the malware, the infected devices can recover and 
the temporary blacklisting can be removed.  
7.7.3.4 The Effects of Virtualisation and Deleting Infected 
Genotypes 
Like blacklisting, the use of VMȂs to create and destroy genotypes, is applied to 
every device regardless of what state it is in, but is only of use when devices are 
actually infected since it removes undetected malware. During a genotype - VM 
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update cycle, if the device is infected it will move back to the susceptible state as 
shown in Figure 7-11. Simulations and analysis involving virtualisation are 
conducted in conjunction with blacklisting (§8.3.4).  
7.8 Outputs 
This section defines the outputs from the agent model as shown in Figure 7-13, 
most of which are comparable to the epidemic model. Only two analytical outputs 
are defined for the agent model, all other outputs are determined from simulation 
including the two key components of stability: resistance and resilience. A key 
benefit of the epidemic model is its analytical solutions. This enables an optimum 
diversity to be calculated in terms of the number of variants at each locus to tolerate 
or mitigate a specific type of attack for a given scenario. In constrained mode, the 
agent model is comparable to the epidemic model and therefore simulated outputs 
are compared to those calculated. Beyond the bounds of the epidemic model, with 
the inclusion of dynamic diversity, device geographical location, blacklisting, 
virtualisation and practical constraints, the results are analysed purely through 
simulation and comparisons with the epidemic based results. The outputs are 
summarised as follows. 
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Figure 7-13 - Outputs and optimum diversity for the agent-based model 
7.8.1 Analytical Outputs 
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Maximum obtainable variant diversity         (§7.4.2): This calculated value is the 
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software compatibility.  Its calculation is defined in equation (7-2). 
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The minimum network size (minimum number of ad hoc devices) to achieve absolute 
maximum diversity         (§5.3.2.3): This is the minimum number of ad hoc devices 
necessary to utilise every possible genotype configuration for one run instance of a 
simulation and is calculated using equation (2-12).  
7.8.2 Simulated Outputs 
Variant Diversity of the network       : This is the measured instantaneous variant 
diversity from the simulation across all devices in the network calculated using the 
Nei diversity index equation (2-8). 
Local Variant Diversity measured by each device     ): This is the measured 
instantaneous variant diversity from the simulation across all local encounters 
stored in the genotype buffer calculated using the Nei diversity index equation (2-8). 
Blacklisting Dynamics     : This is the instantaneously measured number of 
devices that are currently blacklisting variants. 
Virtualisation Dynamics      : This is the instantaneously measured number of 
devices performing VM updates. 
Infection Dynamics     : This is the instantaneously measured number of devices 
infected. 
Resistance to Malware     :  As per the epidemic model, this is the measured 
number of devices that do not become infected at the end of the epidemic. For the 
agent model, with or without recovery mechanisms, this equates to the number of 
devices in the S ǻor SȂǼ state at the end of the epidemic ǻmajor outbreakǼ simulation 
since all devices initially start in the S ǻor SȂǼ state. 
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(7-5) 
Resilience to Malware     : This is the reciprocal of the measured time when the 
number recovered is within 1 of its final value. 
Peak Infection Time      (no recovery): This is the time at which the number 
infected is within 1 of its final value. 
7.8.3 Implication of Outputs 
Optimisation of Diversity: For the agent model optimisation of diversity is 
measured through simulation across a parameter range to either tolerate or mitigate 
a specific attack. Unlike the epidemic model where optimisation can be calculated, 
for the agent model the point of desired tolerance, or mitigation is the measured 
point of the optimised diversity.  
Quality of Service Tolerance     :  This is the measured resistance that will inform  
the Quality of Service for a particular scenario and malware type. When resistance is 
measured over a varying parameter, the value of the parameter at the required    
can be found.  
7.9 Matlab Implementation 
This section provides a brief overview of the Matlab implementation of the 
agent-based diverse system model. 
The initial implementation of the agent model was created as a distributed 
architecture in a modular structure. A frame work has been developed with a user 
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interface to allow further network models, diversity algorithms and attack models 
to be added. The model can be run from the user interface where settings files can 
be created, saved and run, multiple simulations can be run sequentially, and output 
files can be saved or loaded into the display. The model can also be run in batch mode 
where a sequence of tests is left to run in order, each providing input to the main 
GUI window, which is pictured in Figure 7-14. 
 
Figure 7-14 - Main GUI window of the Matlab implementation 
A more abstract and efficient implementation was also created which captured 
the individuality of the devices whilst making use of the software tool in a single 
software program environment to utilise global parameters. For example the 
malware exploit data can be stored as a global variable and matched to genotypes 
individually, producing the same result as if the exploit data had been transmitted, 
received and stored individually. This implementation improved simulation speed 
by an order of magnitude and has been used as the basis for the results. 
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A flow chart describing the implementation flow of the software is given in 
Figure 7-15. Where relevant the individual components are referenced to their 
appropriate section or figure number describing the process in more depth. The 
source code for the Matlab implementation of the models can be found at the 
permanent link: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/98458. 
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Figure 7-15 - Matlab software implementation flow 
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7.10 Summary 
This chapter describes an agent-based simulation approach to a diverse system 
model that, like the epidemic model, has been developed to incorporate software 
diversity and malware at the genetic level of an ad hoc network ecosystem. The 
chapter predominantly describes the design of the model and, unlike the epidemic 
model, the outputs of the agent model are analysed purely through simulation. The 
agent-based diverse system model is comprised of three components; a network 
model, a diversity model, and a malware model. It has been designed with greater 
flexibility than the epidemic based method with the inclusion of dynamic genotype 
configuration, device geographical location, and practical constraints. In the agent 
model, diversity does not remain as a stand-alone security strategy. The dynamic 
approach is exploited through the integration with other security mechanisms such 
as publically available vulnerability data and virtualisation technology to enhance 
its effectiveness. However, it is also capable of simulating the same conditions as the 
epidemic model to allow the comparison of results between diversity methods and 
for the comparison of results where the inclusion of additional mechanisms is made. 
Optimisation of diversity is measured through simulation across a parameter range 
to either tolerate or mitigate a specific attack.  
The development of the agent model provides a simulation framework for 
incorporating biodiversity concepts and algorithms, different network models and 
malware models, and integrating them with other security mechanisms.  In relation 
to the hypothesis, the framework provides a method for analysing how diversity 
can make ad hoc networks more resistant to cyber security attacks. 
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8 Results and Analysis 
Chapter 8 
Results and Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate through mathematical modelling 
and simulation the hypothesis that Incorporating biodiversity within peer-to-peer mobile 
wireless computer networks makes them more resistant to multi-exploit malware 
propagation. This is achieved using the two models developed and detailed in 
chapterȂs Ŝ and ŝ. This chapter is split into two sections: 
Constrained Diverse System Model: Epidemic Based - This section details the results 
of the epidemic based system model (§6). It firstly looks at the susceptibility 
relationship with diversity and malware types, since for the epidemic model, this 
can inform on the extent of the malware attack when there are no recovery 
mechanisms. Secondly it looks at the optimisation of diversity in order to predict 
how much is needed to either tolerate different malware in order to maintain 
Quality of Service, or mitigate malware when recovery mechanisms are present. 
Thirdly it looks at the resistance and resilience outputs of the ad hoc network 
ecosystem to show the relationship with diversity in relation to different types of 
malware attacks. 
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Diverse System Model: Agent-Based- This section details the results of the agent-
based system model (§7). It firstly compares the agent model to the epidemic model 
under the same input conditions, specifically comparing the amount of static 
diversity needed to mitigate different types of malware. The purpose of which is to 
verify functionality of the agent model. Secondly the performances of the dynamic 
algorithms are assessed in reaching the maximum diversity level, both under ideal 
conditions, and when generic constraints are applied. The aim is to compare 
random with intelligent decisions, and compare the maximum achievable diversity 
with the actual diversity achieved. Thirdly the different modes of operation are 
analysed using the random encounter network model, including dynamic diversity 
as a standalone approach, and then with the additional security mechanisms in 
order to assess their beneficial impact. The effect of constraints on resisting the 
different malware types are considered including spatially constraints which are 
analysed using the Random Waypoint (RWP) network model. Unless explicitly 
stated, results are given for the one locus malware and the four locus malware 
configurations which cover the two extreme cases over the range considered. The 
results compare, for example a 4 exploit cross layer malware such as Stuxnet in the 
AND scenario (but in an ad hoc network), with the equivalent OR scenario and with 
malware targeting a single locus (which by its definition, additionally compares 
other epidemic malware models which consider malware and devices as single 
entities (§6.3.2.1). As previously stated susceptibility relationships are important for 
the static diversity case because they directly impact the magnitude of the malware 
attack. Here the implication of other loci configurations are also discussed (§8.2.1). 
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8.2 Constrained Diverse System Model: Epidemic 
Based 
8.2.1 Susceptibility Relationships for Static Diversity 
Devices that are susceptible to a specific instance of malware are at risk from 
being attacked. When diversity remains static for a period of time, so too does the 
susceptibility, allowing epidemic based models to predict the extent of the malware 
attack. The question is whether increasing static diversity can reduce the 
susceptibility of the ad hoc ecosystem, and lower the security risk. 
The answer to this question depends upon several factors including the type of 
malware, the number of exploits and the variants they target, the initial diversity of 
the ad hoc ecosystem, and how diversity is increased (§5.3.2.2). 
8.2.1.1 The One Locus Model with Increasing Variant Diversity 
When the initial diversity is realised from an unequal distribution of software 
variants there are many solutions for increasing diversity from a minimum (single 
variant dominance) to a maximum (evenly distributed variants). Figure 8-1 gives 
two examples for a single locus, equivalent to the one locus model, with a maximum 
of eight possible variants being used (v1 to v8). For both examples, at minimum 
variant diversity ǻȁminȂ columnǼ only one variant is utilised with the highest 
possible frequency. “t maximum variant diversity ǻȁmaxȂ columnǼ all eight variants 
are evenly distributed with identical frequencies. The two examples differ in that 
the first has one dominating variant that becomes less dominant as diversity is 
increased, by use of the other variants in a minimal way, whilst the second example 
maintains an even distribution of variants as more are utilised.  
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Figure 8-1 – Susceptibility relationship with increasing variant diversity 
For the one locus model, the AND and OR malware types are identical and 
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examples, when a malware instance, labelled as A, with one exploit, targets variant 
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becomes utilised as diversity is increased. As more exploits are added to each 
malware instance, more variants become susceptible (e.g. malware A with 2 exploits 
targets variant v1 and v2, and malware B with 2 exploits targets variant v8 and v7, 
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in the case of malware A, or increase susceptibility, as in the case of malware B. This 
result has been seen within natural systems and is explained by the dilution effect 
(§2.2.2.2.3) where increasing diversity dilutes the proportion of susceptible variants, 
and the amplification effect whereby increasing diversity increases the representation 
of susceptible variants. This result is intuitively expected in a static diversity 
scenario and confirms that exploits targeting higher frequency variants result in a 
more susceptible ad hoc ecosystem, and pose a higher security risk. The modelling 
of non-maximally diverse scenarios is not considered by other malware models, but 
it can allow the effects from the diversity of current networks to be analysed in 
response to different malware types, assuming the necessary data can be collected 
for each analysed layer of the software stack (§9.3). 
8.2.1.2 Multiple Loci at Absolute Maximum Diversity 
When a fixed number of software variants are evenly distributed, susceptibility is 
no longer dependent on which variant the malware is targeting at a given locus: The 
malware could target any single variant and the susceptibility would be the same. 
The susceptibility is now dependent upon the malware type and the number of 
exploits targeting the variants at each locus. Two malware types have been defined, 
the logical AND, and the logical OR (§5.3.3). The difference in their susceptibility 
relationships with varying numbers of exploits (exploit richness) for a fixed variant 
richness of 8 is shown in Figure 8-2 (a) and (b) respectively.  The relationships in 
these graphs show the condition of absolute maximum diversity (§5.3.2) where the 
maximum number of unique genotypes are utilised and equally distributed in addition 
to variants at each locus being equally distributed. The relationships follow the 
Chapter 8  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 239 of 357 May 2017  
susceptibility equations for the logical AND and logical OR types (§6.3.2), and allow 
comparisons between multiple loci and the ȁone locus modelȂ (single locus, §6.3.2.1).  
 
Figure 8-2 - Susceptibility relationships at absolute maximum diversity 
For the one locus model the AND and OR relationships are identical where the 
susceptibility increases linearly with the number of exploits until there is an exploit 
for each of the 8 variants. This identical relationship is as expected and was derived 
by equations (6-12) and (6-15). For the AND malware type the susceptibility 
decreases with the number of loci, for a given exploit and variant richness. This is 
because of the nature of the AND relationship where increasing the number of loci 
means additional specific variants need to be present in a single genotype before it 
can be infected by malware, hence reducing the scope of those susceptible. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Variant Richness
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
d
e
v
ic
e
s
 s
u
s
c
e
p
ti
b
le
 (
S
p
)
 
 
1 locus (one locus model)
4 loci OR
1 exploit
at one locus
1 exploit at 
each of the 4
        loci
3 exploits at each
of the 4 loci
12 exploits
at one
 locus
4 exploits
at one
 locus
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 10
-3
Variant Richness
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
d
e
v
ic
e
s
 s
u
s
c
e
p
ti
b
le
 (
S
p
)
 
 
4 loci AND
1 exploit at
each of the
4 loci
3 exploits at
each of the
4 loci
d) One locus model and 4 locus OR malware typec) 4 locus AND malware type
b) OR malware type– up to 4 loci with a variant richness of 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
d
e
v
ic
e
s
 s
u
s
c
e
p
ti
b
le
 (
S
p
)
Exploit Richness
 
 
1 locus (one locus model)
2 loci
3 loci
4 loci
Increasing
loci
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
d
e
v
ic
e
s
 s
u
s
c
e
p
ti
b
le
 (
S
p
)
Exploit Richness
 
 
1 locus (one locus model)
2 loci
3 loci
4 loci
Increasing
loci
a) AND malware type – up to 4 loci with a variant richness of 8
Chapter 8  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 240 of 357 May 2017  
Understanding susceptibility relationships is important because it defines the 
magnitude of the malware attack when there are no recovery mechanisms in place. 
Particularly when considering homogeneous mixing models where devices are 
assumed to make contact with each other at random which forms an underlying 
assumption of the mathematical epidemic model (§4.2.5). When there are recovery 
mechanisms the reproduction number (§4.3.2.5) additionally contributes to the 
extent of the malware attack.   
For a fixed exploit and variant richness (as shown in Figure 8-2 (a)) increasing the 
number of loci in which the AND malware type targets not only reduces the 
susceptibility but the reduction in susceptibility also becomes less. This means that 
in practice it is beneficial from a security perspective to ȁencourageȂ malware to 
ȁhaveȂ to use multiple exploits across layers to infect and propagate, for example 
designing loci divisions that make it difficult for malware to spread using only one 
exploit. Although, the benefit of malware using an increasing number of cross layer 
exploits diminishes. For the OR malware type the susceptibility increases with the 
number of loci, for a given exploit and variant richness. This is because the more 
exploits there are available, which increase with the number of loci in this example, 
the greater number of genotypes there are that will be susceptible, making this type 
of malware a high security risk. However, opposite to the AND scenario, for a fixed 
exploit and variant richness (as shown in Figure 8-2 (b)) increasing the number of 
loci in which the OR malware type targets not only increases the susceptibility but 
this increase diminishes as more cross layer exploits are added. 
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However increasing diversity through variant richness for either of the malware 
types, under absolute maximum diversity conditions, reduces the susceptibility as 
shown in Figure 8-2 (c) and (d). The difference being in the gradients of their 
reduction. For the AND malware type, every increase in variant richness produces a 
large reduction in the proportion of susceptible devices. For an exploit richness of 
one the proportion of devices susceptible becomes very small by the time a variant 
richness of ten is reached. For the OR malware type the reduction is smaller, and 
when the variant richness is large relative to the total number of exploits, the 
susceptibility can be approximated by the one locus model with the same total 
number of exploits (§6.4.4.4.4). As shown by the curves, the equivalent one locus 
model (with the same total number of exploits) has either the same or a higher 
susceptibility, and therefore malware writers with OR capability wishing to inflict 
maximum damage regardless of the variant richness could better do so by targeting 
any single locus with multiple exploits (see Figure 5-6 Malware threat model) rather 
than spreading the exploits across loci.  
8.2.2 Optimum Diversity to Tolerate or Mitigate a Malware 
Attack 
8.2.2.1 Optimisation and Simulation Process 
This section considers how much diversity is needed to tolerate or mitigate a 
specific type of malware attack (§6.4.4). When tolerance      is required to maintain 
a specific QoS for the ad hoc network ecosystem, or mitigation is required to 
prevent a major outbreak (reproduction number     ), the diversity optimisation 
process follows that pictured in Figure 8-3. Firstly the specified constraint is used to 
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calculate the necessary susceptibility      using equations (6-21), (6-23), and (6-28) 
defined in section 6.4.4. The calculated    is then used to determine the diversity in 
terms of the optimum number of variants needed per locus to tolerate or mitigate a 
specific malware attack (§6.4.4.4) using equations (6-32),(6-33) for the AND malware 
and (A-7),(A-8) for the OR malware. To simulate and verify the calculated 
predictions using a malware model, the    value is recalculated using the 
discretised optimum number of variants. This is used to calculate susceptible 
infection rate      and the number of susceptible devices      for input in to the 
malware model. Running the deterministic or stochastic malware model (§4.3.1, 
§6.4.2) can be used to measure peak infection times, resistance or resilience, for 
either optimum diversity conditions, or other specified diversity levels for a specific 
malware attack. 
 
Figure 8-3 - Process for optimising diversity and simulating the malware model 
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8.2.2.2 Tolerance of a Specific Attack with no Recovery (SI) 
When there are no recovery mechanisms, tolerance of a security attack is critical 
in maintaining QoS. It is presumed that high QoS levels are required to maintain 
adequate functioning of an ad hoc ecosystem. However 100% tolerance is likely to 
be difficult to achieve in practice since the susceptibility asymptotically approaches 
zero as the variant richness increases producing diminishing benefits. A tolerance 
below this may be sufficient to maintain an adequate QoS for the network. QoS 
Tolerances of 80%, 90% and 95% are used to compare and determine the required 
diversity in terms of the optimum number of software gene variants at each of the 
four loci to tolerate a specific attack. Capturing the exact tolerance requirement for 
real networks is difficult in the absence of data, or event based simulators which 
have the ability to model lower levels of abstraction such as traffic generation and 
communication protocols (see §9.3.1.2). 
8.2.2.2.1 Optimum Diversity (General) 
In the first instance the general equations are used (§6.4.4.4.1, §6.4.4.4.4) to 
calculate the exact number of variants necessary to tolerate a specific number of 
exploits targeting each of the four loci in the modelled software stack (§5.3.1.3, 
Figure 5-5). A range of exploits are demonstrated for both the AND and OR 
malware types up to a maximum of eight per locus. Table 8-1 shows the exact 
number of exploits used and Figure 8-4 shows the calculated results.  
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Table 8-1 – Specific AND and OR malware examples 
 
The optimum number of variants for the four locus AND and OR malware types 
are computed using the general equation (6-32) and the general approximation 
(because a high tolerance equates to a low   ) equation (6-39) respectively, together 
with the minimisation equation (6-29) (§6.4.4.4) where the first computed optimum 
solution is used as the final result. Optimum diversity results for the AND and OR 
malware types for the three selected tolerance levels are given in Figure 8-4. To 
show the results graphically the total number of exploits used by each malware is 
on the x axis of the graphs. The required number of variants for each locus 
(v1,v2,v3,v4) to tolerate each malware is shown in each vertical set on the graphs as 
numbered. For the AND malware type fewer than 20 variants are needed per locus 
to maintain a QoS Tolerance between 80% and 95% for up to eight exploits at each 
locus. For the OR malware type however, up to 160 variants are needed for an 80% 
tolerance rising to over 600 to maintain a 95% tolerance. 
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Figure 8-4 - Optimum diversity (variants at each locus) to tolerate an attack 
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The advantage of the general method is that there can be several optimum 
solutions from which to choose. This could be particularly useful for the AND 
malware type where there are relations across loci, even for a large number of 
variants. For example if there are an abundance of variants available at one locus, 
but the variants are restricted at another, the QoS could be maintained by allocating 
an alternative valid solution, aiming to comply with the variant restrictions. One 
realistic example could be a limited number of available core OS library variants 
balanced by having a greater number of application service variants (§3.2.1.3). 
8.2.2.2.2 Optimum Diversity (Average) 
In situations when the exact security risk at each locus is not clear, an average 
number of exploits (exploit richness) can instead be specified resulting in a diversity 
optimisation of an average number of variants (variant richness). Here there is only 
one diversity solution and no minimisation is required. The one locus model is 
compared to the four locus genotype model with the AND malware type using the 
variant richness equation (6-33), and the OR malware type using the approximation 
equation (6-40). The results are shown in Figure 8-5 for the three specific    values. 
Results for two and three loci are given in Appendix B. 
The variant richness follows a linear relationship with the exploit richness. The 
non-exact linear relationship for the four locus AND case (Figure 8-5 (c)) is due to 
rounding when calculating an exact integer number of variants. For the AND 
malware type, as more exploits are added across loci (e.g across four loci compared 
to one locus) to propagate the malware and act out its malicious intent, the less 
variant richness is required to achieve the same QoS Tolerance. However the 
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resultant number of unique genotypes is very large as shown in Figure 8-5 (d) and 
hence the minimum network size to achieve the required tolerance, under 
maximum diversity conditions is also very large. For smaller network sizes the 
number of genotypes present will equal the number of devices so that not all of 
those possible genotypes will be utilised. This may alter the susceptibility and hence 
the QoS. For the OR malware type (Figure 8-5 (b)), more variant richness is required 
to achieve the same QoS tolerance, however under approximation conditions 
(§6.4.4.4.4), the variant richness can also be used to define the minimum network 
size which is considerably less than for the AND type. For the one locus model, the 
resultant number of genotypes is the same as the variant richness. 
 
Figure 8-5 - Optimum diversity (variant richness) to tolerate an attack 
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An example of a four locus – four exploit AND malware type is the Stuxnet 
worm (§3.3.4). The worm caused the disruption of a nuclear facility, but closely 
related versions, were later found propagating elsewhere [17]. To tolerate such a 
worm at a network level where 95% of QoS is maintained, only three variants at 
each of the four loci would have been needed. For an equivalent OR malware type, 
such as those generated using exploit kits (§3.3) 80 variants would be needed. 
8.2.2.3 Peak Infection Time with No Recovery (SI) 
For a fixed number of devices    and contact rate                the peak 
infection time    can either be estimated by calculation (for the deterministic model 
§6.4.5.1) for a specified QoS Tolerance    (results given in §8.2.2.3.1) or calculated 
from a specific malware attack with a specified    (results given in §8.2.2.3.2) following 
the process in Figure 8-3. In the first calculation no knowledge of the specific 
malware attack or diversity is used. For a specified   , equation (6-21) is used to 
calculate    and then substituted in equation (6-42) to calculate the peak time   . For 
a more accurate result diversity is firstly optimised for a specific malware attack to 
account for the discrete values needed for the number of variants at each locus 
(§6.4.4). This information is then used to recalculate the susceptibility    for a 
specific attack where the true peak infection times, using equation (6-42), can be 
calculated. 
8.2.2.3.1 Specified QoS Tolerance 
Figure 8-6 (a) shows the calculated time of peak infection for a specified QoS 
Tolerance (80%, 90% and 95%), whilst Figure 8-6 (b) shows the simulated time 
(measured from simulation) for both the deterministic and stochastic SI models. The 
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total network size was made large (20,000) so that even after reduction to those 
susceptible, the simulated network was still considered large. The peak infection 
time parameters are given in Table 8-2. The stochastic simulation was averaged over 
500 runs, with the standard deviation bar as shown. As predicted, the simulated 
deterministic result agrees with the calculated deterministic result. The difference 
between the deterministic and stochastic curves is known as the stochastic lag [228]. 
The higher the specified QoS tolerance the fewer the number of devices that become 
infected overall. Also the time to reach the peak of infection takes longer giving 
more time available to react to the malware if intervention mechanisms such as 
detection or recovery are present.  
 
Figure 8-6 - Calculated and simulated peak infection times 
Table 8-2 – Peak infection time parameters 
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8.2.2.3.2 Specific Malware Attack with QoS Tolerance 
Figure 8-7 show the corresponding calculated peak infection times for the 
optimum variant richness given in Figure 8-5 for the three specified    values. For 
the one locus model and the OR type, the peak infection times in this scenario are 
the same as those calculated and shown in Figure 8-6 (a) since the calculation 
resulted in an integer number of variants for the    values specified, although this 
is not generally the case for all    values.  For the AND malware type there is a 
difference due to both the power terms in the average variant richness equation 
(6-33) and integer rounding. As an example, for the four locus AND type with one 
exploit per locus, the true peak infection time is calculated to be over twelve hours 
for 95% tolerance instead of just under four hours as previously estimated from 
calculation, and thereby lengthening the time window of performance degradation 
and hence increasing the reaction time for intervention. Results for two and three 
loci are given in Appendix B and show similar differences in the peak infection 
times for the AND case. 
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Figure 8-7 - Calculated peak infection times with no recovery 
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specified   . The three critical values of    are calculated and shown in Table 8-3 
using the Bound C equation (6-26). 
Table 8-3 – Critical Rc values for a given QT 
 
Small       values indicate either a low infection rate or a high recovery rate. 
Under this condition, a high proportion of devices can become susceptible whilst 
the QoS is still maintained.  
Optimisation of diversity for a fixed    of 0.8 (80%) with recovery is shown for 
the one locus model (Figure 8-8 (b)), the four locus AND malware type (Figure 
8-8(c)), and the four locus OR malware type (Figure 8-8 (d)). Malware types with up 
to eight exploits at each locus are calculated. Four fixed values of the       ratio are 
used between the upper and lower bounds, where         (bound A) and      (bound B) (§6.4.4.2). For the one locus case as shown in Figure 8-8 (b), the 
required variant richness (    varies between 8 and 40 for 8 exploits. The required 
upper limit of 40 equates to the result when there is a very low recovery rate or a 
high infection rate since this is representative of when        for the non recovery 
scenario. The lower limit of 8 equates to the result where      where all devices 
are susceptible and so the number of variants equates to the minimum number 
imposed to accommodate 8 exploits. This equates to the result when there is a high 
recovery rate or a low infection rate. 
 
QT RC
0.8 (80%) 1.1157
0.9 (90%) 1.0536
0.95(95%) 1.0259
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Figure 8-8 - Optimum diversity to tolerate an attack with recovery. 
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maintain an acceptable QoS. There is therefore a trade off between maintaining QoS, 
the speed of recovery, and the variant richness. 
The ability to recover quickly through patching in a system with diversity will 
depend upon the way in which variants are generated and the way in which 
variants are stored, and maintained. When variants are generated by COTS software 
the total number of different patches required to maintain them will be higher than 
a non-diverse system as there will be more underlying software. When comparing 
patching against malware only however, the same number of different fixes will be 
required in a non-diverse system as a diverse system to recover from the same 
number of different malware. Even if the malware is comprised of multiple exploits, 
each of the targeted vulnerabilities would need to be fixed in the software in both a 
non-diverse and diverse system. In practice however for a non-diverse system 
multiple fixes may be combined into a single patch, but would need to be 
distributed to all devices. For a statically diverse system a smaller number of 
devices would require patching. However the fixes may need to be spread over 
several individual patches to be applied in parallel to different variants at different 
loci. For the AND malware type, recovery would begin the moment the first patch is 
applied due to the dependent relationship across loci. In a dynamically diverse 
system the distribution of patches will depend upon how variants are stored. If 
variants are stored in a globally accessible pool, patches would be applied to the 
pool so that when they are next downloaded the patched versions are retrieved. 
However if variants are stored locally, a single patch would need to be disseminated 
to all devices with the vulnerable variant. When variants are generated using 
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automated techniques, the amount of patching may depend upon the source of the 
vulnerability. If an exploit attacked a single variant where the vulnerability source 
was in the software code then all associated variants may need to be recompiled and 
patched to avoid similar exploits attacking the same vulnerability in different 
variants. If the vulnerability is associated with a single variant, only that would 
need to be patched or replaced. 
8.2.2.5 Mitigation of an Attack with Recovery (SIR) 
To prevent a major outbreak of a specific malware type the reproduction number    must be less than 1, where, using equation (6-28)    must be less than the ratio     . Figure 8-9 shows the relationship in terms of variant richness necessary to 
mitigate an attack for a range of      ratios with varying exploit richness. The one 
locus model is compared to the four locus genotype for both the AND and OR 
malware types. For example, for a      ratio of 0.2, the one locus model would 
require 20 software variants to mitigate a malware attack with 4 exploits. A four 
locus AND malware attack with 4 exploits, each targeting a different locus (exploit 
richness of one) would required a variant richness of 2 to mitigate the attack. A four 
locus OR malware attack with the same exploit richness would require 19 variants. 
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Figure 8-9 - Optimum diversity to mitigate an attack with recovery 
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a densely populated area where there may be many ad hoc devices, the average 
time between successful contacts may therefore be around 10 seconds. With this 
contact rate, the four locus AND malware type would only require a variant 
richness of 6 to mitigate the attack, the one locus model would require 720 variants 
and the four locus OR malware type would require a very large variant richness of 
2,879 before preventing the spread. 
 
Figure 8-10 – Malware mitigation of a practical scenario 
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AND type leading it to span true ȁmulti-lociȂ since the generated genotype 
configurations (assuming they encompass the separate locations at which the 
malware targets) will reduce the susceptibility (§8.2.1.2). Equally there needs to be 
consideration of the OR malware type which increases susceptibility as the number 
of exploits across loci increases (§8.2.1.2). If the granularity and functionality 
definition of the software stack genotypes is ill-considered for potential OR cases, it 
may not improve the security benefit against these types of malware. 
8.2.2.6 Simulated Resistance and Resilience to Mitigate an Attack 
The resistance and resilience outputs of the ad hoc network ecosystem are used 
to show their relationship with diversity in a constrained diverse system model. The 
four locus AND and OR malware types are simulated using the deterministic 
malware model (stochastic results are shown in §8.3.1.2) to measure the resistance 
and resilience properties for mitigating a specific attack. A fixed      ratio of 0.2 is 
used to show the relationship. For example, from inspection of Figure 8-9 (a), 
mitigation of the four locus AND type, with an exploit richness of one should occur 
at a variant richness of two.    values are calculated for a specified diversity and 
malware attack using the process pictured in Figure 8-3.  The diversity is varied 
over a range to include the calculated optimum diversity points given by the          lines in Figure 8-9. The deterministic malware model is run for a fixed 
network size of 1000 devices      with those calculated to be susceptible as    at an 
infection rate of    using equations (6-1),(6-3),(6-4). Both the resistance and resilience 
parameters are measured from the output of the simulations, where 100% resistance 
equates to the point at which there is no malware outbreak. The calculated 
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susceptibility values    for specific AND and OR malware attacks are shown in 
Figure 8-11 (a) and (b) respectively. The dashed lines are representative of an    
value of 1 for an exploit richness of 1, and correspond to the calculated non 
discretised    values. Figure 8-11 (c) and (d) show the simulated number infected 
for the AND and OR malware types, each with one exploit, respectively for above 
and below the      critical threshold. Variant richness values corresponding to      show a clear malware outbreak with devices being infected. Variant richness 
values corresponding to      show the single infection dying away.  
Figure 8-11 (e) and (f) show the simulated resistance from the deterministic 
malware model for the AND and OR malware types respectively by measuring the 
final size of the epidemic simulated and using the resistance equation (6-19) to 
determine the resistance. For each specific malware simulated, as diversity increases 
so too does the resistance, until it asymptotically approaches 100% past the critical 
variant richness value where     . The calculated points for the single exploit case 
are indicated as dashed lines. The result is as expected and matches the variant 
richness values calculated in Figure 8-9. With recovery mechanisms in place 
therefore it is possible to determine from the simulated resistance, the variant 
richness required to mitigate against specific malware types. 
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Figure 8-11 – Simulated resistance and resilience to mitigate an attack 
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Figure 8-11 (g) and (h) show the measured resilience for the OR and AND 
malware types respectively by recording the reciprocal of the time in which the 
number recovered settles to within 1 device of the final value (§6.4.5.2). As diversity 
increases towards the point of mitigation, the resilience actually worsens. The 
reason for this can be explained: As diversity increases, fewer devices are 
susceptible to the malware but the overall density of the devices remains the same. 
This results in the malware taking longer to spread since it will take longer for a 
susceptible device to come into contact with an infected device. Consequently this 
means longer to recover from the point of initial infection (the infection curves 
become shallower and more spread out). This has the result of reducing the 
resilience until it reaches a minimum at the      point. As diversity is increased 
further beyond this point resilience rapidly increases as the malware infection dies 
away faster. This result indicates that for the SIR epidemic model, an increase in 
diversity can either reduce or increase resilience depending upon which side of the      line it sits. However the model assumes that recovery can only occur after 
infection has already taken place, since this is what happens in a biological system 
where the recovery rate indicates the average time in which an individual remains 
unwell before recovering. In a practical computing network patching and antivirus 
updates now tend to occur at regular intervals regardless of whether a device is 
infected and recovery could occur whilst still susceptible potentially changing the 
resilience response to diversity and the point of mitigation and is discussed further 
in future work (§9.3.1.3). 
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8.2.3 Section Summary 
This first section detailed the results of the epidemic based constrained diverse 
system model. Despite its constraints it is able to model some general diversity 
principles in relation to an ad hoc network ecosystem. The OR malware type poses a 
higher security risk over the AND malware type since the more exploits there are 
available, the greater the overall susceptibility. Additionally, malware with multiple 
exploits targeting the same locus is a greater threat than those targeting multiple 
loci with the same number of multiple exploits. Increasing static diversity in terms 
of variant diversity in the ad hoc ecosystem can either increase or decrease 
susceptibility of the devices depending upon which variants the malware is 
targeting and the starting point of diversity in terms of variant frequencies. When 
absolute maximum diversity is already achieved in an ad hoc ecosystem for a fixed 
number of loci and variants, increasing diversity further in terms of variant richness 
reduces the susceptibility and hence the security risk for both the OR and AND 
malware types. 
When there are no recovery measures in place the susceptibility defines how 
resistant the ad hoc ecosystem is since all those susceptible eventually become 
infected with the malware. With no recovery, static diversity can be optimised to 
tolerate a specific type of attack in order to maintain a specified quality of service. 
The process of diversity optimisation can be used to inform the minimum number 
of software gene variants required at each locus of a software stack genotype. The 
general method of diversity optimisation can be used to choose from several 
solutions, which could benefit situations where there are a limited number of 
variants available at one particular locus, such as a limited number of operating 
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system core library variants, and an abundance of variants at another. This could be 
particularly useful for guarding against the AND malware type where there are 
relations across loci. The time taken for the malware to fully spread, denoted as the 
peak infection time, can be calculated from a specified quality of service tolerance or 
a specific type of attack. 
When there are recovery measures in place such as through the release of 
antivirus signatures and software patches it may be possible to have a higher level 
of susceptibility whilst maintaining an adequate quality of service. There is a trade 
off between optimising diversity, maintaining quality of service, and the speed of 
recovery. Additionally, when there is recovery, diversity can be used to not only 
tolerate, but also mitigate against a specific attack. The minimum variant richness is 
calculated to prevent the spread of specific malware types which occurs when the 
reproduction number is less than unity. For the four locus AND malware type, such 
as a Bluetooth version of the Stuxnet worm, mitigation of the attack at the network 
level could have occurred with a variant richness of 6 assuming it could be detected 
and patched within a couple of hours. 
 Ecosystem resistance and resilience can be measured from the malware model 
given a constrained set of input parameters. Resistance to malware increases with 
static diversity, which asymptotically approaches 100% once past the critical 
mitigation point. Simulated resistance can therefore also be used to determine the 
necessary diversity needed to mitigate an attack. Static diversity can both reduce 
and increase resilience depending upon which side of the mitigation point it sits. As 
diversity increases fewer devices are susceptible resulting in the malware taking 
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longer to spread and consequently longer to recover (since the model assumes 
recovery only takes place after an infection), and hence reducing the resilience until 
mitigation occurs. As diversity is increased further beyond this point resilience 
rapidly increases as the malware infection dies away faster.  
8.3 Diverse System Model: Agent-Based 
8.3.1 Constrained Agent System Model as an Epidemic Model 
Firstly, the agent model is constrained by the random encounter (RE) network 
model, static diversity, and the SIR malware model as detailed in chapter 7, and 
compared to the epidemic model by measuring susceptibility and simulating the 
mitigation of the different malware attack types. The purpose is to verify and 
baseline the agent model to allow further comparisons with additional and dynamic 
mechanisms. All simulations are conducted at maximum variant diversity for a 
given number of variants. 
8.3.1.1 Susceptibility Relationships: Agent vs. Epidemic 
The proportion of devices susceptible to a particular malware type within a static 
diversity system of the agent model is compared to that calculated using the 
epidemic model equations (§6.3.2) and is given in Figure 8-12. The initial diversity 
conditions are generated using the static diversity random assignment (§7.5.1), 
which when matched directly with malware gives the initial susceptibility of the 
network. The network was simulated with 1000 nodes over 10 runs (although the 
same accuracy can be achieved with 10 nodes over 1000 runs). The susceptibility 
influences how many and how quickly the devices become infected and the result is 
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generated from the combination of diversity and malware type. For the epidemic 
model only those susceptible are simulated in a malware attack. For the agent 
model, all devices are simulated, however it is necessary to ensure that the number 
susceptible can be adequately represented within the population to achieve an 
accurate result without requiring the full calculated minimum network size (§7.8.1).  
 
Figure 8-12 – Susceptibility: agent model vs. epidemic model 
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is closely aligned to the calculated epidemic model result for the static diversity 
scenario averaged over the 10 runs. 
8.3.1.2 Comparative Mitigation of an Attack 
For the epidemic model, the mitigation point of an attack where 100% resistance 
occurs, for a given exploit richness and malware type can be calculated to determine 
the necessary variant richness and is previously shown in section 8.2.2.5, for fixed      ratios. The constrained agent model behaves as a stochastic epidemic model 
(§7) and so the resistance and resilience output measurements of the deterministic 
example along with the approximation properties of the stochastic SIR (§4.3.3.6) are 
used to predict the measured agent result. As with the deterministic epidemic 
model example a fixed      ratio of 0.2 is used where                    . 
Comparisons are conducted for an exploit richness      of one so that the calculated 
variant richness     , using equations (6-33) and  (A-8), to mitigate an attack under 
absolute maximum diversity (§5.3.2.3) conditions is estimated for the agent result as 
given in Table 8-4. Results from the agent model are shown with an exploit richness 
of one, to focus upon additional aspects that the mathematical model does not 
simulate. Increasing the exploit richness will follow the relationships already shown 
by the mathematical model with the same input conditions (§8.2). 
Table 8-4 - Calculated variant richness to mitigate an attack 
 
Malware type
Exploit 
Richness 
(ER)
Calculated 
mitigation point: 
Variant Richness 
Discrete         
mitigation point: 
Variant Richness (VR)
One locus model 1 5.00 5
4 loci AND 1 1.50 2
4 loci OR 1 18.43 19
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Simulations are conducted with 1000 devices. For the stochastic and agent 
models each data point is averaged over 100 runs. Statistical properties of the output 
simulations are graphically compared, in Figure 8-13 to Figure 8-15, to the 
approximation calculations of the stochastic SIR (§4.3.3.6) to confirm accuracy of the 
results. These properties include the proportion of major outbreaks (Equation 4-41), 
the mean resistance (determined from the mean of the final size – Equation 4-42), 
and the standard deviation (Equation 4-43) of the output distributions over the 
variant richness range of interest. 
8.3.1.2.1 One Locus Model 
The results for the one locus model are given in Figure 8-13 with the compared 
resistance and resilience given in (a) and (b) respectively. The dashed lines represent 
the calculated mitigation point        before rounding to the nearest whole    
number (note for the one locus model      produces an exact    of 5). The 
measured resistance of the simulated agent and stochastic models are derived from 
the mean of the final size of the major outbreak distribution, which is shown for the 
agent model in Figure 8-13 (c) and (d) for two different    values. Figure 8-13 (c) 
shows the result when     . Under this condition      and the minor and 
major outbreak distributions are far apart. The measured proportion of major 
outbreaks for each    of the agent and stochastic models is given in Figure 8-13 (e) 
and is closely comparable to the stochastic approximation calculation ((4-42). The 
infection curves for the simulated outputs are given in Figure 8-13 (f) showing the 
resultant mean of only the major epidemics against the deterministic model. 
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Outputs for          are clearly visible and closely resemble the deterministic 
result. 
As    approaches 1, the minor and major distributions merge together as shown 
in Figure 8-13 (d) for a    of 5 at the calculated mitigation point       , thus 
making it difficult to distinguish the separation between the two distributions. 
When major outbreaks are no longer detected (determined by a specified cut off 
point between the two distributions) only minor outbreaks remain. At this point the 
simulated    is assumed to be the point of malware mitigation. 
Due to the stochastic nature of the modelȂs output around the mitigation point 
major outbreaks may still be occurring: It depends on how close the    point is to 
the mitigation point. In the case of the one locus model the    point of 5 sits exactly 
at the mitigation point. For the agent model some major outbreaks will still occur 
due to the way in which the software variants are assigned randomly from a 
uniform distribution. The measured susceptibility distribution      of the agent 
model at      is shown in Figure 8-13 (h). The calculated    at      is 0.2 
equating to 200 devices. The distribution sits around this point leading to some runs 
with major outbreaks (those above 200 susceptible devices). By the time      only 
minor outbreaks are detected and the resistance for both stochastic and agent 
models is measured as 100%. Both the stochastic and agent models have therefore 
detected the mitigation point to be located at     . 
The resilience measured by both the stochastic and agent models as shown in 
Figure 8-13 (b) reduces with variant richness to a minimum at the mitigation point 
due to the infection taking longer to spread and hence longer to recover before 
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jumping to maximum resilience where no major outbreaks occur. The deterministic 
model however rises comparatively slower as there is no distinction between minor 
and major epidemics, with the infection dying away faster as diversity increases 
(§8.2.2.6). 
8.3.1.2.2 Multiple Loci 
Results for the four locus AND and OR malware types are given in Figure 8-14 
and Figure 8-15 respectively. For the AND result both the agent and stochastic 
models measure the mitigation point correctly as      due to three factors. Firstly, 
the true calculated mitigation point lies under      and is shown by the dashed 
line in Figure 8-14 (a), (b), and (e) so that when      there is already no trace of 
major outbreaks occurring. Secondly, Figure 8-2 of section 8.2.1.2 shows the 
relationship between    and    for the different malware types. The AND malware 
type shows a steep gradient so that when    is increased from 1 to 2 there is a large 
change in    (   shifts from 1 to 0.0625) which corresponds to             . This 
gives the clear simulated result of the mitigation point. Thirdly the approximated 
standard deviation is very small for a low-valued    and so the error will be very 
small over 100 runs. This can be seen in Figure 8-14 (g) where the measured 
standard deviation is very close to the approximated value. 
For the OR result as shown in Figure 8-15 there is a larger difference between the 
measured and calculated result for the opposite reasons to the AND case. The 
steepness of the    versus    gradient at the critical    value of 0.2        is much 
shallower than the AND case and also more shallow than in the one locus model. 
Therefore, several of the    points lie very close to the critical    value with the 
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susceptibility distributions overlapping the mitigation point. The approximated 
standard deviation of the distribution is very large as shown in Figure 8-15 (g), 
causing the minor and major outbreaks to merge together and making it difficult to 
establish a cut off point between the two distributions. This larger standard 
deviation increases the uncertainty of the mitigation point which must then be 
extended to a point where no major outbreaks are detected, which occurs after the 
calculated        point. For the agent model this is measured as       and in 
the stochastic model measured as      . 
In conclusion therefore the constrained agent model is representative of the 
stochastic model, however there may be differences in the measured point of 
mitigation. The stochastic and agent models may show a higher diversity 
requirement to mitigate an attack than the approximated or deterministic result. 
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Figure 8-13 - One locus model: agent vs. stochastic and deterministic 
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Figure 8-14 – Four locus AND malware: agent vs. stochastic and deterministic 
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Figure 8-15 – Four locus OR Malware: agent vs. stochastic and deterministic 
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8.3.2 Dynamic Diversity Performance with the RE Network 
Model 
For the static diversity case modelled by the constrained mode of operation, 
maximum diversity is already achieved through the uniformly distributed pre-
assignment of variants. In a practical ad hoc network diversity may not be pre-
assigned, or the starting condition may have no diversity at all in a worst case 
scenario. In order to achieve maximum diversity and be able to adapt to changing 
information and constraints, diversity is assigned dynamically using continuous 
dynamic updating (§7.6). The performance of the random variant (RV) algorithm, 
which can be seen as an extension to the static case, and the Favourability Score (FS) 
algorithm, which assumes distributed knowledge, in reaching the maximum 
obtainable variant diversity is compared with the random encounter (RE) network 
model (see §8.3.6 for the random waypoint (RWP) network model). 
8.3.2.1 Ideal Scenario 
The maximum variant diversity that can be achieved in an ideal scenario where 
there are no practical constraints is limited by the number of variants and can be 
calculated using equation (7-2). The time taken to achieve this limited maximum 
variant diversity, given a fixed contact rate, from a starting point where all devices 
have the same set of variants and hence genotypes (i.e no diversity), is dependent 
upon how often the devices are updated. Figure 8-16 (a) shows the time evolution of 
the network in reaching maximum diversity for four different update rates (number 
of encounters before an update) when the variant richness     . The linear 
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relationship with time is shown in Figure 8-16 (b) where it tapers towards a point 
when updates are performed at every encounter.   
 
Figure 8-16 - Dynamic diversity performance: random encounters 
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data and will be unrepresentative of local genotype configurations both in terms of 
physical locality and time. A buffer size of 10 is chosen to perform decisions based 
upon the most recently encountered devices and their configurations. For small    
values, which would be likely in practice if commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
software programs are utilised to generate the different variants (§3.2.1.3,3.4.4.6), the 
FS algorithm is faster at reaching maximum diversity. This can be explained by 
considering the initial conditions. When the initial point of diversity is at a 
minimum (all devices have the same dominating variant), the dominating variant 
has an equal probability of being picked again for the RV-E algorithm relative to the 
other variants, whereas it is less likely to be chosen initially by the FS algorithm 
since it is already being used with a high frequency. The probability of picking the 
dominating variant reduces as the variant richness increases hence the time to reach 
maximum diversity in this case is approximately the same for both algorithms. For 
the RV algorithm that is dependent upon time only (RV-T), maximum diversity can 
be reached in one time interval (not shown in the graphs) when the update rate is 
set to one time interval. The fastest way to achieve maximum diversity for the 
distributed algorithm is to perform updates at every successful encounter where 
new genotype information is available. 
8.3.2.2 The Constrained Scenario 
For a generically constrained scenario, the calculated maximum obtainable 
variant diversity (§7.4.2) can no longer be reached, instead the actual diversity 
achieved can be measured and is compared between the RV-E and FS algorithms. A 
generically constrained scenario refers to anything in the ad hoc ecosystem 
Chapter 8  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 277 of 357 May 2017  
constraining the availability of, or reducing the use of variants, and thus limiting the 
variant diversity (§7.4.3). For example those caused by user desirabilities or 
hardware constraints, the blacklisting of variants, or software incompatibilities. 
Constraints are applied to both algorithms such that a proportion of devices (¼ , ½, 
¾) are limited to having a selection choice of the same single variant at a single 
locus such that for the constrained devices they appear to have no diversity between 
them which remains static over time. The remaining devices continue to have a 
choice of all variants.  
Figure 8-16 (d) shows the resultant variant diversity of the network as    is 
varied for a single locus. The differences between the achievable diversity reached 
by the two algorithms can be explained. For lower    values, the FS algorithm can 
obtain a higher diversity since it will avoid using the constrained variant whereas 
the RV algorithm continues to assign the constrained variant using the same 
uniform distribution. This also accounts for the larger difference when more devices 
are constrained. For a large   , there is less difference in achievable diversity 
between the two algorithms, since there are more variants to choose from and the 
likelihood of choosing the constrained variant diminishes. 
In an ideal scenario therefore both the RV and FS dynamic diversity algorithms 
can achieve maximum diversity, with the FS algorithm performing faster with the 
same input conditions. When a realistic scenario is simulated where there are likely 
to be constraints imposed on a proportion of the devices, the distributed FS 
algorithm can have an advantage over the RV algorithm by achieving a higher 
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variant diversity level. The impact of constraints and differences in variant diversity 
on malware propagation is considered in section 8.3.5. 
8.3.3 Malware Attack within an RE Network with Continuous 
Updating 
8.3.3.1 With no Recovery (SI) 
During continuous dynamic updating, the dynamic diversity algorithms aim to 
maximise diversity, and if left, continue to update and maintain the required 
diversity level responding to encounters with other devices and changes in the 
network. Constantly changing configurations can confuse a targeted attacker 
(§3.4.3.4), but its effect on the spread of malware, when configurations are selected 
from a common pool is shown in Figure 8-17. Figure 8-17 (a) shows the averaged 
time evolution of a malware epidemic using the different static and dynamic 
diversity schemes, with the dynamic algorithms using continuous dynamic updates. 
No additional security mechanisms or constraints are used. Under this 
configuration the malware model has two states: S and I, and the FS and RV 
algorithms perform equally following the same curves. The dynamic algorithms are 
compared to both the static case with the same variant richness of five, and the case 
of no diversity. The contact rate is fixed at 0.02, since when there is no recovery, 
there is no reproduction number and varying the contact rate does not change the 
magnitude of the final state, only the speed at which it happens. It is the impact of 
diversity that is the focus, not the changing timescales. The malware epidemic is 
initiated after the dynamic algorithms have reached their maximum diversity level. 
As shown in Figure 8-17 (a), for such a dynamic diversity scheme eventually all 
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devices become infected over time, and this is unlike the static case which protects a 
proportion of devices from becoming infected (for a single malware). The reason 
being is that as devices randomly interact within a closed space, at some point in 
time an infected device will still come into contact with a susceptible device. The 
result of continuous dynamic updating from the same pool of software is that the 
final size of the epidemic is as bad as the non-diverse case so that the resistance is 
zero. However, the infection process is slowed down by dynamic diversity and the 
linear relationship between time and the number of variants is shown in Figure 8-17 
(c) and (d). The time taken for the whole network to become infected is also 
dependent on the contact rate of devices and hence the update rate of genotypes as 
shown in Figure 8-17 (b) since the malware can only spread at the rate of susceptible 
contact. Attempting genotype update rates more often than every encounter has no 
further impact on the network infection time, which can be seen where the RV-T 
(update rate of one time interval) and the RV-E (update rate of one encounter) 
follow the same curve.  
This suggests that although the continuous dynamic mechanism lengthens the 
time taken to reach the peak of infection in comparison to no diversity at all, it 
would be more beneficial to employ static diversity when there are no additional 
security mechanisms in place to minimise the final size of the epidemic. Static 
diversity however can be open to targeted attacks on specific devices if their 
configurations remain fixed and become known for a sufficient amount of time. 
Additionally, devices in reality do not move in random patterns. For example if 
moving devices with common vulnerable variants congregate, malware may spread 
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quickly in these areas when configurations cannot be changed. Thus the optimum 
solution would be to maximise diversity as quickly as possible in a changing 
network and then remain static for as long as possible, particularly during a 
malware epidemic.  The results also suggest that whilst distributed analysis of local 
diversity could be beneficial for maximising network variant diversity in a 
practically constrained scenario (§8.3.2), allowing all devices access to all software 
may not be effective. Restricting software access would not be realistic when 
variants are provided by COTS software programs, however automated software 
generation using the techniques described in section 3.4.2 could be used to locally 
generate variants from established sources with restrictions on their distribution. 
 
Figure 8-17 - Malware epidemic comparing different diversity schemes 
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8.3.3.2 With Recovery (SIR) 
When recovery mechanisms are available to remove malware from infected 
devices and prevent re-infection, diversity can be used to mitigate an attack even 
when performing continuous dynamic updates. In fact, the same mitigation point is 
observed for both static and dynamic diversity as shown in Figure 8-18 for the one 
locus, and Figure 8-19 for the four locus AND and OR malware types. The 
proportion of major outbreaks quickly diminishes to zero past the mitigation point. 
Results are shown for malware with an exploit richness of one.  For    values less 
than the mitigation point, the resistance to the malware can be much less for 
continuous dynamic updating, depending upon the update rate. For the single locus 
case and the OR type it can be seen that the faster the update rate (small number of 
encounters), the lower the resistance, until the      point where the amount of 
variant richness is sufficient to prevent further malware outbreaks. The reduction in 
resistance due to the dynamic algorithms is not apparent for the AND case shown 
since for a    of 1 all devices are susceptible so there is no diversity, and for a    of 
2, the      point has already been surpassed, showing no differences in the 
outcome between static and dynamic diversity.  
Chapter 8  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 282 of 357 May 2017  
 
Figure 8-18 – Malware resistance with recovery – one locus 
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Figure 8-19 – Malware resistance with recovery – AND / OR 
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resistance to malware. A low resistance to malware will lead to a poorer quality of 
service for the network as a whole (§6.4.3.3).  
8.3.4 Malware Attack in an RE Network with Additional 
Mechanisms 
The agent model includes the option to stop updating software stack genotypes 
once variant diversity has been maximised, only resuming the update process if a 
defined trigger occurs (§7.6.4). Thus, effectively becoming equivalent to the static 
case if malware is initiated during the static period. This section considers the effect 
of diversity when additional security mechanisms are present during a malware 
attack within the static period and how this compares to post infection recovery 
mechanisms. The additional security mechanisms include blacklisting (§7.6.3) of 
known vulnerable variants, which is only possible when alternative variants are 
dynamically available, and the effects from the utilisation of a virtualisation platform 
(§7.6.5). The time evolution effects from blacklisting and virtualisation are firstly 
analysed before considering the comparative resistance and epidemic timescales. 
The time evolution of a one locus malware epidemic with blacklisting is shown in 
Figure 8-20 (a) for the FS algorithm.    is fixed at 0.02 as with previous examples, 
and the variant diversity is firstly maximised with a     . The number of devices 
that have stopped updating, and the number that are performing blacklisting are 
measured throughout the simulation and are shown in the graph. After all devices 
in the network have stopped updating malware is then injected into the system. It is 
assumed that at the point of injection, the vulnerability has just been publically 
disclosed and the blacklisting data begins to be disseminated.  
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Figure 8-20 - Malware epidemic with additional mechanisms 
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Malware attacks like this can happen as part of a surge in follow on attacks after 
a zero-day vulnerability has been announced (§3.3.3) and before a patch or antivirus 
signature has yet to be released. On reception of blacklisting information, devices 
restart the genotype update process to enable vulnerable variants to be temporarily 
deselected (§7.6.3) resulting in a drop in the variant diversity of the network. In this 
scenario the act of reducing diversity has made the network less susceptible to a 
specific malware attack by reducing the representation of those with vulnerable 
variants resulting in the dilution effect (§2.2.2.2.3).  
The time evolution of a one locus epidemic with blacklisting plus the additional 
effects from virtualisation (VM update) is shown in Figure 8-20 (b) where an 
infection is removed if it is present during a genotype update cycle. This happens 
during the period of static diversity when a trigger occurs to restart the update 
process such as new vulnerability data becoming available. In the specific time 
evolution shown this has had the effect of the final state of all devices returning to 
or remaining in the susceptible compartment, and in effect recovering the network 
from the epidemic. 
Figure 8-21 (a) shows the comparative relationship between recovery, 
blacklisting, and blacklisting with virtualisation for the one locus model, against 
malware resistance for four values of variant richness     . The recovery and 
blacklisting rates are varied over the same range, with the infection rate      fixed at 
0.02 as in previous examples. Unlike the recovery mechanism, blacklisting does not 
result in minor and major outbreaks (Figure 8-21 (e)), instead it results in a single 
distribution of the final number left in the susceptible state corresponding to the 
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resistance. The reason being is that blacklisting impacts only those still susceptible 
and cannot remove an infection once it is present. Two example distributions at 
different blacklisting rates for      are shown in Figure 8-21 (b) to illustrate this. 
Resistance to malware is measured by the proportion that does not become infected 
(§6.4.3). When virtualisation is included it is measured by firstly counting the 
number of devices that have been infected at least once during the epidemic (since a 
single device may become infected multiple times), and then subtracting this from 
the network size. For all security mechanisms the minimum resistance is dictated by 
the variant richness, since at the lowest rate where the mechanisms do not exist, it is 
only the effects from static diversity that persist. Comparative results show that 
blacklisting is more effective at resisting malware when applied at the same rate. 
This is because recovery mechanisms are applied after infection has already 
occurred and blacklisting can be effective before infection occurs. However, the 
mitigation point is the same for blacklisting as it is for recovery, and occurs when 
the rate increases beyond the rate of new infectives     . So that the point of 
mitigation occurs when          , where    is defined by the malware and 
variant richness (§6.3.2). For dissemination rates of blacklisting below the mitigation 
point, variant richness becomes effective at increasing the resistance. Similar to the 
recovery mechanism, there is a trade off between the speed of dissemination, 
diversity, and resistance. Figure 8-21 (c) shows the effect of blacklisting during 
continuous dynamic updating, where although the resistance against malware is 
very poor for low blacklisting rates, the approach can still very quickly outperform 
the recovery mechanism. 
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Figure 8-21 – Comparative malware resistance with security mechanisms 
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The effect of adding virtualisation marginally increases the resistance, but, as 
stated previously, has the benefit of recovering the network without requiring 
signature based protection or patching. However without these signature or 
patching mechanisms the network is open to a repeat attack from the same 
malware.  
Figure 8-22 shows the comparative resistance and epidemic times for the 
different security mechanisms for the specific one locus, four locus AND, and the 
four locus OR examples. The variant richness is varied for the two dynamic 
algorithms at maximum variant diversity. The contact rate and hence    is fixed at 
0.02, the recovery rate   is fixed at 0.004, resulting in a      ratio of 0.2 as per 
previous examples. The blacklisting rate is fixed at the same rate as the recovery to 
compare resistive performance. For the recovery scenario the end of the epidemic 
time occurs when, after a major outbreak, all devices have recovered and is 
equivalent to the resilience time. During blacklisting, devices that become infected 
before they have received the necessary vulnerability data do not recover and 
therefore the end time of the epidemic occurs when the peak infection occurs. With 
additional virtualisation, and assuming the malware cannot escape outside the VM 
isolation (§7.6.5), individual recovery occurs when a VM is deleted and recreated 
during the update process. The device however does not become immune, only re-
susceptible and therefore the time to the end of the epidemic is measured when the 
infected state reaches a minimum after the initial infection has started (such as that 
shown in Figure 8-20 (b)). When there is no diversity        blacklisting and 
hence VM updating does not occur and therefore devices do not return to the 
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susceptible state, and time in this case is not measured. All times are measured 
when the system is within one of its final value.  
 
Figure 8-22 – Comparative resistance and epidemic times with different malware 
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All dashed lines within Figure 8-22 represent the point of mitigation. For the 
comparatively chosen blacklisting rate (0.004), the resultant resistance is very high 
for all malware types regardless of the variant richness (as can also be seen in Figure 
8-21 (a)). When virtualisation is added to additionally recover those infected 
resistance is increased further and in the scenario simulated has increased the 
resistance against all malware types to 100%. As shown by the graphs in Figure 8-22 
(b), (d) and (f) the additional mechanisms correspondingly reduce the end time of 
the epidemic.  
8.3.5 Malware Attack in an RE Network with Constraints 
This section analyses the effects of diversity on the resistance and resilience to 
malware when different constraints are applied. Firstly the effects of generic 
constraints are considered for both the dynamic algorithms in relation to the 
diversity performance analysed in 8.3.2.2. Secondly the effects of user desirabilities 
and software compatibility on malware resistance and peak infection times are 
considered for the FS diversity algorithm. 
8.3.5.1 Constraints with Single Locus Malware and Recovery 
(SIR) 
Figure 8-23 shows what happens to malware resistance and resilience when the 
generic constraints are applied (§8.3.2.2), where ¼, ½, and ¾ of devices are limited 
to one variant. The resultant variant diversity achieved by the FS and RV algorithms 
for such constraints were previously shown in Figure 8-16 where the FS algorithm is 
able to achieve a higher variant diversity level for small variant richness values. This 
result is reflected in the achieved resistance against malware as shown in Figure 
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8-23 where the FS algorithm is able achieve a higher resistance for small variant 
richness values. For this scenario recovery mechanisms are in place where malware 
mitigation for the one locus model (    ) is indicated by a dashed line in Figure 
8-23 (a). When ¼ are constrained to the same variant the susceptibility becomes                       , where     is fixed at one since there is only one variant 
and     can vary along the variant richness axis. When    is set very large the first 
term approximates zero so that        , meaning that the mitigation susceptibility 
of 0.2 can never be reached. The resistance therefore levels out as variant richness is 
increased, and so too does the resilience as shown in Figure 8-23 (b).  
 
Figure 8-23 – One locus SIR with generic constraints 
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increasing the variant richness of the remaining devices without improving 
recovery times. 
8.3.5.2 FS Constraints with Multi Locus Malware 
The distributed FS algorithm is able to model additional multi-locus constraints 
including user desirabilities and software compatibility across loci (§7.6.2.2). Results 
are shown in Figure 8-24 for the four locus AND and OR malware types when there 
are no additional security mechanisms in place and devices have stopped updating. 
The resistance and peak infection times are shown for four scenarios: 1. Without 
constraints, 2. With user desirability constraints, 3. With software compatibility 
filtering, and 4. With user desirabilities and compatibility filtering.    is fixed at 0.02 
as previous examples. 
User desirability constraints can be set based upon the data from real networks if 
it is available to gain an understanding with regard to their vulnerability to different 
malware types relative to a network with maximum diversity. Here constraints are 
set at the community scale to represent a plausible scenario where a favoured 
variant from each locus has 84% usage, equivalent to a market share held by 
Android during the first quarter of 2016 as reported by Gartner [264]. The remaining 
variants are favoured with equal probability. The malware is set so that the 
favoured variant at each locus is targeted by an exploit. The resultant effect of the 
four locus AND malware type on resistance is shown in Figure 8-24 (a) where it is 
reduced to 0.5 from almost 1 with no constraints, and correspondingly reducing the 
peak infection time as shown in Figure 8-24 (b).  
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Figure 8-24 – Four locus malware with FS algorithm specific constraints (SI) 
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number of variants (greater than one) since the same variants are always susceptible 
by the same percentage, hence giving the flat line. The resultant effect of the four 
locus OR malware type on resistance and peak infection time is shown in Figure 
8-24 (c) and (d) respectively where the four locus OR susceptibility Equation (A-4) 
results in        hence the measured resistance is zero, also with a flat line across 
all variant richness values. 
Software compatibility filtering is constrained such that each OS core library 
variant is compatible with only two variants at each of the other loci. Variants are 
chosen such that the compatible variant number is the same in each of the other loci, 
plus the next one, if it exists, otherwise it is wrapped around as shown in Figure 
8-24 (f). This configuration is representative of software that is dependent upon 
other software at different layers with some overlap that may occur through 
compatibility with closely related versions of the same program. The resultant effect 
is a reduction in the number of genotypes, however the variant diversity remains 
maximised as shown in Figure 8-24 (e) (filtering) since the variants themselves 
remain equally distributed (§5.3.2). As shown in Figure 8-24 (a) the effect of 
compatibility filtering has reduced the resistance against the AND type only when 
user desirabilities are additionally assigned, but interestingly has increased the 
resistance against the OR type as shown in Figure 8-24 (c) when used both stand 
alone and with user desirabilities. This is because the act of forcing only specific 
variants across loci to be compatible introduces an AND relationship in the 
genotypes. For the OR case the resulting reduction in genotypes from filtering 
means that a higher proportion of the genotypes available to use are without a 
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vulnerable variant. For the AND case little difference is seen since there is already 
an AND relationship across the loci, unless the user desirabilities are set, where the 
resistance reduces because a higher proportion of devices (84%) has the vulnerable 
genotype (variant 1 in each locus). This results in the amplification effect (§2.2.2.2.3) 
where the representation of those vulnerable is increased. Although only one 
specific example is given here for compatibility filtering, it highlights its effect on 
constraining genotypes and introducing an AND relationship for the OR malware 
type which could occur for any combination of compatibility filtering across loci, 
although the exact result would vary depending upon the filter applied. 
8.3.6 Dynamic Diversity Performance with the RWP Network 
Model 
For the RWP network model, when devices move around randomly in a closed 
space the resultant diversity and resistance relationships that appear at the network 
level are similar to those of the RE model. This is because the random movement of 
devices results in all devices eventually coming into contact with each other. 
Differences arise in terms of time scales, where for the RWP model, the contact rate 
is determined by several parameters (§7.3.2). Additionally it is possible to introduce 
spatial effects into the RWP model that the RE model cannot analyse. 
For example when generic constraints (¼, ½, and ¾ of devices are constrained to 
the same variant) are applied to a random selection of devices, a similar relationship 
is observed between the RWP as shown in Figure 8-25 (a) and the RE network 
(Figure 8-16 (d) §8.3.2.2) models. Simulations were run with 1000 devices, and a 
fixed FS buffer size of 10 genotypes as per previous results (§8.3.2) where the buffer 
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size represents the most recently encountered devices and their configurations. The 
device selection method chosen is random in range comparative to the RE network 
model, although the selection method does not affect the final variant diversity 
obtained. Updates occurred every encounter once the data buffer was full, together 
with a genotype time out period of 10 seconds and a 1 second genotype data 
transmission window so that the maximum variant diversity was achieved as fast as 
possible. For randomly moving devices, their average speed, transmission range, 
and bounded area does not affect the final variant diversity obtained, only the time 
at which it is achieved. It is difficult to compare the two network models directly 
since the successful contact rate of the RWP model is determined by these additional 
parameters, rather than being specified directly. A fixed wireless transmission range 
of 10m equivalent to a standard Bluetooth connection [3], a bounded area of 600m 
by 600m (the size of a large park, or small campus facility), and an average walking 
speed of 1.4ms-1 was modelled. The mean time to reach maximum diversity when 
there are no constraints was measured for each of the three device selection 
methods (available in range, random in range, nearest in range) as the time required 
to transmit data between devices was varied. The result is shown in Figure 8-25 (b), 
where for high data transmission times the available in range selection method is 
shown to marginally (in this scenario) take longer to reach maximum diversity since 
the devices have to wait longer between communications.  
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Figure 8-25 – Random waypoint variant diversity relationships 
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data was set at two seconds and the devices were limited to a slow walking pace of 
1ms-1. As shown, when the network variant diversity is low, the locally measured 
diversity by the devices is also low, with some devices measuring 0.2, and others 
0.4, with a majority of the devices operating with variant 1. When variant diversity 
of the network is at its maximum level, the local variant diversity measured by each 
device is also at a maximum where in the majority of cases different variants are 
located adjacent to each other. 
 
Figure 8-26 – Dynamic diversity performance: random waypoint 
8.3.7 Spatial Constraints with Multi Locus Malware (RWP) 
As discussed previously the RWP network model can be used to analyse effects 
such as spatial constraints which are likely in a practical ad hoc network. Three 
scenarios are modelled: Malware attacks with 1) no constraints, 2) randomly placed 
generic constraints, and 3) location based generic constraints (room or building). 
The scenarios are simulated and compared for both moving and stationary devices, 
and for single locus, four locus AND, and four locus OR malware types. No 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time (seconds)
V
a
ri
a
n
t 
D
iv
e
rs
it
y
 (
n
e
tw
o
rk
) 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 s
to
p
p
e
d
 u
p
d
a
ti
n
g
 
 
 
Variant Diversity
Stopped updating
maximum obtainable
Local Diversity
1.0
0.8
 
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
1.0
0.8
 
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
5
4
 
3
2
1
5
4
 
3
2
1
Variant number
Variant number
Variant diversity
Variant diversity
Local Variant
Chapter 8  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 300 of 357 May 2017  
additional security mechanisms are applied. Due to simulation times, in the order of 
a day per simulation set, a small network size of 100 devices was modelled with a 
genotype and virus transmission time of 1 second and averaged over 100 runs for 
each data point. 
The two generically constrained scenarios are pictured in Figure 8-27, where (a) 
shows the random assignment of constraints, and (b) shows the location based 
constraints (such a room or office). Constraints are applied such that ¼ of the 
devices are constrained to using the same single variant at each locus, equivalent to 
devices using the same software stack. The location constrained devices are 
bounded spatially to an area ¼ the size of the simulation area, whilst those 
remaining are free to move or be positioned anywhere in the bounded simulation 
space. This could be representative of a work place with devices that have no 
diversity, surrounded by devices that employ the dynamic diversity scheme, some 
of which may also enter the work place and then leave again, for example customers 
visiting a shop, a tourist attraction, or a public service. The network is simulated 
until it becomes maximally diverse and the devices have stopped updating before 
malware is released. The source of malware is modelled so that it is always initiated 
from the device closest to the origin. The resistance to malware is measured, along 
with the peak infection times, and the average distance the malware travelled from 
its origin. 
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Figure 8-27 – Random waypoint constraints 
Results are pictured in Figure 8-28 and Figure 8-29. For moving devices, 
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travelled is skewed by their random movement such that for a single infected 
device, its final location reflects the distance even if it has not infected any other 
devices.  
 
Figure 8-28 – Effects of spatial constraints on malware types – moving devices 
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Figure 8-29 – Effects of spatial constraints on malware types – stationary devices 
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its distance. Room placed constraints result in the least travelled malware with an 
increasing variant richness reducing the distance further, particularly for the AND 
malware type which was reduced to approximately the diagonal length of the room 
indicating it had been spatially contained for only a handful of variants.  
For stationary devices, the transmission range relative to the density and location 
of those susceptible impacts upon the resistance, the peak infection time, and the 
distance malware travels. For small transmission ranges, such as 1m, the malware 
does not travel at all even when there is no diversity since devices are too far apart 
to communicate (not shown). As the transmission range increases, the network 
becomes less resistant and malware travels further on average. When the 
transmission range is set at 10m, the resistance relationship with diversity is 
comparable to the moving case as shown in Figure 8-29 (a) and Figure 8-28 (a). 
However the peak infection times as shown in Figure 8-29 (b) are higher and there is 
a larger difference between the three constrained scenarios. Stationary devices 
therefore can tolerate longer recovery times to achieve the same    mitigation point. 
For stationary devices malware travels the least when there are no constraints (as 
expected), and the most for randomly placed constraints as shown in Figure 8-29 (c). 
Similar to the moving devices result, the four locus AND malware type is shown to 
be confined within the constrained area by relatively few variants. Further increases 
in variant richness will eventually confine the one locus and the four locus OR 
malware types preventing further spatial spread. 
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8.3.8 Section Summary 
This second chapter section detailed the results of the agent-based diverse system 
model. In constrained static diversity mode, the agent model performs as a 
stochastic epidemic model where there may be differences in the measured malware 
mitigation point from the approximated or deterministic result due to the rate of 
change of the variant richness versus susceptibility relationship for specific malware 
types. Static diversity however can lead to targeted attacks on specific devices if 
their configurations remain fixed and become known. Also real devices do not move 
in random patterns and therefore random static assignment of software may not be 
the best distribution for a particular scenario where there may be continuous 
changes in the network topology or influences from constraints.  
Incorporating dynamic diversity allows software stacks to be changed in 
response to network conditions, new information, or to confuse a targeted attacker. 
The fastest way to achieve maximum diversity from a starting point of no diversity 
is to perform update decisions at every successful encounter. The FS algorithm can 
be faster than the RV algorithm at reaching maximum variant diversity for the same 
input conditions, and can also achieve a higher diversity level when practical 
constraints are applied and few variants are available, which may be likely in 
practice. This is reflected in the amount of resistance provided by the two 
algorithms during a malware attack, with the RV algorithm requiring a faster 
recovery rate to achieve the same variant richness mitigation point. If any malware 
type is released during continuous updating of genotypes (from the same pool) 
without security measures, eventually all devices become infected resulting in no 
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resistance. The time to reach the peak infection however in comparison to no 
diversity is lengthened because of dynamic updating which is dependent on either 
reducing the update rate or increasing the variant richness. Without any mechanism 
for recovery the optimum solution to preserve resistance against malware is to 
maximise diversity as quickly as possible and then remain static for as long as 
possible. When recovery mechanisms are applied at a fixed rate, the same 
mitigation point is observed for both static and continuous dynamic diversity for 
each malware type, meaning constantly changing configurations, for example to 
confuse a targeted attacker can be tolerated if the variant richness is high enough. 
Operating with a variant richness that is below the mitigation point may give a 
lower resistance for continuous updating depending upon the malware type and 
relative recovery rate.  
As well as responding to changing network conditions, dynamic diversity allows 
integration with potentially more effective security mechanisms that can be applied 
sooner than antivirus signatures or patching. When compared to recovery 
mechanisms, blacklisting can be more effective at increasing resistance and reducing 
the duration of the epidemic, even at the same rate since it can be applied before an 
infection occurs. Similar to the recovery mechanism there is a trade off between 
dissemination speeds, diversity and resistance. When a virtualisation platform is 
added where infections are removed during blacklisting updates, resistance is 
increased even further. In the scenario simulated this resulted in the mitigation of all 
malware types with an exploit richness of one as soon as a second variant became 
available at each locus. 
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Desirability constraints can be set for the FS algorithm to reflect the diversity of 
real networks. An example has been shown to reflect the market share of the 
currently dominating mobile phone operating system and its impact on the 
resistance to the different malware types comparative to maximum diversity. For an 
84% dominance at each locus of the vulnerable variant, the resistance against the 
four locus AND type is halved, and the resistance against the four locus OR type is 
reduced to zero, rendering any remaining diversity ineffective. Introducing 
software compatibility to reflect problems arising from the use of COTS software as 
diverse variants can result in a reduction of the number of available genotypes, 
whilst maintaining variant diversity. This can have the effect of introducing an 
AND relationship across loci, reducing the number of genotypes with vulnerable 
variants, and increasing the resistance against the OR malware type. For the AND 
malware type there is already an AND relationship so this has little effect, unless the 
genotypes are not equally distributed where the vulnerable genotype has a greater 
representation resulting in the amplification affect and reduced resistance. 
Introducing spatially located constraints modelled by the RWP network model 
can change peak infection times, and the average distance travelled by different 
malware types, in comparison to randomly located constraints. Increasing variant 
richness in the remaining unconstrained network can contain the spread of the 
malware such as preventing its spread beyond a vulnerable office with little 
diversity. Differences in peak infection times however will require differing rates of 
recovery to achieve mitigation of malware for a given variant richness.  
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8.4 Summary 
The results from two different, but closely related, diverse system models have 
been analysed. Under static diversity conditions, and within an ideal scenario, the 
epidemic model can predict the diversity requirement needed to tolerate or mitigate 
specific types of malware attacks. The agent model can simulate the same conditions 
as the epidemic model (albeit with much longer simulation times) and subject to 
some differences in the results due to its stochastic nature. When recovery is 
included it resembles the stochastic epidemic model. Predictions from the epidemic 
model can be used by the agent model to make comparative measures against 
dynamic diversity algorithms, practically constrained scenarios, or the inclusion of 
additional security mechanisms. 
The combined results show that resistance to multi-locus malware within an ad 
hoc network ecosystem can be improved by maximising variant diversity and 
increasing the number of variants at each locus, with the additional effect of 
lengthening the time at which the peak infection is reached. When recovery 
mechanisms are in place there is a trade off between optimising diversity, 
maintaining quality of service or mitigation, and the speed of recovery. The exact 
diversity requirements can be calculated by the epidemic model or simulated by the 
agent model. The multi-locus OR malware type poses a higher security risk than the 
AND malware type and consequently requires considerably more software variants 
to tolerate or mitigate against the malware for the same number of exploits. 
The results confirm the hypothesis (§1.2) that incorporating biodiversity concepts 
within computer networks can make them more resistant to cyber security attacks. 
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When diversity becomes dynamic and integrated with other security mechanisms it 
can become even more effective. When compared to recovery mechanisms for 
example, blacklisting can be more effective at increasing resistance and reducing the 
duration of the epidemic since it can be applied before an infection occurs, helping 
to alleviate surges in attacks from newly disclosed vulnerabilities. 
Simulating constrained scenarios can aid in understanding the impact of 
diversity on current networks, or where practical limitations may affect the 
outcome. Software compatibility, for example, may be beneficial in increasing the 
resistance against the multi-locus OR malware type due to the effect of introducing 
an AND relationship across loci. Spatially located constraints modelled through the 
RWP network model have shown that diversity can be used to contain malware 
outbreaks to local areas, when there is both very little diversity and susceptible 
configurations within these areas. 
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9 Conclusion and Future Work 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is split into two sections. The first section summarises the 
motivation for the work performed, the research carried out, and the conclusions 
from the results and analysis. The second section outlines some practical limitations 
of the models and provides some suggestions for further work. 
9.2 Conclusion 
9.2.1 Motivation 
Motivation behind the work in this thesis has been inspired through a number of 
topics including malware epidemics exasperated through monoculture software 
and criminals responding faster to new vulnerabilities, multiple exploits targeting 
different layers of the software stack, the benefits and relationships of biodiversity 
in natural ecosystems, and future trends in the growth of ad hoc networks and peer-
to-peer connections. 
Although diversity for cyber security is already considered as a beneficial 
mechanism, it has yet to be fully quantified. A diverse system model incorporating 
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ecosystem concepts, the modularity of software stacks, potential diversity enabling 
technologies, and practical constraints, together with cross layer multiple exploit 
malware propagating within ad hoc networks, provides a method for analysing the 
benefits of diversity and how much is required to tolerate or mitigate specific types 
of attacks. In creating the model, metrics for the diversity of computing systems 
have been defined. 
9.2.2 Research 
Using the ecosystem as a framework, together with the mechanisms that link 
biodiversity to functionality, relevant analogies were made to define an ad hoc 
network ecosystem. Although the focus is on ad hoc networks, many of the 
principles described are also applicable to computer networks in general. The 
biodiversity functionality is generated by software and hardware components 
where individualised software stacks are defined as genotypes with multiple loci. 
Some constraints were applied to limit the size of genotypes and focus on software 
gene variation, as oppose to software gene functionality, and incorporate malware 
with cross layer multiple exploits. A threat model has been defined with two types 
of malware: the logical AND and the logical OR, which are representative of 
malware using multiple exploits in different ways to gain entry and propagate 
(chapter 5). The AND and OR types are limited to a single stage logical function, but 
there may be other types of malware exploit relationships such as both OR and 
AND across loci requiring multi-stage logic. However, the AND and OR logical 
functions (together with inversion) form the basic blocks for which all other logical 
functions can be created (see future work §9.3.1.3).The number of loci was limited to 
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four to both represent one function from each of the broad layers of the software 
stack (§3.2.1.3), and to correspond with real malware using up to 4 exploits targeting 
different layers (§3.3.3). This limitation on the number of loci still allows diversity 
and multi-loci malware concepts to be modelled, when there are no dependencies 
between functionality such as lower level libraries, however in practice there would 
be many loci, with differing amounts on different computers with many 
dependencies. 
Two diverse system models have been developed to incorporate software 
diversity and malware at the genetic level utilising the ad hoc network ecosystem 
concept. The first is a constrained system level mathematical model, and the second 
is an agent-based model. 
The constrained diverse system model builds upon the traditional mathematical 
SIR epidemic model and is comprised of a network model, a susceptibility model 
and a malware model. The mathematical approach is constrained by assuming 
homogeneous mixing, static diversity, compatible software functions, and non–
influential users. Despite these constraints some key mathematical results have been 
established to investigate the security protection offered by diversity and how much 
diversity is needed to tolerate or mitigate against specific types of attacks. 
Additionally the mathematical model provides a stepping stone between, and a 
method of comparing, an existing one locus model to the multiple locus method and 
the agent model developed here (chapter 6). 
The agent-based diverse system model is able to simulate the same conditions as 
the epidemic model, but additionally incorporates dynamic genotype configuration 
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which can be based on local interaction, user mobility and practical constraints. The 
dynamic approach is further exploited through the integration with other security 
mechanisms such as publically available vulnerability data, and virtualisation 
technology to enhance its effectiveness. This allows the exploration of dynamic 
diversity and malware propagation beyond the constraints of the epidemic 
approach. The agent-based approach is comprised of a network model, a diversity 
model and a malware model. Optimisation of diversity is measured through 
simulation across a parameter range to either tolerate or mitigate a specific attack. 
Although simulation times are much longer for this model, its development 
provides a simulation framework for incorporating additional biodiversity 
algorithms, network models and malware models, as well as integrating them with 
other security mechanisms as part of an integrated security approach (chapter 7). 
Single measures of diversity in computing systems have been defined in the 
literature, however several metrics are necessary to define diversity at the genetic 
level of computing systems such as ad hoc networks, all of which provide a 
different, but important perspective. The number of software variants at each locus 
of the software stack, termed variant richness when the quantity is the same, 
indicates the amount of variation at the locus level. However it is also necessary to 
understand variant distribution in order to maximise the diversity for a given set of 
variants and hence a measure of variant diversity is needed. The number of variants 
and their distribution determines the number of unique genotypes in the network 
which can be limited by the number of devices. For multiple locus malware, 
maximising the utilisation of the different genotypes keeps susceptibility at a 
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minimum. Outputs from the two models include the two key components of 
ecosystem stability: resistance and resilience (chapter 6 and 7).  
9.2.3 Results and Analysis 
Results from the epidemic and agent models have shown that biodiversity 
applied within a simulated ad hoc network ecosystem can provide tolerance against 
multi-locus malware, or provide improved mitigation when recovery mechanisms 
are in place. This has the overall effect of improving the resistance against such 
attacks and benefiting cyber defence. The exact diversity requirements needed to 
tolerate or mitigate malware can be calculated by the epidemic model or simulated 
by the agent model. Predictions from the epidemic model can additionally be used 
by the agent model to make comparative measures against dynamic diversity 
algorithms, practically constrained scenarios, or the inclusion of additional security 
mechanisms. The results are limited in that they show malware that can only target 
up to four loci in a single targeted attack. In a real system there may be multiple 
malware targeting different combinations of loci with varying dependencies. 
The epidemic model showed that few software variants are needed to drastically 
reduce the susceptibility and increase resistance of the overall network, with 
differences depending upon the type of malware attack. The logical AND malware 
type with multiple exploits spread across layers of the software stack poses the least 
risk and can be tolerated or mitigated with very few software variants. The OR 
malware type poses a higher security risk since the more exploits the malware has 
available, the greater the overall susceptibility. In a practical system therefore it is 
not necessary for every device to have a different software variant installed at every 
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locus to adequately tolerate or mitigate different types of malware. For the epidemic 
model it is possible to quantify through calculation, an optimum diversity, given a 
specified quality of service that will tolerate, or mitigate an attack for the two 
different types of malware. The optimum diversity calculated assumes the diversity 
of the devices remain static (i.e. unchanged) for a period of time equal to or longer 
than the duration of the epidemic. When recovery mechanisms are in place there is a 
trade off between optimising diversity, maintaining quality of service or mitigation, 
and the speed of recovery. The faster the recovery, the higher the tolerated 
susceptibility and hence less diversity is required. Modelling static diversity can 
allow epidemic based models to predict the extent of a malware attack under such 
conditions. Static diversity however can lead to targeted attacks on specific devices. 
Additionally real devices do not move in random patterns and therefore random 
static assignment of software may not be the best distribution for a changing 
network topology with user influences and constraints. 
The flexibility of the agent model allows both static and dynamic diversity to be 
modelled whereby software stacks are able to be dynamically modified in response 
to changing network conditions, new information, or as a response to additional 
security mechanisms. However simulation times are much longer, with large 
networks and a large variant richness or long timescales becoming impractical to 
simulate. The distributed favourability score diversity algorithm can be beneficial 
over the random variant algorithm when there are few variants (likely to occur in 
practice with COTS software) by achieving a higher variant diversity, more quickly 
under the same input conditions and constraints. This is reflected in a higher 
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resistance provided by the distributed algorithm during a malware attack. The 
concept of dynamic diversity is based upon the assumption that it is possible to 
change variants without disrupting the user experience or device operations. It is 
also a mechanism for confusing a targeted attacker regarding existence of 
vulnerabilities at a particular device. In continuous updating mode dynamic 
diversity can linearly extend the peak infection time as the number of variants, or 
the time between updates, increases, but without recovery or intervention 
mechanisms in place the entire network can become infected, when the same set of 
variants are available to every device (e.g. when standard commercial software is 
available as variants). Static diversity therefore is necessary to maintain long term 
resistance in the absence of recovery or intervention. For a dynamic scheme it is 
beneficial to maximise diversity as quickly as possible and then remain static for as 
long as possible. When recovery is available at a fixed rate, the same mitigation 
point, in terms of variant richness, is observed for both static and dynamic diversity 
meaning that constantly changing configurations, for example to confuse a targeted 
attacker, can be tolerated if the variant richness is high enough. When dynamic 
diversity is integrated with other security mechanisms it can become even more 
effective:  In comparison with recovery mechanisms for example, blacklisting can be 
more effective at increasing resistance and reducing the duration of the epidemic, 
even if at the same rate, since it can be applied before an infection occurs helping to 
alleviate surges in attacks from newly disclosed vulnerabilities. Similar to the 
recovery mechanism there is a trade off between dissemination speeds, diversity 
and resistance. When a virtualisation platform is added to allow infections to be 
removed during blacklisting updates, resistance is increased even further. 
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Simulating constrained scenarios can help to understand the diversity impact of 
current networks, or where practical limitations may affect the overall resistive 
outcome of a diversity scheme. Software compatibility for example may be 
beneficial in increasing the resistance against the multi-locus OR malware type due 
to the effect of introducing an AND relationship across loci. Spatially located 
constraints modelled by the RWP network model can change peak infection times in 
comparison to those of a random placement, requiring differing rates of recovery to 
achieve mitigation for a given variant richness. Additionally, increasing the variant 
richness of the unconstrained devices in these scenarios can contain malware 
outbreaks to local areas, such as a vulnerable office, where diversity maybe lower. 
The combined results confirm the hypothesis that incorporating biodiversity 
concepts within ad hoc networks, a form of peer-to-peer mobile wireless network, 
can make them more resistant to cyber security attacks (chapter 8). The 
contributions of the research are listed in §1.3.  
9.3 Future Work 
This section considers a number of parallel avenues that are necessary to take the 
research further including additional functionality, improved modelling 
approaches, real world scenarios, and practical considerations. 
9.3.1 Additional Functionality 
9.3.1.1 Specific to the Mathematical Epidemic Model 
The epidemic model is much faster computationally than the agent model in 
predicting diversity requirements and resistance to different malware types. 
Remaining statically diverse during a malware epidemic has resistive benefits and 
Chapter 9  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 318 of 357 May 2017  
modelling such a scenario can be representative of a time window of a dynamic 
scheme, or a situation where it may not be practical or desirable to keep changing 
software configurations. However the epidemic model is currently limited in terms 
of functionality where the specified contact rate alone defines how quickly the 
malware can spread. In a practical ad hoc network, wireless transmission 
characteristics and the time taken to transfer malware contribute to a successful 
contact. These aspects have been incorporated into the agent-based model on top of 
the random waypoint mobility algorithm, but simulation times are very long. A 
mathematical network model of moving devices has been incorporated into the 
deterministic Bluetooth malware epidemic model previously developed by the 
author [3]. It includes additional states to simulate different malware spreading 
mechanisms. The research focus was on diversity, but a next step for the epidemic 
model would be to integrate these aspects together with diversity, multilayer 
software stacks and logical malware types, as well as the additional security 
mechanisms such as blacklisting and virtualisation to generate a more functional 
and representative mathematical model. Blacklisting can be added through the 
inclusion of an additional state which will have the effect of removing susceptible 
devices causing them to become temporary immune at a specified rate. 
Virtualisation causes feedback from the infected state into the susceptible state, and 
both of these two additional mechanisms will change the dynamical equations of 
the malware model. This will provide results faster than the agent model with the 
benefit of being able to simulate networks with a large variant richness over long 
timescales. 
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9.3.1.2 Specific to the Agent Model 
A benefit of the agent model is in its flexibility to add functionality without the 
requirement to describe the process mathematically meaning additional concepts 
that are difficult or impossible to model using the epidemic method can still be 
incorporated. For example diversity through evolutionary principles (§3.4.3.3) 
alongside multiple and mutating malware, locally generated variants, or limiting 
variant choices at each device rather than allowing selection from a pre-existing 
software pool. This may be feasible when variants are generated as different 
binaries from the same source code. Modelling malware with the potential to attack 
the diversity concept could also be investigated. 
A simple example has been demonstrated in the results to highlight the effect of 
user influence on diversity patterns and hence malware resistance. Collected data of 
computer configurations from a medium sized network could give a more realistic 
insight into the current diversity of software stacks and their variation at different 
layers. This data could be fed into the agent-based model to analyse its current 
resistance to different multi-exploit malware. The concept of blacklisting and 
resetting of software stacks through virtualisation could be integrated with heuristic 
methods used by antivirus software of malware detection to provide a model of 
detection, removal, and temporary immunity. A reflection on the expectation of 
homogeneous mixing within ad hoc networks and whether this is realistic would 
depend upon the scenario under which it is being considered. A market, science 
fair, careers event, conference, or other clearly defined area where devices may 
move around with users could be considered representative. However in many 
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cases particular patterns of mobility may occur, for example people and cars 
travelling along repeated routes. This will alter the assumption of random contact 
into non-random, with some cars or people never coming into local contact with 
each other at all. It should also be noted however that although homogeneous 
mixing is not realistic in many cases it does however form a baseline for which 
many models and research is based. Additionally the random waypoint model has 
the flexibility to be extended to include other geographically shaped areas of interest 
with different spatial effects, or modified to incorporate non-random waypoints 
such as movement patterns of devices travelling between non-random destinations. 
Alternatively the random waypoint algorithm could be replaced with real waypoint 
trace data of mobility patterns providing true movement of devices and resulting in 
more realistic diversity and malware relationships. The modelling approach used to 
represent an ad hoc network has been from a high level abstract perspective. Lower 
levels of abstractions are necessary to capture the true dynamics of an ad hoc 
network and how malware or other types of attack may interfere with operations. It 
would be beneficial to incorporate routing algorithms, traffic generation models and 
emulate true multilayer software stacks using event based simulation. This will 
better inform on the effect of diversity and malware propagation on the measurable 
quality of service parameters such as throughput, latency, and end user impact. For 
the simulation scenarios diversity optimisation results were obtained for QoS 
tolerances between 80% and 95% resulting in a large range in diversity requirement 
(Figure 8-5).  The measurable QoS parameters listed above will aid in the 
assessment of more realistic QoS requirements in order to define the optimal 
diversity necessary. Finally, the agent-based model as currently implemented takes 
Chapter 9  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 321 of 357 May 2017  
a significant time to execute a scenario, in the order of a day to run a small 
simulation set across a parameter range, with even longer times prevailing when the 
random waypoint network model is used. More efficient coding techniques or a 
different language, such as C++, could be used to accelerate processor intensive 
functions. 
9.3.1.3 General Functionality 
Recovery mechanisms integrated into the SIR epidemic model assume antivirus 
or patching occurs after malware infection has already taken place, since this is 
what happens in a biological system where the recovery rate indicates the average 
time in which an individual remains unwell before recovering. In a practical 
computing network patching and antivirus updates now tend to occur at regular 
intervals regardless of whether a device is infected; if a patch is developed in time 
recovery could effectively occur whilst some devices are still susceptible, potentially 
changing the resistance and resilience response to diversity and the point of 
mitigation. Future work could include the modelling of more realistic patching to 
account for regular updates. Additionally, in practice not all users patch their 
software, for example to avoid potential conflicts between components or across a 
network, and so future work could analyse this aspect and include it in the model. 
The way in which malware targets exploits at multiple layers of the software 
stack is defined by the logical AND and OR types applied as a single stage logical 
function. The AND and OR logical functions (together with inversion) form the 
basic blocks for which all other logical functions can be created. The model could be 
extended to include multi stage logic to model more complex malware exploit 
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functions (§5.3.3) or relationships between layers impacting whether software 
becomes vulnerable or not (§5.3.1.3). 
Both diverse system models are limited such that each device can only utilise one 
variant per locus at a time leading to monoploid genotypes. In practice, for some 
users, it may be necessary to have the use of more than one variant from the same 
locus for example if incompatible software programs are used as variants where 
access to different files and data are needed. The models could therefore be 
extended to include multiple variant selections. Finally, the biodiversity concepts 
explored here are also applicable to other types of computer networks, the exact 
mechanisms will differ due to how and when connections are made and differences 
between distributed and centralised architectures. The work focuses on ad hoc 
networks and is bounded by the characteristics of such a topology (which will 
inherently be different to other topologies). Ad hoc networks by themselves, for 
example, do not scale easily due to excessive protocol overhead and tend to be 
limited to small geographical regions. The lack of scale however does not 
necessarily have an adverse impact on the effectiveness of a biodiversity scheme. 
The principle of software variants at different layers of a software stack applies to 
both small and large networks. The physical separation of different ad hoc networks 
may actually prove to be advantageous, by helping to contain malware to localised 
regions. Additionally global connectivity can be achieved through access points to 
the internet such as in the case of mesh networks (§3.2.3) allowing new variants and 
vulnerability data to be accessed. Future work could explore the effects on different 
network models. 
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9.3.2 Practical Considerations 
9.3.2.1 Practical Generation, Dissemination and Storage of 
Variants 
There are  still remaining questions regarding what should be made diverse, for 
example results suggest that only a handful of variants may be necessary at each 
software layer to mitigate against a single exploit four locus AND malware attack 
such as Stuxnet. In this case it may be practically viable to have a small number of 
different software programs available at each stack layer. On the other hand to 
mitigate a four locus OR malware type of attack, several hundred, or even 
thousands of variants may be necessary in which case the automated generation of 
software variants from a limited source of software programs would be required to 
generate the large volumes of variants required. The practicability in disseminating 
and maintaining large volumes of different software variants still needs to be 
addressed. Creation and dissemination methodologies still remain at the concept 
stage within the literature and further practical trials are needed [179]. For example, 
there is suggestion that compiler generated software originating from single source 
code (§3.4.3), potentially conducted within the cloud (§3.2.1.1), could provide the 
necessary functionally equivalent variants when requested by users [110]. Such 
concepts could be embedded within current software download areas, for example 
ȁ“ppȂ stores, requiring no additional user input. This suggests the generation of 
automated variants could be via a centralised source, but the option of generating 
variants locally and dynamically from known good raw software sources has 
largely been unexplored. Within a distributed network such as an ad hoc network it 
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may be advantageous to be able to both download variants at relatively slow 
timescales, and generate or swap in new ones locally on faster timescales to be able 
to adapt to local situations. Generating diversity at the compiler stage is only one 
approach to generating diverse software (§3.4.3), other techniques can be applied 
after distribution such as during installation, loading or program execution [178]. 
These techniques for example could be adopted locally. In practice only a small 
number of variants may be able to be stored locally due to limitations in memory, 
and therefore techniques for local and dynamic generation within ad hoc networks 
would be advantageous. If the concept of blacklisting is to be made viable, fast 
access to alternative variants are necessary such as alternative choices stored locally. 
Results showed that regular changing of genotypes to confuse a targeted attacker 
from the same global pool of software could lead to the entire network becoming 
infected. Additionally, results showed that limiting variant choices through 
compatibility filtering can actually reduce the spread of malware, and therefore 
limiting variant choices by each device and self generation of variants should be 
explored further. When diversity is generated from independent software programs 
it may result in a greater difficulty of maintenance, a larger range in their quality 
since the diverse variants both within and across loci may come from many 
different sources. Even those that do come from the same source such as through 
the diversification of binary files or memory allocation may differ in terms of 
efficiency of resources, and speed. The quality however may only become a problem 
if it starts to noticeably impact the end user. Finally, as with any software 
distribution method, there is the possibility of variants being generated from 
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unauthenticated sources containing hidden malicious code, and careful 
management of distribution is also required. 
9.3.2.2 Security of Genotype Exchange for the Distributed 
Algorithm 
With the distributed favourability score algorithm where genotype information is 
exchanged, careful attention is needed towards the secure sharing of information 
during the communication link set up and the authenticity of the data since ill-
informed genotype information could result in variant choices to the advantage of 
the attacker. As discussed in §7.6.2 In order for the scheme to become practically 
viable both a discovery protocol to determine software variant information, and a 
trust model to authenticate and maintain privacy of the genotype information 
between trustees would need to be developed. 
9.3.2.3 Vulnerability Data and Blacklisting 
Software vulnerability information is currently stored in publically accessible 
databases (§3.4.4.6). In order for blacklisting as described within this thesis to 
become viable, the speed of dissemination will be critical in preventing infections. 
There is a trade off between the speed of blacklisting and variant richness to obtain 
the necessary resistance for the specified malware type. Antivirus companies are 
best placed to assess vulnerability data, and disseminate blacklisting information as 
a precursor to disseminating updated signature databases to detect and block the 
malware. This is because they already have the expertise in understanding the 
vulnerabilities, their perceived threat, and the necessary infrastructure to 
disseminate the data using authentication and integrity checks during downloads. 
Chapter 9  Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 326 of 357 May 2017  
Antivirus companies can already block access to certain websites and terminate 
suspicious activity, and therefore processing vulnerability data would be an 
additional capability integrated into a multi-layered security approach. Careful 
consideration will be necessary to the perceived level of threat since it would be 
undesirable for many variants to be simultaneously blacklisted as this will reduce 
the diversity of the network, increasing the susceptibility to other potential attacks. 
Additionally there may be the need for the recipient to be involved in the 
blacklisting decision process if the inconvenience of an unusable variant out-weighs 
the risk of infection. The automated dissemination of vulnerability information 
could be released as soon as it becomes available and would be more timely than 
the corresponding antivirus signature and software patch, and more importantly 
potentially faster than the response from cyber attackers. 
9.3.2.4 Virtualisation 
Dynamically changing software stacks, or parts of software stacks on devices, 
including through blacklisting can only be viable, if it is physically and succinctly 
possible to do so without affecting the user experience and interrupting network 
operations, such as without having to reboot devices. Virtualisation could 
potentially provide a mechanism for this. Using virtualisation to swap chunks of 
functionally equivalent software in an attempt to confuse a targeted attacker has 
been investigated in the literature (§3.4.3.4) highlighting that the concept is possible. 
However, there are currently practical limitations that need to be overcome before 
virtualisation technology can be fully used for dynamic diversity. For example in 
order for a dynamic strategy to utilise virtualisation, a diversity hypervisor or a 
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hypervisor extension supporting diversity would need to be developed. This would 
need to automate and manage the usage of virtual machines to create, back-up, and 
destroy genotypes on-the-fly and enable security loop holes to be evaded until a 
patch is created. Hiding diversity to maintain an adequate user experience from the 
device requires additional complexity. A possible solution is given in Figure 9-1. 
Although the bulk of the software would be embedded within the VM Genotypes it 
is proposed in the first instance that standard clients together with user selected 
(constrained) software are run on the user VM with what appears to look like 
relevant proxies on a VM Genotype. These clients would use data protocols with 
network traffic such as email, and web access. This would allow client software 
preferred by the user to remain constant whilst allowing the underlying software to 
be made diverse using VM Genotypes. The proxies would carry out additional 
security tasks, above normal servicing requests, such as rendering and recoding of 
the data before returning it back to the client. This would help prevent malicious 
exploits from penetrating through to the client. Development of proxies capable of 
supporting the clients would be complex and made difficult by secure network 
protocols. An alternative solution would be to construct a specific framework of thin 
or zero client [265] software for the biodiversity scheme to replace the standard set 
of clients and provide front ends to common applications such as word processing. 
The thin client would be a translated ȁimageȂ of the software running on the VM, 
similar to those used for cloud computing, except it would be tailored to the user 
and would remain constant unless changed by the user, regardless of the diverse 
software running on the VM genotype. The functionality of the standard client 
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would then be encompassed back into the VM genotype giving more control over 
the diversity of components, with the associated greater security benefits. 
 
Figure 9-1 - Possible virtualisation architecture to support dynamic diversity 
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A Constrained Diverse System Model: Epidemic 
Equation Derivations  
Appendix A 
Constrained Diverse System Model: 
Epidemic Equation Derivations  
A.1 Susceptibility Derivation: Three Locus Logical OR 
Malware Type 
Three Loci: For three independent events the probability OR rule (General 
Addition Rule) can be applied iteratively using the two locus result    . 
                                                     (A-1) 
 
                                                       
                                                                                   
 
And therefore the proportion susceptible    for a three locus network becomes 
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Logical OR type: 
(three loci) 
                                                               
(A-2) 
A.2 Susceptibility Derivation: Four Locus Logical OR 
Malware Type 
Four Loci: For four independent events the probability OR rule (General 
Addition Rule) can be applied iteratively. 
                                                               (A-3)                                                                            
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Therefore the proportion susceptible    for a four locus network 
becomes: 
Logical 
OR type: 
(four loci) 
                                                                                                                                                       
(A-4)  
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A.3 Diversity Optimisation Derivation: Three Locus OR 
Malware Type 
General Equation: 
Using Equation (A-2) for 3 loci where 
                                                                              
                                                                  
(A-5) 
For a given          value, and   ,    can be solved computationally for a range 
of    and    values to find the valid solutions satisfying the minimum variant 
richness     . Where the valid solutions are positive and non imaginary, and must be 
greater than the number of exploits. 
Average Equation: 
Variant Richness (average number of variants for an average number of exploits): 
Assuming the number of exploits and variants are the same in each loci, the 
equation can be simplified to: 
                  (A-6) 
Which can be solved numerically for  . 
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A.4 Diversity Optimisation Derivation: Four Locus OR 
Malware Type 
General Equation: 
Using Equation (A-4)  for 4 loci where 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                                        
(A-7) 
For a given             value, and   ,    can be solved numerically for a range of        and    values to find the valid solutions satisfying the minimum variant 
richness     . Where the valid solutions are positive and non imaginary, and must be 
greater than the number of exploits. 
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Average Equation: 
Variant Richness (average number of variants for an average number of exploits): 
Assuming the number of exploits and variants are the same in each locus, the 
equation can be simplified to: 
                        (A-8) 
Which can be solved numerically for  . 
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B Optimum Diversity and Peak Infection Times for 
Two and Three Loci  
Appendix B 
Optimum Diversity and Peak 
Infection Times for Two and Three 
Loci  
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B.1 AND Malware Type 
 
Appendix Figure B-1 – AND malware type 
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B.2 OR Malware Type 
 
Appendix Figure B-2 – OR malware type 
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Abbreviations 
3G Third Generation 
4G Fourth Generation 
5G Fifth Generation 
ABM Agent-Based Models 
AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc 
API Application Program Interface 
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomisation 
BYOD Bring Your Own Devices 
CODEC COder-DECoder 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
D2D Device-to-Device 
DNA DeoxyriboNucleic Acid 
DNS Domain Name Server 
DSR Data Space Randomisation 
DSU Dynamic Software Updating 
FIFO First-In First-Out 
FS Favourability Score 
GIMP GNU Image Manipulation Program 
GNOME GNU Network Object Model Environment 
GNU GNU's Not Unix! 
GPU Graphics Accelerator Card 
GTK+ Object-oriented GIMP ToolKit 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol 
IoT Internet of Things 
IP Internet Protocol  
ISR Instruction Set Randomisation 
IT Information Technology 
KDE K Desktop Environment 
LTE Long Term Evolution 
LXDE Lightweight X11 Desktop Environment 
M2M Machine to Machine 
MANETs Mobile Ad hoc NETworks 
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output 
MITRE The Mitre Corporation 
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service 
MU Multi-User 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NOP No Operation (computer instruction) 
NVD National Vulnerability Database 
OS Operating System 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PAN Personal Area Network 
End Matter    Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 339 of 357 May 2017  
PC Personal Computer 
PDF Probability Density Function 
PHP PHP Hypertext Preprocessor 
QoS Quality of Service 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification Device 
RE Random Encounter 
RV Random Variant 
RV-T Random Variant – Time 
RV-E Random Variant – Encounter 
RWP Random WayPoint 
SANS SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security (Escal Institute of 
Advanced Technology) 
SEIRD Susceptible Exposed Infected Recovered Dormancy 
SEIRS Susceptible Exposed Infected Recovered Susceptible 
SEIS Susceptible Exposed Infected Susceptible 
SEPTICOX Susceptible Exposed Prevented Treated Infected Contained 
Offline eXposed-offline 
SI Susceptible Infected (epidemic model) 
SIR Susceptible Infected Recovered (epidemic model) 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (email) 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SSH Secure Socket Shell (secure remote login) 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol  
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
VM Virtual Machine 
WiFi Wireless Fidelity 
X11 X window system (protocol version 11) 
XFCE XForms Common Environment 
XOR eXclusive-OR 
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Trademarks 
The following are presented in the text and have, or assert to have, status as 
(registered) trademarks: 
Apache Software Foundation 
Apache® 
Apple Inc. 
Apple®, Cocoa Touch®, iPhone®, Safari® 
BitTorrent, Inc. 
BITTORRENT® 
Bluetooth SIG, Inc. 
Bluetooth® 
Canonical Limited 
U”UNTU™ 
Cisco Systems, Inc. 
iOS® (licensed to Apple Inc.) 
Eclipse Foundation, Inc. 
Eclipse® 
Google Inc. 
Google™, “ndroid™, Gmail™ 
Intel Corporation 
Intel™ 
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Kai Kreuzer (openHAB Foundation e.V) 
OpenHAB® 
Linux Mark Institute 
Linux® 
MathWorks, Inc. 
M“TL“”®, ThingSpeak™ 
Microsoft Corporation 
Internet Explorer™, Microsoft™, Outlook™, Silverlight™, Visual ”asic™, 
Windows™, Visio™ 
MITRE Corporation  
MITRE® 
Mozilla Foundation 
Mozilla®, Firefox® 
MySQL AB 
MySQL® 
Netflix, Inc. 
NETFLIX® 
Opera Software AS 
Opera® 
Oracle Corporation 
Oracle®, Java®, JavaScript™ 
SCALABLE Network Technologies, Inc. 
QualNet® 
End Matter    Ph.D. Thesis 
Jennifer Jackson 342 of 357 May 2017  
Silicon Graphics, Inc. 
OpenGL® 
Software in the Public Interest, Inc. 
Debian® 
Symantec Corporation 
Symantec™ 
Riverbed Technology, Inc. 
OPNET® 
Velcro Industries B.V.  
Velcro® 
Wi-Fi Alliance 
Wi-Fi® 
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